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The Art of Existentialism: 
F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, Norman Mailer, and the  
American Existential Tradition 
 
J’aimé L. Sanders 
 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of my research is to examine the philosophic influences on three 
literary works: F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, Ernest Hemingway’s Death in the 
Afternoon, and Norman Mailer’s An American Dream. Through an investigation of 
biographical, historical, cultural, and textual evidence, I will argue for the influence of 
several European philosophers—Friedrich Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, and Martin 
Heidegger—on these authors and on the structures and messages of their works. I will 
discuss how the specific works I have selected not only reveal each author’s apt 
understanding of the existential-philosophical crises facing the individual in the twentieth 
century, but also reveal these authors’ attempt to disseminate philosophic instruction on 
the “art of living” to their post-war American readers. I will argue that Fitzgerald, 
Hemingway, and Mailer address what they see as the universal philosophical crises of 
their generations in the form of literary art by appropriating and translating the existential 
concerns of existence to American interests and concerns. I will argue that Fitzgerald, 
Hemingway, and Mailer’s emphasis on the individual’s personal responsibility to first 
become self-aware and then to strive to see the world more clearly and truly reflects their 
own sense of responsibility as authors and artists of their generations, a point of view that 
  v
repositions these authors as prophets, seers, healers, so to speak, of their times. Finally, I 
will discuss how, in An American Dream, Mailer builds on the Americanized existential 
foundations laid by Fitzgerald and Hemingway through his explicit invocation of and 
subtle references to the art and ideas of his literary-philosophic predecessors—Fitzgerald 
and Hemingway.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: The Foundations of Existentialism in America 
 
Because F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, and Norman Mailer are writers 
who contributed to the shape of our national identity and our national consciousness, their 
American literary and philosophic roots, as well as the American cultural currents of their 
times, have been extensively explored in their literary art. A point of agreement among 
scholars is that Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer’s contributions to American culture 
reach far beyond their roles as American literary artists—they are not only considered 
vociferous social critics of twentieth-century America, but articulate interpreters of their 
American cultural milieu. Literary works such as The Great Gatsby, Death in the 
Afternoon, and An American Dream stand as testaments to these authors’ engagement 
with and apt understanding of their cultural moments, yet these works also reveal that 
their art takes shape as a vision inspired by the intellectual and philosophic currents of 
their time.  
Scholars have variously argued that the philosophic voices that reverberate in the 
American consciousness—and in the works of Fitzgerald and Hemingway—can be 
attributed to American philosophers such as William James, John Dewey, George 
Santayana, Paul Tillich, and Ralph Waldo Emerson.1 As a result of research focused on 
                                                 
1 See critical works by Ronald Berman and Wright Morris for discussions of American philosophers 
influence on Fitzgerald’s ideas and works.   
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claiming the “Americanness” of Fitzgerald and Hemingway, the influence of the 
European existentialists on the American consciousness and on the works of Fitzgerald 
and Hemingway has received much less critical attention. Mailer’s appropriation of 
European existentialisms, on the other hand, has been the focus of many book-length 
studies, interviews, and articles in the years since Mailer himself claimed that he was 
developing his own brand of existentialism (Adams 4). Yet, what is significant about 
these three authors taken together is not merely the influence of European existentialisms 
on their canon of works, but the depth of the cultural moments they capture in their art in 
works such as The Great Gatsby, Death in the Afternoon, and An American Dream, 
moments that reflect the growing influence of European existentialisms in American 
culture. For Fitzgerald, the historic moment of Gatsby—the postwar Jazz Age—reflects 
the dominant strain of cultural discourse, which focused on the applicability of Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s philosophies of modern civilization and the modern individual to American 
interests and concerns. In Hemingway’s bullfight manifesto Death in the Afternoon, 
Hemingway’s study of death via the Spanish bullfight reflects the philosophic discourse 
of Søren Kierkegaard, a philosopher whose importance to twentieth century thought was 
being recognized in the 1920s and 1930s. In Mailer’s cultural milieu, the applicability of 
Martin Heidegger’s notions of the individual’s struggle for authenticity and the growing 
discourse on the viability of existential psychology as an alternative to psychoanalytic 
approaches to mental health become the subject of Mailer’s analytic of American culture 
in An American Dream. It is through the uniqueness of these authors’ adaptations, 
interpretations, and translations of existential philosophies to American interests and 
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concerns that Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer not only capture their specific 
American cultural moments and crises and put their cultural moments in motion in the 
form of literary art, but they add depth and dimensions to their art through their 
engagement with and espousal of the existential discourses that were gaining currency in 
their cultural moments.  
Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, Hemingway’s Death in the Afternoon, and 
Mailer’s An American Dream were each written during a time when the foundations were 
being laid for the study of existential philosophy in America via Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, 
and Heidegger respectively. In Fitzgerald’s postwar 1920s, American cultural critics and 
intellectuals focused in on Nietzsche’s philosophies of morality and perspectivism and 
attempted to apply Nietzsche’s philosophies on modern subjectivity to modern American 
culture, something Fitzgerald himself addresses in The Great Gatsby. In Hemingway’s 
Death in the Afternoon, although it was written and published just prior to the explosion 
of Kierkegaard translations on the American scene in the early to mid 1930s, Hemingway 
engages with the growing discourse on Kierkegaard’s philosophies of life and death, 
discourses which correlate to postwar American concerns—i.e., how to live in the face of 
literal and existential death. In Mailer’s postwar era, Nietzschean and Kierkegaardian 
existentialisms remained a part of America’s growing discourse on the applicability of 
existentialism to American culture, yet Mailer writes An American Dream at the moment 
existential psychology is replacing the traditional Freudian and Jungian approaches to 
psychoanalysis in America, a moment when Heideggerian philosophy and psychology 
flooded American discourse, a moment Mailer captures in An American Dream. Yet 
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although the specific cultural moments and the specific philosophies each of these 
authors engage with vary, they find common ground in their shared existential vision of 
the dilemmas of and remedies for the modern individual and the modern, “civilized” 
world. 
Like Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer, “The Existentialists” share a similar 
vision of the complications of existence and of living in modern times. Specifically, 
existentialists focus in on the implications of our inherent subjectivity and thus our 
inability to ever achieve a truly objective viewpoint; they focus on the difficulty of 
making choices, decisions, and commitments in the absence of absolute “Truths” and 
objective guides; they focus on our existence as meaning-seeking and self-creating beings 
who must find meaning and value for our lives in spite of the fact that the world in which 
we have been “thrown” is irrational, meaningless, and absurd. Significantly, 
existentialists both build on and answer Naturalism: yes, the world is comprised of brute 
forces beyond our control—political, social, economic, and natural—yet existing 
individuals are not merely animals swept along by urges, impulses, and the basic, 
biological struggle to survive. Existing individuals have the ability to and must strive to 
transcend these forces and create genuine meaning and content for their own lives. In 
short, the existing individual is responsible for developing his/her essence, and although 
there are undeniable biological and social forces that shape the individual, existing 
individuals have the ability to become aware of these forces and choose how they will 
respond to them, or let them shape them, in their everyday lives. Achieving the proper 
perspective through which the individual comes to see self and world more clearly, 
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embracing our freedom to choose what our lives will amount to, and taking responsibility 
for our lives, these are the subjects of Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer’s critiques of 
and remedies for the modern individual and the modern world. Yet, although Fitzgerald, 
Hemingway, and Mailer’s visions are undeniably existential in nature, the specifics of 
their philosophic visions, like those of their existential-philosophic predecessors, greatly 
vary. Thus, it is necessary to trace the reception of Nietzschean, Kierkegaardian, and 
Heideggerian philosophies in America and thus show the specific philosophy and the 
specific philosophic-cultural moments Fitzgerald, Hemingway and Mailer engage with, 
Americanize, and make accessible to their American readers in the form of literary art.    
 
Friedrich Nietzsche: 
The Philosopher-Critic and Prophet in American Discourse 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s introduction to the American scene was marred by early 
misconceptions of and misinterpretations of Nietzsche and his works. The first work to 
appear in English on Nietzsche was Max Nordau’s Entartung, published in English as 
Degeneration in 1895, a best-seller but a “highly contaminated source” of Nietzschean 
thought (Pütz 3). 2 Nordau’s work “summarily claimed Nietzsche’s writings as prime 
exhibits for the diagnosis of rapidly spreading madness and degeneracy” in modern 
European culture (Pütz 3). Although American readers could identify with what Nordau 
presented as Nietzsche’s view of modern civilization as in decline, Nordau’s “raving 
                                                 
2 See William James 1895 “Review of Max Nordau’s ‘Entartung’” and Alfred Hake’s 1896 work 
Degeneration: A Reply to Max Nordau for analyses of Max Nordau’s interpretation of Nietzschean thought.  
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denunciation of all modern art, literature, and thought as indications” of the corruption of 
modern European culture is not, as Nordeau claims, a Nietzschean-based sentiment (Pütz 
3). In addition to Nordeau’s distortion of Nietzschean thought, the first English 
translations of Nietzsche’s works that followed were some of the last works Nietzsche 
wrote and published. In 1896 Thus Spake Zarathustra was the first of Nietzsche’s works 
to be translated into English, followed by the 1896 publication of The Case of Wagner, 
Nietzsche Contra Wagner, The Twilight of the Idols, and The Anti-Christ. The result was 
that the English-speaking world’s picture of Nietzsche and Nietzschean thought was 
“distorted beyond recognition” (Pütz 3).  
Between 1899 and 1908, several studies on Nietzsche aimed to present a more 
accurate picture of Nietzsche and Nietzschean philosophy and addressed the applicability 
of Nietzschean thought to American interests. In 1899, Grace Neal Dolson’s Cornell 
University doctoral dissertation, which was published in 1901 as The Philosophy of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, turned attention to Nietzsche’s moral system and his views on the 
moral relativity inherent in modern civilizations. This early focus on Nietzschean 
morality was in part due to the cultural climate in America, a climate in which Victorian 
values and standards were being reevaluated, questioned, and criticized. Hayes Steilberg 
notes that   
The turmoil of change that overshadows the beginning of the 
twentieth century brought forth an almost panic-stricken insecurity about 
the validity of all accepted values (which was paradoxically accompanied 
by a manic hopefulness regarding the possibility of achieving new values). 
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We need not be surprised that this affected the readings of a philosopher 
who envisioned the modern era as one of a decisive “transvaluation.” 
(258-259) 
Nietzsche’s push for “a transvaluation of values” in the modern world, a concept tied to 
the epistemological shift to modern subjectivity and the rejection of the absolutism of 
Victorian morality and perception, is evident in the early focus on Nietzsche’s moral 
system and the moral relativity he claims persists in all modern civilizations (Mencken 
62, 125). Since the modern world required “a transvaluation of values” and a new 
approach to thinking about morality, the emergence of a new, modern individual who 
could live authentically, so to speak, in the midst of moral, personal, and social relativity, 
was not only a concern of Nietzsche’s, but an concern of Americans who no longer 
identified with the old, bureaucratic values of the nation. As Hays Steilberg notes: 
The dominant strains in the ‘first wave’ of philosophical Nietzsche 
reception in American were, undoubtedly, political and moral: phrased as 
the questions of power and new values. This befits the era. The age of 
modernism responded to the fin de siècle’s paralytic obsession with the 
double burden of hypertrophic historical consciousness and exhausted 
culture by producing a cult of the new man who must…find completely 
new values in order to redefine the human as the superhuman. (259) 
This focus on Nietzschean morality was perpetuated by the first American monograph on 
Nietzsche: H.L. Mencken’s 1908 The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Touted by Hays 
Steilberg as a “remarkable study” and by Edwin Slosson as the “most complete 
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exposition of Nietzschean philosophy,” Mencken’s monograph became a seminal work in 
Nietzsche studies that had not been matched by 1913 or by 1917, the years in which 
Mencken published subsequent editions of this work (Steilberg 20; Slosson 697). 
Manfred Pütz notes that the popularity of Mencken’s monograph was due to the fact that 
Mencken’s “dealings with Nietzsche were rather borderline cases of an intricate mixture 
of literary, philosophical, and popular concerns, which finally made Mencken one of the 
most vociferous Nietzsche-inspired cultural critics of his time” (Putz 6). Mencken’s 
goals, according to Steilberg, were to make Nietzsche’s philosophy accessible, show that 
his philosophy was logical, and show that “Nietzsche had a definite importance for 
current events in America” (243). Manfred Pütz explains: 
Of course, some of the drastically foregrounded issues of the first 
major wave of Nietzsche reception in America bore the stamp of 
genuinely American concerns. One of them aggressively addressed the 
question of Nietzsche’s “Americanness,” an issue that pointed to the 
problematics of whether the philosopher’s ideas could either be seen as 
compatible or as totally incompatible with the whole framework of 
principles, tenets, and suppositions that supplied the basis for a genuinely 
“American creed” constitutive of the encompassing cultural and political 
practices of American society as such. (Pütz 5) 
Because Mencken’s monograph included Mencken’s own explication of Nietzschean 
ideology in terms of “genuinely American concerns,” The Philosophy of Friedrich 
Nietzsche stands as “a landmark of the reception, interpretation, and propagation of 
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Nietzschean ideas in America,” and Mencken stands as “the best-known American 
propagator, if not disciple, of the German philosopher at the beginning of the twentieth 
century” (Pütz 5-6).  
Aside from Mencken’s apt, though not flawless, explication of Nietzschean 
thought, Nietzsche’s sister, Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, attempted to present a more 
accurate picture of Nietzsche to the world when she published a two volume biography of 
her brother called Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches in 1895. Although Forster-Nietzsche’s 
biographical volumes were not translated into English until 1912 and 1915, her volumes 
were cited in newspapers and journal articles well-before the English translations 
appeared (Steilberg 21). Forster-Nietzsche also contributed an “Introduction” to Thomas 
Common’s English translation of Thus Spake Zarathustra in 1909 in which she traces 
“How Zarathustra Came into Being.” Although her narrative focused on clearing away 
misconceptions of Nietzsche’s concept of the Superman, for example, and focused on 
positioning her brother not merely as a philosopher and a social critic but as a poet as 
well, her work has been highly criticized for creating an inaccurate picture of Nietzsche 
and his philosophy (Steilberg 21-22).  
Although Mencken’s and Forster-Nietzsche’s works were flawed, both went a 
long way toward presenting a more comprehensive picture of Nietzsche and his works in 
many respects. Yet, due to the persistence of inadequate English translations of 
Nietzschean thought as well as misinterpretations of Nietzsche, the man, and Nietzschean 
philosophy as a whole, Nietzsche remained a “hotly debated” topic throughout the first 
half of the twentieth century (Pütz 6). According to Hays Steilberg’s assessment of early 
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English studies of Nietzsche, works such as Paul Elmer More’s Nietzsche (1912), 
William August Huassmann’s collection The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche: 
The First Complete and Authorized English Translation (completed in 1913), Paul Carus’ 
Nietzsche and Other Exponents of Individualism (1914), George Santayana’s Egotism in 
German Philosophy (1915), and William Salter’s Nietzsche the Thinker (1917), were all 
individually flawed either in translation or explication, but their existence provides 
insight into Nietzsche’s popularity in the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, as 
early as 1913, Paul Elmore More concludes that “if the number of books written about a 
subject is any proof of interest in it, Nietzsche must have become the most popular of 
authors among Englishmen and Americans” (qtd. in Pütz 12-13).  
 In the beginning of the twentieth century Nietzschean thought was being 
advanced not only through philosophers, theologians, and social critics, but also through 
American literary artists. Writers such as Theodore Dreiser, Jack London, Eugene 
O’Neill, Ezra Pound, and T. S. Eliot, for instance, have been studied for their intimate 
knowledge of and espousal of Nietzschean philosophy in their works.3 Manfred Pütz 
notes that Dreiser and London in particular  
were demonstrably interested in and influenced by Nietzsche, but they 
never played a noticeable role in the raging public debates as sketched 
above. Instead, they turned what intrigued them in Nietzsche’s philosophy 
(of which they had anything but a complete picture) into literature by 
                                                 
3 See Manfred Pütz Nietzsche in American Literature and Thought, Sidney Finkelstein’s Existentialism and 
Alienation in American Literature, and John Killinger’s Hemingway and the Dead Gods for comprehensive 
studies of Nietzsche’s influence on modern and postmodern American literary artisits. 
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weaving their reflections on certain Nietzschean ideas that fascinated them 
into the very texture of their novels. (Pütz 6) 
Additionally, scholars such as David Ullrich argue for Nietzsche’s influence on 
Fitzgerald’s formation of his own “complex philosophy of culture,” a philosophy Ullrich 
traces to the influence of Nietzschean philosophy on Fitzgerald’s early short stories and 
novels (“Memorials” 2). In Existentialism and Alienation in American Literature, Sidney 
Finkelstein explicates the Nietzschean influence on Fitzgerald’s short story “The 
Diamond as Big as the Ritz,” and both Ronald Berman’s The Great Gatsby and 
Fitzgerald’s World of Ideas and Olaf Hansen’s “Stanley Cavell Reading Nietzsche 
Reading Emerson” note differing aspects of The Great Gatsby they see as influenced by 
Nietzschean thought (Finkelstein 293; Berman 9; Hansen 293-294). Although scholarship 
that traces the influence of Nietzsche on Fitzgerald’s canon of works is certainly not 
lacking, studies of The Great Gatsby as a Nietzschean-inspired vision of the philosophic 
dilemmas of American culture and American identity remains to be examined. 
 
Søren Kierkegaard: 
 The Philosopher-Critic and Prophet in American Discourse 
 
Although Søren Kierkegaard’s influence in America took hold well after 
Nietzsche had been a “hotly debated” topic for decades in American culture, discourse on 
Kierkegaard and Kierkegaardian thought began in American theological and 
philosophical societies in the early twentieth-century (Pütz 6). According to Kierkegaard 
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scholars Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Kierkegaard’s theological and 
philosophical importance was recognized first by the Swedes and the Germans as early as 
the middle of the nineteenth-century, and then by the French before the turn of the 
twentieth century.4 The Hong and Hong Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf’s Lutheran 
College houses the first critical articles and translations of Kierkegaard’s work in English 
dating as far back as Adolf Hult’s 1906 study Søren Kierkegaard in His Life and 
Literature and Francis Fulford’s 1911 study Søren Aabye Kierkegaard: A Study. By 1916 
David F. Swenson, who later became one of the most notable Kierkegaard scholars of the 
early twentieth century, had presented and published “The Anti-Intellectualism of 
Kierkegaard” in which he praised the accessibility of Kierkegaard’s writing and 
illustrations and provided a brief explication of Kierkegaard’s views on the formation of 
the personality. But, the first selections of Kierkegaard’s writings that were translated 
into English did not appear until 1923 when L.M. Hollander, an adjunct professor of 
Germanic languages at the University of Texas, published his translations under the title 
Selections from the Writings of Kierkegaard.  Hollander’s translated selections were from 
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, “Diapsalmata” (from Either-Or, Part I), “The 
Banquet” (from Stages on Life's Road, Part I), Preparation for a Christian Life, and The 
Present Moment. Since Hollander’s translations of Kierkegaard were part of Hollander’s 
study of Scandinavian literature, he introduced Kierkegaard to the English-speaking 
world as a literary figure instead of a philosopher and provided very little explication of 
Kierkegaardian thought in his “Introduction” to his Selections. David Swenson, on the 
other hand, was actively investigating the philosophical and theological implications of 
                                                 
4 See Victor Deleuran’s 1897 dissertation “Esquisse d'une Étude sur Soeren Kierkegaard.” 
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Kierkegaard’s writings throughout the first quarter of the twentieth-century, and he 
continued to translate, explicate, and give lectures on Kierkegaard and Kierkegaardian 
thought until his death in 1940.5 Yet it was not until the 1930s with the explosion of 
translations of Kierkegaard’s writings into English that Kierkegaard began to be viewed 
by the English-speaking world as one of the premier existentialists of the nineteenth-
century and began to gain more wide-spread attention as an important voice in twentieth 
century philosophy and religious studies. 
 From the foundations laid by German and French translations of Kierkegaard’s 
writings before the turn of the century and the early discourse in English on Kierkegaard 
and Kierkegaardian thought, by the 1930s the demand for translations of Kierkegaard’s 
writings in English-speaking world began to be satisfied. Interest in Kierkegaard is 
evident in the sheer number of and types of studies published in the 1930s. E.L. Allen’s 
semi-biographical study titled Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought appeared in 1930. 
Studies such as John Bain’s Søren Kierkegaard, His Life and Religious Teaching (1935), 
Theodor Haecker and Alexander Dru’s study Søren Kierkegaard (1937), Walter Lowrie’s 
study Kierkegaard (1938), and Melville Chaning-Pearce’s study The Terrible Crystal: 
Studies in Kierkegaard and Modern Christianity (1941) engaged with the existing 
discourse on Kierkegaard’s life and writings and offered new insights into his writing and 
thought. Eduard Geismar’s collection of 1936 lectures on Kierkegaard entitled Lectures 
on the Religious Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, appeared in print in 1937 with an 
                                                 
5 David Swenson’s lectures and addresses on Kierkegaard, collected and published posthumously by his 
wife Lillian Swenson, spanned the years 1927 through 1936. See Something about Kierkegaard (1941) and 
Kierkegaardian Philosophy in the Faith of a Scholar (1949), which are collections of Swenson's 
philosophical talks on Kierkegaard’s writings. 
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introduction by translator David Swenson. Swenson’s own addresses and lectures on 
Kierkegaardian thought dating from 1927 to 1936 were published posthumously by his 
wife in 1941 and 1949 under the titles Something About Kierkegaard and Kierkegaardian 
Philosophy in the Faith of a Scholar. As for the influx of English translations of 
Kierkegaard’s works, translations of Diary of a Seducer and Philosophical Fragments; or 
a Fragment of Philosophy by Johannes Climacus were published in 1932 and 1936 
respectively. Posthumously published translations by Swenson, again edited and 
compiled by his wife, such as Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life, Three 
Discourses of Imagined Occasions and Concluding Unscientific Postscript appeared in 
1941, the same year Walter Lowrie published his translation of Repetition under the title 
Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology. 6 Otto Kraushaar notes that the influx 
of English language translations by David F. Swenson, Walter Lowrie, and Alexander 
Dru in the 1930s and early 1940s “marks a philosophical and literary event of the first 
magnitude” and marks a shift from Kierkegaard’s influence in theological, philosophical, 
intellectual, academic and literary circles to his instatement in American universities and 
as an emerging subject in American cultural discourse (563). Although German 
theologians, philosophers, and academics had been touting Kierkegaard as “one of the 
seminal minds of the nineteenth century” for decades, in America, England, France, and 
Spain Kierkegaard’s importance was just beginning to be recognized in the first quarter 
                                                 
6 Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions contains the selection “At the Side of a Grave,” which is a 
discourse on the earnest thought of one’s own death. Although this English-language translation did not 
appear until 1941, since it was posthumously edited and published by Swenson’s wife Lillian, it is unclear 
when Swenson began translating this work. It is important here to note that the Germans enjoyed 
translations of Kierkegaard’s “Discourses” as early as 1922. Since much of the early discourse in the 
English-speaking world relied on German translations of Kierkegaard (including Swenson’s early readings 
of Kierkegaard), Theodor Haecker’s translation of Kierkegaard’s discourses entitled Religiöse Reden is 
worth mentioning. 
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of the twentieth century (Kraushaar 562). Aside from the cultural discourse on 
Kierkegaard in French and Spanish, The Diary of a Seducer (Le Journal du Seducteur) 
and The Sickness unto Death (Traite du Désespoir (La Maladie Mortelle)) were 
translated into French in 1929 and 1932 respectively, and in Spain The Concept of Dread 
(El Concepto de la Angustia) and “Displamata” (from Either/Or Part I) appeared in 
translation in 1930 and 1931. Although the English, French, and Spanish speaking worlds 
only had a few of their own translations of Kierkegaard’s writings by 1932, a handful of 
seminal book-length studies, master’s theses, PhD dissertations, and articles appearing in 
journals provides evidence that their was already significant literary, cultural, and 
academic discourse on Kierkegaard world-wide7.  
 In part due to America’s consuming interest in Nietzsche in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century, and in part due to the limited amount of English-speaking scholars 
qualified to translate Danish, Kierkegaard did not “inundate the fields of philosophy, 
theology, and criticism,” as Otto F. Kraushaar notes, until the 1930s and 1940s. 
Kraushaar writes: 
bolstered by the influence of Jaspers and Barth, as well as the enthusiasm 
of torch-bearing American students returning from German universities in 
the ‘twenties and early ‘thirties, and the recent influx into American and 
English universities of German refugee scholars, the name of Kierkegaard 
                                                 
7 The mention of the reception of Kierkegaard’s works in France and Spain is pertinent to this study due to 
Hemingway’s fluency in both French and Spanish. Since the French, as Hong and Hong correctly note, 
recognized the importance of Kierkegaard’s writing much earlier than the English-speaking world, early 
studies of Kierkegaard in France deserve mention. See in particular Victor Deleuran’s dissertation Esquisse 
d'une Étude sur Soren Kierkegaard (1897), Raoul Hoffmann’s Kierkegaard et la Certitude Religieuse: 
Esquissse Biographique et Critique (1907), Maurice Blondel’s Études sur Pascal (1923), and Eduard 
Geismar’s La Victoire sur le Doute Chez Sören Kierkegaard (1926). 
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was given some currency in the conversations and writings of American 
philosophers. In the meantime, Kierkegaard’s thoughts were being 
introduced into the literary world by Franz Kaffka and W. H. Auden and 
contributors to some of the advanced literary reviews. (Kraushaar 562) 
Like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard’s writings and thought attracted the attention of literary 
artists world-wide. As early as 1900, Kierkegaard’s literariness as well as his influence 
on the literary world was recognized. Early academic endeavors include Clyde Charles 
Holler’s Boston University Dissertation Kierkegaard's Concept of Tragedy in the Context 
of his Pseudonymous Works (1900) and Einar Wulfsberg Anderson Master’s thesis  
The Influence of Kierkegaard's Philosophy on the Works of Henrik Ibsen (1926). In 
addition, articles such as Edwin Muir’s "A Note on Franz Kafka" (1931), which focuses 
on the spiritual qualities of Kafka's work as Kierkegaardian, began to appear in the pages 
of literary journals.  
 In respect to Kierkegaard’s influence on the writing and thought of Ernest 
Hemingway, critical studies on this influence did not begin in the English-speaking world 
until the 1960s. The most notable of these studies, although it does not focus exclusively 
on Kierkegaardian philosophy, is John Killinger’s Hemingway and the Dead Gods 
(1960). Yet, just as the importance of Kierkegaard was recognized by the English-
speaking world more than fifty years after Germans began studying Kierkegaard, 
scholarship tracing the influence of Kierkegaard on modern American and English 
writers was almost fifty years behind as well. Works by German scholars such as Wayne 
Kvam not only trace the critical reception of Hemingway’s works in Germany after 
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World War I, but he and other scholars attribute some of Hemingway’s early popularity 
in Germany to his articulation of existentialisms, Kierkegaardianism included. Although I 
have yet to find direct evidence in Hemingway’s letters, manuscripts, or reading 
collection that proves Kierkegaard’s influence on Hemingway, the cultural discourse on 
Kierkegaard in the years leading up to Hemingway’s publication of Death in the 
Afternoon, as well as the text itself, tells an entirely different story.8  
 
Martin Heidegger:  
The Philosopher-Critic and Prophet in American Discourse 
 
 Although existential psychology was not widely known or practiced in America 
until the middle and late twentieth-century, both practical and theoretical existential 
therapies were being developed in Europe during the first half of the twentieth-century. 
For example, Martin Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological approach to “authentic” 
being discussed in his work Being and Time (1927) influenced a group of Swiss 
therapists who sought alternatives to Freudian psychoanalytic theories and treatments for 
psychological concerns and disorders. Psychiatrist Hans Cohn notes in his book 
Heidegger and the Roots of Existential Therapy that “this was the first attempt to develop 
a method of psychotherapy from “‘existential’ roots” (Cohn xviii). Swiss therapists 
                                                 
8 Kierkegaard’s influence on Hemingway may have been indirect, but it is an influence that is evident 
throughout Hemingway’s study of death in Death in the Afternoon. It is likely that if Hemingway did not 
personally read translations of Kierkegaard’s writings, he was introduced to Kierkegaardian philosophy 
through Swenson or Hollander, through the works and critical studies of Kafka and Ibsen, and/or through 
the dominant strain of intellectual, literary, and artistic discourse on Kierkegaard in the 1910s, 20s, and 
early 30s.  
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turned to Heidegger’s philosophies of existence and created a new approach to therapy 
that eventually became known as Daseinsanalyse. 9 Although this approach was in the 
process of being developed before it was dubbed Daseinsanalyse in 1941, it was not until 
Heidegger became personally and actively involved in the development of this approach 
from 1959 to 1969 that Daseinsanalyse began to replace more traditional approaches to 
psychiatry world-wide. Cohn notes that “Heidegger played an active part in contributing 
to the first model of an existentially oriented psychotherapy” by teaching 
psychotherapists and psychiatrists his view of the world and “its potential relevance to 
their work” (xviii, 5).  
The institutionalization of Heideggerian philosophy in America is marked by the 
explosion of cultural discourse on Heidegger and Heideggerian-based Daseinsanalysis in 
1950s and 1960s America, most notably during the years that Heidegger formed 
friendships with founding members of Daseinsanalysis, Medard Boss, Gion Condrau, 
and Ludwig Binswanger. Although Binswanger stopped working with Boss and Condrau 
in 1957, Boss and Condrau continued to develop Daseinsanalysis as an alternative 
therapy to Freudian and Jungian approaches to mental rehabilitation.10 Yet aside from 
Boss’ school of Heideggerian-inspired Daseinsanalysis and Binswanger’s school, which 
was a mixture of Freudian, Jungian, and Heideggerian approaches to psychology, several 
                                                 
9 The main distinctions between Heideggerian-based existential psychology and the prevailing trends in the 
psychology of the times are two-fold: 1) where the traditional Freudian approach to psychology, for 
example, is a psychoanalysis in which the psychoanalyst in an integral part of the process, existential 
psychology is a psychotherapy that emphasizes the importance of continual self-analysis; 2) existential 
psychotherapy focuses in on the individual’s recognition of his/her absorption in the social world in which 
identity is shaped and individual expression is thwarted, where psychoanalysis promotes normalizing the 
patient according to what is viewed as acceptable (in terms of identity, behavior, and choices for one’s life, 
for example) in the everyday social world.  
10 Due to Boss’ publication of a critique of Binswanger’s approach to existential psychology, Binswanger 
left the group and continued to formulate his own existential approaches to psychology.   
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other existential approaches to psychology emerged in the 1950s. For example, Viktor 
Frankl’s analysis of existence, Existenzanalyse, and Jean-Paul Sartre’s existential 
psychoanalysis, psychoanalyse existentielle, were also being developed and sought to 
institute a phenomenological approach to mental health. Thus, not only was 
Daseinsanalysis gaining currency world-wide as late as the 1950s, but a new field of 
psychology—existential psychology—was actively being developed and debated.  
American discourse on existential-phenomenological approaches to mental health 
began to inundate the field of psychology as early as 1950. Early English language 
studies of the developing field of existential psychology include Werner Wolff’s book-
length study Values and Personality: An Existential Psychology of Crisis (1950), Adrian 
Van Kaam’s study of the differing approaches to existential therapy in his collection The 
Phenomenological-Existential Trends in Psychology: A Series of Papers, published in the 
1950s, and Ulrich Sonnemann’s Existence and Therapy: An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Psychology and Existential Analysis (1954). Articles such as Stephan 
Strasser’s “Phenomenological Trends in European Psychology,” which appeared in the 
journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 1957, and Maurice Freidman’s  
“Existential Psychotherapy and the Image of Man” originally published in Commentary 
in 1959 and reprinted several times between 1959 and 1964, illustrate the English-
speaking world’s growing interest in existential psychology. In 1958, two of the major 
voices in existential psychology, Rollo May and Medard Boss, published book-length 
studies under the titles Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology and 
The Analysis of Dreams respectively. Boss’ study is significant in that he presented his 
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Heideggerian-based approach to dream analysis as an alternative to the Freudian and 
Jungian approaches that dominated the field of psychology at this time.  
American interest in existential psychological approaches to mental health 
drastically increased throughout the 1950s, yet the number of English language book-
length studies in the beginning years of the 1960s alone more than doubled. In 1960, 
Adrian Van Kaam published another study on the field of existential psychology entitled 
The Third Force in European Psychology: Its Expression in a Theory of Psychotherapy, 
the same year Paul Tillich published Existentialism and Psychotherapy. In 1961, Rudolf 
Aller’s collection of lectures Existentialism and Psychiatry: Four Lectures was published 
the same year Rollo May contributed to and edited another collection under the title 
Existential Psychology. Yet the most significant publication of 1961 came in the form of 
a periodical published by the Association of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry under 
the title Review of Existential Psychology & Psychiatry. Thus, existential psychology was 
not only recognized a valid, emerging field of psychology, but one important enough to 
dedicate a journal to. In 1962, the most significant publications in the field came in the 
form of taped lectures and conferences. Abraham Maslow and Rollo May’s joint lectures, 
catalogued as dialogues on existential psychology, were published as audio tapes entitled 
“Existential Psychology I” and “Existential Psychology II.” In addition, the Proceedings 
from The Sonoma State College Conference on Existential Psychology and 
Psychotherapy were released on audio tape—eight tapes to be precise. In 1963, Medard 
Boss’ study entitled Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis was translated into English by 
Ludwig Lefebre, the same year Boss’ estranged colleague Ludwig Binswanger’s papers 
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were translated by Jacob Needleman under the title Being-in-the-world; Selected Papers 
of Ludwig Binswanger. Also published in 1963 was James Bugental’s study Existential-
analytic Psychotherapy, followed by a 1964 translation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s The 
Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the 
Philosophy of Art, History, and Politics. The influx of translations in the early 1960s 
provides evidence that the field of existential psychology was not only gaining a strong 
foothold in the English-speaking world, but that researchers and practicing therapists 
alike were debating differing ways to approach mental health phenomenologically, i.e. 
existentially.   
Although differing schools of existential psychology began to emerge in the 
1950s and 1960s, due to the translation of Heidegger’s Being and Time into English in 
1962 and Heidegger’s direct involvement with formulating and fine-tuning 
Daseinsanalysis, his version of existential psychology received a great amount of 
attention in the world of psychology.11 In literature there are no Heideggerian 
connections to my knowledge until decades after existential psychology inundated the 
fields of philosophy and psychology world-wide. Mailer, it seems, with his 1960s 
publication of An American Dream, was the first literary artist to fully engage with 
Heideggerian philosophy and Heideggerian-based existential psychology in his historic 
moment. 12 Although Heidegger’s name can be found alongside Mailer’s in numerous 
literary studies today, the influence of Heideggerian philosophy and psychology on 
                                                 
11 Simultaneously, led by French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, psychoanalyse existentielle (existential 
psychoanalysis) was being developed and formed another school of existential psychology at this time. 
12 Mailer’s An American Dream was first published in serialized form in 1964 and then in novel form in 
1965.  
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Mailer’s creation of Rojack as a professor of existential psychology and as an existing 
individual who is concerned with his existential predicament in life, has yet to be fully 
explored.  
 
Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer’s Cultural Moments 
 and the “Art of Living” Existentially 
 
The postmodern focus on existential philosophy is, in part, discussed in the 
context of literary theory, which, among other points of focus, scholars such as Bernd 
Magnus argue for the erasure of “the boundaries between philosophy and literature,” a 
distinction that seems to me to be overdue in the case of Fitzgerald and Hemingway (qtd. 
in Pütz 11). Although the traditional distinction between philosophy and art is not that 
they differ “in the depth and general quality of their thinking about life, but that they 
differ “in the form taken by the working out of this thinking” (Finkelstein 8). On one 
hand philosophy “offers itself in terms abstracted from the concrete life and the social 
and historical conditions that gave birth to it” (Finkelstein 8). A work of art, on the other 
hand, “offers itself as the very life it is discussing” (Finkelstein 8). The “common 
ground” that philosophy and art share is that both attempt to present their readers with the 
real world, the world that the philosopher, the artist, and the reader all share (Finkelstein 
8). The worlds that Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer share with their readers are, in 
part, the worlds they inhabit and, in part, the world they share with their readers. The 
worlds they inhabit—the realms of heightened perception and acute self-awareness—are 
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the worlds they share with their readers, worlds of consciousness they can teach their 
readers about, guide them to, and help them to understand and actualize. It is in this way 
that their art is inseparable from the philosophies they espouse. Their literary art takes the 
shape of their philosophic visions and become living illustrations, so to speak, of the 
existential predicaments of existence, visions that dance in the readers’ imaginations as 
the reality of their uniquely American historic and human moments. In fact, it is in how 
these authors capture their respective historic moments and put philosophy in motion 
through their art that Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer’s art and philosophy become 
inseparable. Their characters serve as more than mouthpieces for the “art of living” each 
author espouses; they serve as living illustrations of individual’s faced with and 
attempting to work out “the dilemmas of philosophy” (Berman, World 31).  
Although Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer’s philosophies vary, their visions 
are the same: they each strive to break all illusions and present an “art of living” to their 
fellow Americans, and they present philosophies through which their readers can learn to 
live more authentically. Specifically, they attempt to inspire readers to find a more 
genuine, meaningful existence than the one offered by the modern and postmodern 
“American Dream” consumer culture that America had been cultivating throughout the 
twentieth-century. These authors not only address what they see as the universal 
philosophic crises facing the individual American in the twentieth century in the form of 
literary art, but The Great Gatsby, Death in the Afternoon, and An American Dream stand 
as evidence of these authors’ desire to disseminate philosophic instruction on “the art of 
living” to their postwar American readers. In fact, their concerns for their fellow 
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Americans, as a whole, are the same: they are concerned with their culture, which breeds, 
nay demands, mediocrity and conformity, and they are concerned with the direction they 
see American culture heading—towards the death of the vitality and spirit of the 
individual and the nation. Further, they each emphasize the individual’s personal 
responsibility to become more self-aware, to strive to see the world more clearly and 
truly, and to take responsibility for what their lives amount to. Fitzgerald, Hemingway, 
and Mailer not only marry philosophy and art, but they do so in a way that they instruct 
their readers without being overtly didactic, pretentious, or pompous; in short, they 
translate their philosophic visions and show readers “the dilemmas of philosophy” and 
the dilemmas of human existence by putting their chosen philosophy in novelistic 
motion. In fact, the major symbols of The Great Gatsby, Death in the Afternoon, and An 
American Dream embody the philosophy these authors espouse in these works, works 
that reposition Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer as prophets, seers, and healers, so to 
speak, as well as ingenious artists of their generations.  
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Chapter 2 
Fitzgerald’s Eckleburgian Vision:  
Advertising Corrective Lenses for the Modern Individual 
 
As Ronald Berman aptly notes, F. Scott Fitzgerald writes The Great Gatsby at the 
moment the Victorian public conscience is replaced by modern subjectivity—an 
epistemological shift from which questions of truth and morality inevitably rise 
(Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and the Twenties 53). In Gatsby we see that Fitzgerald is not 
only aware of and concerned with the problems that accompany a shift to modern 
subjectivity, but is also conscious of the persistence of the competing perceptions of the 
differing classes typified in New York’s Long Island area. Fitzgerald’s choice of 
landscape—from the old-monied East Egg, to the new-monied West Egg, to the no-
monied valley of ashes—provides Fitzgerald with a stratified locale through which he can 
illustrate the competing perceptions of morality and truth of Long Island’s inhabitants. 
But we know that Fitzgerald transformed the historical New York landscape of the 1920s 
by infusing his own vision of New York, both changing and adding places and images to 
further illustrate his vision of the complexities of modernity, and more specifically, the 
complexities of living in Jazz Age New York.  
The most profound of Fitzgerald’s transformations of the landscape is located 
between Long Island’s West Egg and New York, in what Nick calls “a valley of ashes” 
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(27). Fitzgerald’s significant contribution to this re-envisioned locale is the addition of 
Doctor T.J. Eckleburg’s worn-out billboard advertisement, which “brood[s] on over the 
solemn dumping ground” found between Queen and Astoria (28). The billboard’s form 
and placement provides us with a complex image of the times. The form—the billboard 
itself—points to modern America’s growing capitalism, consumerism, and materialism, 
all which had a transformative effect on the standards of truth and morality of the 
American people. The billboard’s placement—“above the grey land and the spasms of 
bleak dust,” a place where “ash-grey men swarm with leaden spades and stir up an 
impenetrable cloud which screens their obscure operation from your sight”—is more than 
a comment on the dilemmas of modern vision (27).  For eighty years scholars and critics 
have, in fact, focused on Doctor Eckleburg’s billboard eyes and their placement in the 
“ash heaps” as the central symbolic device of the narrative and as the thematic center of 
Fitzgerald’s comments on the implications of modern subjectivity.13 Yet it is what Doctor 
Eckleburg is advertising—corrective lenses—that persists as the moral center of 
Fitzgerald’s modern vision. It is a view that “our perceptions, corrected by our experience 
and our common sense, must serve as guides for us, and we must seize every opportunity 
to widen their range and increase their accuracy,” what Friedrich Nietzsche prescribes as 
the perspective for finding “truth” in modern times (Mencken 89). This is what Doctor 
Eckleburg’s “enormous yellow spectacles” advertise—they preach a change of vision, an 
                                                 
13 The earliest comment I have found is in a letter from Maxwell Perkins to Fitzgerald dated 20 December 
1924 where Perkins writes: “In the eyes of Dr. Eckleburg various readers will see different significances; 
but their presence gives a superb touch to the whole thing: great unblinking eyes, expressionless, looking 
down upon the human scene. It’s magnificent!” See Scott Donaldson’s Critical Essays on F. Scott 
Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby p. 260-261.  
  27
improvement in seeing, the need to strive for a new, clearer, and more accurate point of 
view (Gatsby 28). 14 
Since my understanding of Fitzgerald’s construction of Doctor Eckleburg 
assumes Fitzgerald’s conscious infusion of Nietzschean philosophy into the novel, it is 
important here to note that Fitzgerald was not “an innocent of philosophy” as many 
scholars believe (Foster 229). In fact, thanks to Matthew Bruccoli’s extensive research 
into and published collections of Fitzgerald’s interviews, life, and letters, it is possible to 
recreate a rough chronology of the years prior to and during Fitzgerald’s writing of 
Gatsby when Fitzgerald was influenced by Nietzsche. For example, Fitzgerald himself 
reveals in a 1924 interview that at the age of twenty he “wanted to be King of the World, 
a sort of combined J.P. Morgan, General Ludendorff, Abraham Lincoln, and Nietzsche 
not to omit Shakespeare” (qtd. in Bruccoli, Conversations 65). 15 This means that by 1916 
or 1917 Fitzgerald was already an admirer of Nietzsche’s works, what Fitzgerald 
describes in a 1927 interview as his being “a hot Nietzschean” ever since he first read 
Thus Spake Zarathustra (qtd. in Bruccoli, Conversations 87). 16 Although Princeton 
University Libraries does not catalogue Fitzgerald’s copy of Thus Spake Zarathustra as 
one of the books owned by Fitzgerald, H.L. Mencken’s 1913 edition of The Philosophy 
                                                 
14 In a world in which there is an the absence of absolute “Truths” and absolute objectivity, Nietzsche 
advocates that we view ourselves and our world from varying perspectives, from multiple viewpoints; by 
doing so, we will come increasingly closer to understanding what is true for our own, undeniably subjective 
lives. Yet, hand-in-hand with this perspective is Nietzsche’s demand that we hold all things we have found 
to be true tentatively, since the world is invariably in a constant state of change as is our knowledge and 
what we think to be true. Thus, “truth” does not refer to absolute “Truths,” nor does it connote objectivity.  
15 Interviewer B.F. Wilson follows this quote with a note that “There is an implication that he [Fitzgerald] 
has hopes of being all this still” (65). 
16 Although Bruccoli and Baughman footnote that Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra was published in 
English “in four parts between 1883 and 1892” (see p. 87), the first complete English translation did not 
appear until 1896 (see Alexander Tille’s translation).  
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of Friedrich Nietzsche is listed (Princeton). Fitzgerald’s copy, a third edition of 
Mencken’s highly popular original 1908 publication, is personally inscribed to Fitzgerald 
from Mencken, who was not only one of the most influential literary and cultural critics 
of the Jazz Age but was considered “the best-known American propagator” of 
Nietzschean philosophy and “one of the most vociferous Nietzsche-inspired cultural 
critics of his time” (Pütz 5-6).  
Fitzgerald did not become personally acquainted with Mencken until 1919 when 
Mencken, then an editor for Smart Set magazine, accepted Fitzgerald’s story “Babes in 
the Woods” for publication. This was Fitzgerald’s first commercial sale of his work, as 
well as his entrance into the American literary community. Whether Fitzgerald had read 
Mencken’s work on Nietzsche before they met is unclear; but what is clear is that by 
December of 1920, Fitzgerald writes to his aunt and uncle of Mencken, describing him as 
“A keen, hard intelligence interpreting the Great Modern Philosopher” and as “my 
current idol” (qtd. in Bruccoli, F. Scott Fitzgerald on Authorship 86). 17 Three years later, 
in a 1923 interview, Fitzgerald lists Mencken’s The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche as 
number two on his list of favorite works (Bruccoli, Conversations 44). In this same 
interview Fitzgerald also reveals that Nietzsche, to cite the interviewer’s words, was one 
of the “intellectual influences which molded Fitzgerald’s mind” (Bruccoli, Conversations 
44). 18 In 1924 Mencken is still admittedly one of Fitzgerald’s idols. Interviewer B.F. 
                                                 
17 The letter Fitzgerald wrote to his aunt and uncle is dated 28 December 1920.  
18 Fitzgerald’s top three books were The Note-Books of Samuel Butler, The Philosophy of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and Ulysses (the Joyce novel’s shared third place). 
Also, in this article, Samuel Butler, Friedrich Nietzsche and Anatole France are cited as the main 
“intellectual influences which molded Fitzgerald’s mind.” See Conversations with F. Scott Fitzgerald 
where Bruccoli and Baughman have reproduced this article, p. 44-45. 
  29
Wilson cites Fitzgerald as saying, “My heroes? Well, I consider H.L. Mencken and 
Theodore Dreiser the greatest men living in the country today” (qtd. in Bruccoli, 
Conversations 65). Although Wilson does not qualify Fitzgerald’s choice of heroes, a 
closer look reveals that Mencken and Dreiser both participated in the propagation of 
Nietzschean philosophy in American culture—Mencken via his explication of 
Nietzsche’s works and his Nietzschean-based critiques of American culture and Dreiser 
through infusing his own “reflections of certain Nietzschean ideas that fascinated” him 
into his novels —something Fitzgerald himself sought to achieve as a cultural critic, a 
literary artist, and as an aspiring Nietzschean (Pütz 6).19  
Significantly, Fitzgerald’s infusion of Nietzschean ideology into the fabric of The 
Great Gatsby precedes Fitzgerald’s creation of Doctor Eckleburg. In fact, Fitzgerald 
created then added the image of Doctor Eckleburg to the pages of a completed 
manuscript draft of The Great Gatsby after he saw a dust jacket illustration in which 
Daisy’s eyes loomed large over an “amusement park” scene (Eble 89). Fitzgerald took 
this image and transformed it into a uniquely American “sign and symbol of the times,” 
one which simultaneously advertises and critiques modern America’s cultural, social, 
economic, religious, and moral worlds and embodies the Nietzschean philosophy 
Fitzgerald espouses and illustrates throughout Gatsby (Berman, Fitzgerald 53). Yet with 
the addition of Doctor Eckleburg comes a flaw—or what has been identified as “flawed” 
                                                 
19 In his work Nietzsche in American Literature and Thought, Manfred Pütz attributes the popularity of 
Mencken’s book on Nietzsche to Mencken’s own “intricate mixture of literary, philosophical, and popular 
concerns,” and notes that this book “is rightly considered as a landmark of the reception, interpretation, and 
propagation of Nietzschean ideas in America” (5-6). Further, Pütz specifically discusses Nietzsche’s 
influence on authors Jack London and Theodore Dreiser, who Pütz argues “turned what intrigued them in 
Nietzschean philosophy… into literature by weaving their reflections of certain Nietzschean ideas that 
fascinated them into the very texture of their novels” (6). 
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in Fitzgerald’s conception of the image. In his work Apparatus for F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
The Great Gatsby [Under the Red, White and Blue], Matthew Bruccoli notes that 
Fitzgerald’s use of the word “retinas” found in Nick’s description of Doctor Eckleburg’s 
billboard eyes—“blue and gigantic—their retinas… one yard high”—is a mistake 
(Apparatus 33; Gatsby 27). “Fitzgerald,” Bruccoli claims, “meant irises or pupils” 
(Apparatus 33). Although Bruccoli correctly notes that the “[r]etinas are at the back of 
the eye and can not be seen,” it is unclear why Bruccoli attributes the mistaken use of the 
word “retinas” to Fitzgerald instead of the narrator, Nick Carraway, who is admittedly 
struggling with his own perceptions throughout the narrative (Apparatus 33).20 Although 
I accept Bruccoli’s note that “retinas” is anatomically incorrect, I cannot overlook the 
possibility that the “mistake” is a matter of poetic license—that Fitzgerald intentionally 
and consciously chose the word “retinas” for symbolic purposes commensurate with 
Nietzsche, Mencken, and the already existent draft of Gatsby.  
 The agreement among textual scholars that it is Fitzgerald, not Nick, who 
incorrectly uses the word “retinas”—an “error” scholars to this day argue should be 
rectified—accounts for the lack of critical attention to this aspect of Eckleburgian 
symbology.21 Under these critical circumstances, it is not surprising that the symbolic and 
                                                 
20 It remains unclear why Bruccoli notes in Apparatus that it is Fitzgerald who misuses the word “retinas” 
when just a few entries later he attributes the misspelling of the word “appendicitis” to Myrtle’s 
pronunciation instead of Fitzgerald’s misspelling. Bruccoli notes, “The misuage is deliberate; and the 
misspelling may have been an attempt to indicate Myrtle’s pronunciation” (emphasis mine). See Bruccoli’s 
Apparatus p. 34.  
21 In 1970, Richard Johnson identifies an “error” in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s description of Doctor T.J. 
Eckleburg and claims that “Fitzgerald did not want the term retinas to describe Doctor T. J. Eckleburg’s 
eyes” (20). Although Johnson cites no evidence for his claim, he expects “once the error is recognized, the 
symbolic value of the passage will be reevaluated” and “more references to ‘ocular confusions,’ ‘distorted 
vision,’ and those ‘enigmatic eyes’” will follow (21). Although dozens of literary critics including Ronald 
Berman, Scott Donaldson, and Richard Lehan have, in fact, discussed the significance of Doctor 
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thematic implications of Doctor Eckleburg’s “retinas” have gone wholly unexamined to 
this day. But because my examination of Doctor Eckleburg’s advertisement for 
prescriptive spectacles assumes Fitzgerald’s conscious merging of image and philosophy, 
a reconsideration of Nick’s use of the word “retinas” is essential to our understanding of 
both the image and the embedded ideology. I will thus briefly examine Nick’s use of the 
word “retinas” and their anatomical functions and anatomical “flaws” as an aspect of 
Fitzgerald’s Eckleburgian vision for and of the modern individual and the modern, 
“civilized” world.  
 
Doctor Eckleburg’s “Retinas” and the Dilemmas of Modern Vision 
 
 Although Doctor Eckleburg’s advertisement for corrective lenses and its 
placement in the ash heaps calls attention to the need to see more clearly, this theme of 
clouded or distorted vision is not only considered a condition of modernity, but more 
significantly is a condition inherent in the anatomy and function of the retina. While the 
iris and the pupil, as Bruccoli correctly notes, are visible to the naked eye, they merely 
function as a camera lens and control the amount of light the retina receives. The retina, 
on the other hand, functions like a camera: it is the retina that captures the image or the 
“photograph” the eye receives. It is significant to note that the photograph the retina 
receives is distorted: the image is always inverted. This inverted photograph is then 
                                                                                                                                                 
Eckleburg’s eyes and their placement in the ash heaps as indicative of the moral and spiritual blindness 
inherent in the modern condition and as symbolically bound to Nick Carraway’s narrative view, Johnson’s 
expectation that the “symbolic value” of Doctor Eckleburg’s retinas would become the focus of critical 
reexamination has not been met.  
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translated or interpreted by the optic nerve, which reconstitutes the image photographed 
and transfers this image to the brain. The significance of the retina’s function here is 
twofold: first, the retina receives a distorted image, just as subjective beings our initial 
impressions of the world, of people and things, like Doctor Eckleburg’s “enormous 
yellow spectacles,” are colored by our own judgments, prejudices, and hasty 
generalizations; second, the optic nerve translates the image, just as subjective beings we 
naturally translate and interpret the world around us and are oftentimes unaware of and/or 
blinded by our own interpretive processes. This theme of blindness, what has been 
variously attributed to the blindness of Nick Carraway, Doctor Eckleburg, George 
Wilson, and Jay Gatsby, points to the modern condition of spiritual and moral blindness, 
yet blindness is also a condition that is inherent in the retina.22 
   Inherent in the anatomy of the retina is a blind spot—one in each eye. The retinal 
layer is composed of rods and cones which are the photoreceptors of the eye—they 
capture the image; but there is a “flaw.” The place where the retina meets the optic nerve 
is absent of rods and cones (See Figure 1). Therefore, there are no photoreceptors here to 
capture the image.           
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 See Ronald Berman’s discussion of Nick Carraway’s and Doctor Eckleburg’s blindness in The Great 
Gatsby and Fitzgerald’s World of Ideas (p. 45) and Richard Lehan’s discussion of George Wilson as “the 
blind agent of a blind God” in The Great Gatsby: Limits of Wonder (p. 41). Both scholars equate blindness 
with the loss of religious certainty in the novel. 
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                         Figure 1 
 
This means that part of the “photograph” the retina receives is always missing. This 
creates what is known as a “blind spot,” one that goes unnoticed by the seer due to the  
ability of one eye to compensate for the “blind spot” of the other. To illustrate how we  
compensate for our blind spots, I have placed two symbols below (See Figure 2). Simply 
cover your left eye, look directly at the asterisk (*) and move the image closer until the 
“O” disappears.  
 
 
Figure 2 
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Because the simplicity of this test does not lend itself to fully illustrate the effect of our 
blind spots on our vision, it is important to note that what the other eye can not 
compensate for, as illustrated by this simple test, our brain creates. Thus, a portion of 
what we see is made up by the brain; we automatically fill in the gaps in the 
“photograph” to create a whole picture.  
Because every individual’s “blind spots” differ in both location and in size, just as 
every subjective being’s vision is clouded by his/her own pre-conceived notions, 
judgments, and generalizations through which he/she fills in his/her gaps of knowledge, 
Nick’s use of the word “retinas” is not only consistent with the novel’s themes of 
blindness, clouded vision, and moral and spiritual uncertainty, but reinforces the idea that 
no two points of view are alike. Therefore, Nick’s (mis)use of the word “retinas” does not 
necessarily point to an oversight on Fitzgerald’s part—on the contrary. The attention to 
the retina, blindness, inverted or distorted images, flawed vision, the inability to see 
clearly, and the need to compensate for our “blind spots” is imbedded in the image of 
Doctor Eckleburg’s billboard advertisement as described by Nick. We must, as Nick 
subtly suggests with his use of the word “retinas,” survey the world from varying 
perspectives, from several points of view, in order to see the world around us more 
clearly; that is, to compensate for our anatomical “blind spots” and for our inherent 
subjectivity. We must strive to widen our perceptions through “our experience and our 
common sense…and we must seize every opportunity to widen their range and increase 
their accuracy” (Mencken 89).23 This requires that we take responsibility for our own 
                                                 
23 Significantly, on the same page that Mencken discusses Nietzsche’s perspectivism Mencken discusses 
the function of the optic nerve in reference to the impressions we receive (89). Mencken writes: “Those 
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lives and become aware of the complications of modern vision; in short, we must, as 
Nick does, strive to break all illusions and see self and world more clearly and truly.  
 
Nick as an Aspiring Nietzschean 
 
Nietzsche believed… that there was, in every man of the higher type 
(the only type he thought worth discussing) an instinctive tendency to 
seek the true as opposed to the false, that this instinct, as the race progressed, 
grew more and more accurate, and that its growing accuracy explained  
the fact that, despite the opposition of codes of morality and of the iron hand 
 of authority, man constantly increased his store of knowledge. A thought,  
he said, arose in a man without his initiative or volition, and was nothing more  
or less than an expression of his innate will to obtain power over his environment 
by accurately observing and interpreting it.24  
 
 Nick’s opening statement that he “is inclined to reserve all judgements” reveals 
that his perspective, his epistemology, his personal morality, and his art of living in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
metaphysicians who fared farthest from the philosopher of Cusa evolved the doctrine that, in themselves, 
things have no existence at all, and that we can think of them only in terms of our impressions of them. The 
color green, for example, may be nothing but a delusion, for all we can possibly know of it is that, under 
certain conditions, our optic nerve experience a sensation of greenness. Whether this sensation of greenness 
is a mere figment of our imagination or the reflection of an actual physical state is something that we 
cannot tell” (89). Although this idea, Mencken writes, “is entirely impractical,” his explication of the 
metaphysicians questioning of reality and illusion, or delusions, conjures images of Gatsby’s illusory and 
delusory worlds, worlds that revolve around Daisy’s green dock light. This passage may have contributed 
to Fitzgerald’s choice of the word “retinas” and to his choice of the color green for Daisy’s dock light.  
24 Mencken’s explication is found on pages 92-93 of The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche in the section 
entitled “Truth.” 
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modern world all derive from the same source: his inclination to seek what is true. By 
controlling his perceptions, by avoiding rash judgments and hasty generalizations, and by 
increasing his own store of knowledge—by becoming “that most limited of all 
specialists, the ‘well-rounded’ man”—Nick strives to accurately observe and interpret the 
world around him (9).25 He seeks to “obtain power over his environment” by observing 
the world with phenomenological precision and thus “come as near to the absolute truth 
as it is possible for human beings to come” (Mencken 93, 90). What is significant about 
Nick’s conscious and active striving to observe and interpret the world around him more 
accurately by “[r]eserving judgements” is that Nick simultaneously calls attention to the 
dilemmas of the modern epistemological shift to subjectivity and to the creation of his 
own subjectively developed epistemological maxim.  
In the opening pages of his narrative Nick leads the reader to believe that his life 
maxim—“to reserve all judgements”—is based, in part, on inherited advice and, in part, 
on his own interpretation of his father’s advice. In fact, decades of literary critics and 
scholars have focused on Nick’s interpretation of his father’s advice as a 
misinterpretation that calls attention to the freedoms, the flaws, and the relativity of 
                                                 
25 In the opening chapter, part of Nick’s self-introduction contains his aspirations to increase the breadth 
and depth of his knowledge in order to become a “‘well-rounded’ man.” Nick writes:  
There was so much to read for one thing and so much fine health to be pulled down out 
of the young breath-giving air. I bought a dozen volumes on banking and credit and 
investment securities and they stood on my shelf in red and gold like new money from 
the mint, promising to unfold the shining secrets that only Midas and Morgan and 
Maecenas knew. And I had the high intention of reading many other books besides. I was 
rather literary in college—one year I wrote a series of very solemn and obvious editorials 
for the “Yale News”—and now I was going to bring back all such things into my life and 
become again that most limited of all specialists, the “well-rounded” man. (8-9) 
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modern subjectivity and modern perception.26 Yet the claim that Nick’s life-view is based 
on a misinterpretation diminishes the value and significance of Nick’s self-created 
scheme for living in the modern world by failing to acknowledge Nick’s act of 
interpretation and his adaptation of inherited knowledge as an epistemologically valid 
process through which Nick seeks “truth” and creates meaning for his own life.  
Although the prevailing critical view is that Nick misinterprets his father’s 
message, we must consider that Nick’s father’s advice, which is interpreted by Nick into 
a maxim on reserving one’s judgments of others, is Nick’s modernization of, a revision 
of, his father’s “golden rule.”27 Nick’s revision of his father’s advice, a revision that in its 
literal reading reveals Nick’s pursuit of “truth” as a striving for phenomenologically 
precise observation, simultaneously reveals his awareness of perceptual and moral 
relativity and also serves to illustrate the modern epistemological processes Nietzsche 
espouses. Mencken explains: 
The tendency of intelligent men, in a word, is to approach nearer and 
nearer the truth, by the process of rejection, revision and invention. Many 
old ideas are rejected by each new generation, but there always remain a 
few that survive. (Mencken 91) 
Although Nick’s father’s advice continues to have meaning in Nick’s generation, Nick 
creates a maxim that not only embodies his own, personal perspective, but is an apt 
revision for modern times. Through Nick’s interpretation of his father’s advice, Nick 
                                                 
26 For an extended discussion of moral and perceptual relativity in Gatsby, see Ronald Berman’s works 
Modernity and Progress, The Great Gatsby and Fitzgerald’s World of Ideas, and Fitzgerald, Hemingway, 
and the Twenties. 
27 Nick’s father advises: “‘Whenever you feel like criticizing anyone…just remember that all the people in 
this world haven’t had the advantages that you’ve had’” (Gatsby 6).  
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shows us this process of “rejection, revision, and invention” in action: Nick rejects the 
traditional meaning of his father’s advice, revises it, modernizes it, and invents his own 
maxim, one that is applicable for his life and his times. In fact, Nick creates a life maxim 
with a multitude of meanings and applications commensurate with the multifarious nature 
of the turn to modern subjectivity. Thus what Nick tells and shows us in the opening 
pages of his narrative reveals more than his aspirations to “widen the range and increase 
the accuracy” of his perceptions: Nick also serves to illustrate the process by which one 
creates what Nietzsche advises; that is, modern individuals must create “a workable 
personal morality” and a “workable scheme of living” for their own individual and 
undeniably subjective lives (Mencken 55, 47). 
 Although Nick’s morality, or lack thereof, has been the subject of much criticism 
and is often cited as proof of Nick’s unreliability as a narrator, his inclination to “reserve 
all judgements” is applicable to Nick’s epistemology as well as his view of morality.28 
We see that Nick not only resists imposing his judgments on others, but he also refrains 
from imposing moral standards on others. As Nietzsche advises, Nick rejects traditional 
Christian morality, moral precepts Nietzsche argues are man-made constructions given 
“force and permanence” by being put into the “mouths of the gods” (Mencken 44; 46). In 
terms of Christian morality, which is the basis of Nietzsche’s discussion, Mencken 
explicates that 
                                                 
28 For discussions on Nick’s narrative unreliability see Scott Donaldson’s “The Trouble with Nick,” A.E. 
Elmore’s “Nick Carraway’s Self-Introduction,” Ron Nehaus’ “Gatsby and the Failure of the Omniscient 
‘I,’” Peter Mallios’ “Undiscovering the Country: Conrad, Fitzgerald, and Meta-National 
Form,” and Caren J. Town’s “‘Uncommunicable Forever:’ Nick’s Dilemma in The Great Gatsby.” 
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The act of acquiring property by conquest… becomes a crime and is called 
theft. The act of mating in obedience to natural impulses, without 
considering the desire of others, becomes adultery; the quite natural act of 
destroying one’s enemies becomes murder. (Mencken 51) 
Clearly Nick does not adhere to what Nietzsche considers an outdated Christian morality: 
he does not speak of heaven and hell or of sin and salvation; he does not allow the 
prevailing Christian mass morality to color his perceptions or taint his pursuit of “truth.” 
Specifically, Nick does not judge by the standards of Christian morality: he does not 
judge Tom, Daisy, or Myrtle as adulterous sinners; he does not condemn Daisy as a 
murderer or Tom as a conspirator in Gatsby’s death. Instead, he calls Daisy and Tom 
“careless people” and sees Tom’s actions as “entirely justified,” at least from Tom’s point 
of view (Gatsby 187). Although Nick does make a judgment about Tom and Daisy by 
calling them “careless,” what is significant is that Nick’s judgments are not bound to 
Christian notions of morality. Nick knows that “morality, in itself is the enemy of truth,” 
thus he avoids moralizing throughout the narrative (Mencken 54). In fact, Nick not only 
refrains from imposing moral standards on others, but he is also skeptical of the 
judgments and morality of others and what they discern as truths.   
Nick’s comment that “life is much more successfully looked at from a single 
window, after all,” reveals that Nick’s aspirations to become a “‘well-rounded’ man” are 
bound to his pursuit of “truth”: “he believes a thing to be true when his eyes, his ears, his 
nose and his hands tell him it is true. And in this he will be at one with all those men who 
are admittedly above the mass today” (Gatsby 9; Mencken 71). As Nietzsche advises, 
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Nick relies on his own acquired knowledge, his own observations, and his own 
experiences. “A man,” Mencken explains, “should steer clear of rash generalizations 
from his own experience, but he should be doubly careful to steer clear of the 
generalizations of others” (93). Similarly, Nick’s explanation of his “habit” of 
withholding judgments reveals that Nick is skeptical of what other’s say, believe, and 
discern as what is true. Nietzsche’s hesitancy to lend validity to the views of others is 
because of his belief  “that the great majority of human beings are utterly incapable of 
original thought, and so must perforce, borrow their ideas or submit tamely to some 
authority” (Mencken 94). Nick’s skepticism is introduced in similar terms in his 
comment that his own experience and observation has taught him that “the intimate 
revelations of young men or at least the terms in which they express them are usually 
plagiaristic and marred by obvious suppressions” (6). Like Nietzsche, Nick’s skepticism 
toward the views of others, what Nick calls his “unaffected scorn” for the majority of 
men (6) and Mencken calls “Nietzsche’s violent loathing and contempt for the masses” 
(94), manifests itself as a tendency to be suspicious and doubtful of the ideas that are 
generally accepted by the majority. “It is only by skepticism,” Mencken writes, “that we 
can hope to make any progress” (93). In fact,  
If all men accepted without question, the dicta of some one supreme sage, 
it is plain that there could be no further increase of knowledge. It is only 
by constant turmoil and conflict and exchange of views that the minute 
granules of truth can be separated from the vast muck heap of superstition 
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and error. Fixed truths, in the long run, are probably more dangerous to 
intelligence than falsehoods. (Mencken 93) 
This is why Nick claims himself as “one of the few honest people I have ever known”—
because of his “tendency to seek the true as opposed to the false,” his inclination to 
reserve judgments, and his constant skepticism (Gatsby 64; Mencken 92-93). He, like 
Nietzsche, is suspicious of all notions the masses accept as truths because, “What 
everybody believes,” according to Nietzsche, “is never true” (qtd. in Mencken 94). In 
Nick’s narrative this translates into Nick’s desire to learn the truth about Gatsby; that is, 
Nick strives to discern what is mere rumor and speculation and what is true. In fact, 
Nick’s skepticism is what sets Nick apart from the masses who show up at Gatsby’s 
parties: Nick stands apart from “the herd” because he does not buy into, nor does he 
perpetuate, the masses’ speculations and rumors about Gatsby.  
Nick views the droves of people who attend Gatsby’s parties as a representative 
group of modern America’s growing masses and it is through this upwardly mobile 
group—the nouveau rich—that Nick illustrates the perspective of the general public. 
Instead of searching for the truth about Gatsby’s past and present, the masses fill in their 
gaps of knowledge not through a pursuit of truth, but through unfounded speculation. 
Nick’s attention to these rumors, he tells us, is a “testimony to the romantic speculation 
he [Gatsby] inspired” (48). Significantly, the sources of the various “facts” that circulate 
about Gatsby’s past, profession, and source of wealth, for example, are never revealed; 
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instead “they” and “somebody” are the sources cited, suggestive of the mass mentality of 
believing what the majority of society believes to be true.29  
As the narrative progresses, Nick repeatedly calls attention to what is just rumor 
and speculation, what he calls “contemporary legends” about Gatsby and “wild rumors, 
which weren’t even faintly true” (103; 107). After careful observation and investigation, 
and after two years of contemplating the particulars of his summer with Gatsby, Nick 
rejects much of the “romantic speculation” surrounding Gatsby and his death as 
“grotesque, circumstantial, eager and untrue” (171). These comments embody Nick’s 
skepticism and illustrate the process of “rejection, revision, and invention” Nick 
introduces the reader to in the opening pages of the narrative: Nick rejects second-hand 
accounts of Gatsby, revises first-hand accounts, such as the half-truths Gatsby himself 
perpetuates, and notes the revisions to his own impressions during as well as after the 
summer of 1922. The most obvious of Nick’s revisions of his impression of Gatsby, Nick 
tells us, is that Gatsby, “who represented everything for which I have an unaffected 
scorn” became “exempt” from Nick’s normal reaction (6). Nick also revises, that is, he 
comes closer to the “truth” about the rumors concerning Gatsby’s Oxford days, his 
service in the military, his pining for Daisy, and his family and lineage. Although Gatsby 
perpetuates many of these half-truths himself—he is not really an Oxford man, for 
example—Nick’s skepticism towards the views of others, Gatsby included, is bound to 
                                                 
29 Throughout the narrative Nick recounts the rumors he hears about Gatsby, all of which, Nick subtly 
notes, are from unidentified sources. Nick cites, for example: “Well, they say he’s a nephew or a cousin of 
Kaiser Wilhelm’s. That’s where all his money comes from” and “Somebody told me they thought he killed 
a man once,” that “he was a German spy during the war…. I heard that from a man who knew all about 
him, grew up with him in Germany” (emphasis mine 37, 48). At another party later in the novel, Nick 
recalls the unidentified “young ladies” suggestion that “He’s [Gatsby’s] a bootlegger…. One time he killed 
a man who had found out that he was nephew to von Hindenburg and second cousin to the devil” in terms 
that elevate speculation to fact (65).  
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his pursuit of the truth about Gatsby. Thus, it is through the process of rejection and 
revision that Nick invents The Great Gatsby; that is, Nick not only creates a narrative 
through his engagement with this process, but it is through Nick that Fitzgerald illustrates 
this process and sets his philosophy in motion. Thus, what Fitzgerald presents us with is 
an individual in pursuit of “truth” and in the process of becoming.  
Although it is clear that Fitzgerald’s construction of Nick is an illustration of the 
difficulty of modern perception and the process through which one strives to discover 
what is true in modern times, what is also clear is that Nick’s rendering of the people and 
the events in the narrative is colored by his stance as an aspiring Nietzschean. As an 
aspiring Nietzschean Nick aims to increase his, and thus the world’s, storehouse of 
knowledge by widening the range and increasing the accuracy of his perceptions; he 
aspires to increase his own intelligence and efficiency, and thus attain mastery over his 
environment; he rejects traditional truths and morality and creates his own scheme of 
living and his own workable personal morality. But as an aspiring Nietzschean Nick also 
verbalizes his mistrust of the masses and his “unaffected scorn” for the majority of men, a 
view Nick “snobbishly” repeats as “a sense of the fundamental decencies is parceled out 
unequally at birth” (6). Nick’s elistist view, his skepticism towards and loathing of the 
majority of men, according to scholar Robert Roulston, reflects “Mencken’s attitudes 
towards the incompetent poor like George Wilson and the plutocratic rich like Tom 
Buchanan,” yet this point of view should be attributed to Nietzsche since its is 
Nietzsche’s criticism of two of the “three castes of men” he claims exist in all civilized 
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societies—what he calls the “laboring class” and the “legal aristocracy”—that are the 
basis for Mencken’s view (57).  
 
Nietzsche’s Three Caste System & Fitzgerald’s Vision of Jazz Age New York 
 
The order of castes… is the dominating law of nature, against which 
no merely human agency may prevail. In every healthy society 
 there are three broad classes, each of which has its own morality, 
its own word, its own notion of perfection and its own sense of 
mastery. The first class comprises those who are obviously superior 
to the mass intellectually; the second includes those whose eminence 
is chiefly muscular, and the third is made up of the mediocre.30   
 
Through the physical descriptions of the characters and their accompanying 
locations, Fitzgerald creates a New York that resembles the separate and unequal social, 
economic, religious, and moral worlds that Nietzsche argues exist in all modern, civilized 
societies. For example, Nick’s attention to Tom’s aggressive physical presence dominates 
Nick’s descriptions of Tom in the narrative. In the opening chapter, Nick description of 
the “enormous power” of Tom’s body and his “great pack of muscles” reveals that Nick 
is doing more than merely describing Tom’s dominating presence (11). Nick’s comment 
that Tom’s “was a body capable of enormous leverage—a cruel body,” reveals that Nick 
envisions Tom as part of the “chiefly muscular” caste of the legal aristocracy (Gatsby 11; 
                                                 
30 Mencken quotes Nietzsche here. See The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 96. 
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Mencken 96). Wilson, on the other hand, is presented as one of the “mediocre,” “a 
blonde, spiritless man, anaemic and faintly handsome,” one of limited aspirations and 
limited vision, and his place in the valley of ashes reinforces his mediocre existence 
(Gatsby 29). In fact, all of Fitzgerald’s locations—the valley of ashes, East Egg, and 
West Egg—reinforce the characteristics and beliefs that Nietzsche attributes to the 
members of each of these distinct castes of men. 
 
The Blind Masses in the Valley of Ashes 
 
At the bottom are the workers.... It is the law of nature that 
they should be public utilities—that they should be  
wheels and functions.... In them the mastery of one  
thing—i.e., specialism—is an instinct.31  
 
Fitzgerald’s construction of the ashen men who live under the watch of Doctor 
Eckleburg in a visually “impenetrable cloud” of dust recalls Nietzsche’s discussion of the 
caste of workingmen and laborers, the “blind” masses who blindly follow tradition, law, 
and authority instead of thinking or seeing for themselves. Nietzsche notes that the 
laboring men of this caste are usually “wheels and functions,” thus it is no coincidence 
that Fitzgerald positions Wilson and his nameless auto garage amidst the laboring “ashen 
men” whose function is to mechanically move heaps of ash (Mencken 27). Wilson’s sign 
Repairs. GERORGE B. WILSON. Cars Bought and Sold 
                                                 
31 Mencken quotes Nietzsche here. See The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 97. 
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is an advertisement for his function: he deals in “wheels,” in automobiles, and serves the 
transportation needs—such as gas and repairs—of the upper class, of those privileged 
enough to own a car. Although Wilson’s profession is of a higher rank than those who 
haul ashes—he does, in fact, own and run his own garage—his “function” and his 
placement in the valley of ashes suggests he is part of the blind masses.  
Fitzgerald reinforces Wilson’s membership in the masses by presenting him as 
blind to Myrtle’s affair, to Tom’s rouse to sell him his car, and blind to the true identities 
of Myrtle’s lover and her killer. To reinforce the persistence of Wilson’s blindness, 
Fitzgerald invokes the image Doctor Eckleburg. Yet, Fitzgerald does not merely place 
Doctor Eckleburg in the ash heaps as his correlative for spiritual and moral blindness of 
the masses; he makes the billboard visible from Wilson’s window and illustrates the 
inherited morality the masses blindly submit to through Wilson’s reference to Doctor 
Eckleburg.32 
The scene in which Wilson conflates the eyes of Doctor Eckleburg with the eyes 
of God reveals that Nick’s envisions Wilson as one of the masses who blindly follow 
tradition and authority, as one whose notions of truth and morality, like the majority of 
men, are bound to an unreasoning faith in an all-powerful and all-knowing Christian 
God.33 Through Wilson’s recollection of his conversation with Myrtle—he takes her to 
the window, points out Doctor Eckleburg’s billboard and tells her “God knows what 
you’ve been doing, everything you’ve been doing. You may fool me but you can’t fool 
                                                 
32 See Chapter 9 of The Great Gatsby, p. 165-168. 
33 Critics often cite this scene as evidence of Nick’s unreliability as a narrator and argue that Nick clearly 
invents this scene; he was not a witness to Wilson and Michaelis’ conversation. Although Nick was not a 
witness to the conversation, Nick suggests that his knowledge derives from Michaelis’ “testimony” after 
Gatsby’s death. See p. 171.  
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God!”—we see that Wilson not only submits to the authority of God, a God who Wilson 
believes “sees everything” and judges accordingly, but Wilson also invokes God as his 
authority on morality and human sin (167). Like the majority of men Nietzsche discusses, 
Wilson accepts “without question, the dicta of some one supreme sage” (Mencken 93). 
Nietzsche’s and, as I see it, Nick’s view is that blind submission to God’s authority, 
morality, and notions of sin, is absurd; modern epistemology, in fact, “discourages 
unreasoning faith” (Mencken 90). Wilson’s reference to God, coupled with his admission 
to Michaelis that he does not have a “church” he attends, thus no specific faith of 
Christianity that he follows, makes Wilson’s belief in God and his blind adherence to 
Christian morality and Christian Truths seem even more absurd (Mencken 90). Wilson’s, 
and correlatively the masses, blind submission to perceived authorities, whether past or 
present, God or man, and their lack of significant contributions to the world’s storehouse 
of knowledge, explains Nietzsche’s contempt for and, as I see it, Nick’s “unaffected 
scorn” for the majority of men (Gatsby 6). Yet, Nietzsche’s and Nick’s contempt is much 
stronger for the ruling class—what Nietzsche refers to as “the legal aristocracy” 
(Mencken 97).  
 
The East-Egg “Legal Aristocracy” 
 
Now, since all moral codes…are merely collections of the rules laid 
down by some definite group of human beings for their comfort  
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and protection, it is evident that the morality of the master class has 
for its main object the preservation of the authority and kingship  
of that class.34 
 
Nietzsche believed that the legal aristocracy, the Tom Buchanan’s of society, 
“expended its entire energy in combating experiment and change” to ensure its elevated 
position in society (Mencken 98). The morality of this class, as both Nietzsche and Nick 
envision, is bound to retaining its power and thus retaining control of the moral and legal 
apparatuses that keep them in power. In the opening chapter of the novel, Tom’s 
comment that “[i]t’s up to us who are the dominant race to watch out or these other races 
will have control of things,” reveals that Tom’s morality and his view of what he 
perceives to be the “inferior” races is bound to the preservation of his and his race’s 
power and authority; Tom, like the members of Nietzsche’s legal aristocracy, support the 
ideas that help him maintain his inheritance and ensure that his power, his authority, and 
his position in society remains secure. Importantly, Tom’s concern with protecting the 
“white race” from being “utterly submerged” due to “The Rise of the Colored Empires” 
also translates to his elitist view toward the lower classes later in Nick’s narrative (Gatsby 
17). 
 Under the uniquely American system of democracy, equal opportunity and 
freedom of choice make upward mobility a possibility for the “inferior” races and 
“inferior” classes, a possibility that stands in direct opposition to the agenda, morality, 
and security of the legal aristocracy. As Mencken explains: 
                                                 
34 See Mencken’s The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 48. 
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Next only to its [the aristocracy’s] desire to maintain itself without actual 
personal effort was its jealous endeavor to prevent accessions to its ranks. 
Nothing, indeed, disgusts the traditional belted earl quite so much as the 
ennobling of some upstart brewer or iron-master… (Mencken 98) 
—or in Gatsby’s case a bootlegger. As “guardians and keepers of order,” as the one’s 
who, as Tom puts it, “produced all the things that go to make civilization—oh, science 
and art and all that,” the legal aristocracy believes they must protect the “civilized 
society” they helped create from the corruption of the lower classes and “other” races 
(Mencken 97; Gatsby 18). Tom’s view of Wilson, for example—“He’s so dumb he 
doesn’t know he’s alive”—reveals Tom’s disdain for the lower classes; but it is through 
Tom’s reaction to Gatsby’s desire to be reunited with Daisy that Tom’s belief that he is a 
“guardian” of the “civilized” world is reinforced (30). Tom asks Gatsby: 
 “What kind of row are your trying to cause in my house anyhow?” 
… 
“I suppose the latest thing is to sit back and let Mr. Nobody from Nowhere 
make love to your wife. Well, if that’s the idea you can count me out… 
Nowadays people begin by sneering at family life and family institutions 
and next they’ll throw everything overboard and have intermarriage 
between black and white.” (136-137) 
Tom’s refusal to allow “Mr. Nobody from Nowhere” to make love to his wife has more 
to do with the power and boundaries of the aristocracy being threatened than Tom’s 
actual jealousy over Daisy’s potential affair. Tom, as part of “the dominant race” and the 
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dominant class, blocks Gatsby’s entrance into the aristocracy sine his upward mobility 
would disrupt that closed circle which believed it was responsible for the social and 
moral foundations of society, structures which revolve around keeping marriages within 
one’s own class and within one’s own race. Because the legal aristocracy privileges 
“civilized society” and those who are monied, educated, civilized, and refined, it is in this 
class’ own best interests to protect itself and everything that is “civilized”—art, 
civilization, and the foundations of social and moral order—from the coarse, the 
immoral, the uneducated, the uncivilized. The “legal aristocracy’s” view—that they are 
the guardians of truth and morality and that one can only enter this class through proper 
birth—conflicts with the uniquely American ideas of democracy, equal opportunity, and 
upward mobility. From Nietzsche’s point of view, the exclusivity of the “legal 
aristocracy” is absurd since the progress of a civilization, he believed, depends upon “a 
free and constant interchange of individuals between the three natural castes of men” 
(Mencken 98). For this reason, Nietzsche finds that “[t]he morality of the master class is 
irritating to the taste of the present day because of its fundamental principle that a man 
has obligations only to his equals; that he may act to all of lower rank and to all that are 
foreign as he pleases” (qtd. in Mencken 49). 
In Nietzsche’s class structure, the Tom Buchanans of the world belong to this 
ruling class who, by force of their inherited power and “vast carelessness,” as Nick puts 
it, impose their power on the lower classes (188). Wilson, a man associated with the blind 
masses in both Nietzsche’s and Fitzgerald’s constructions, is continually undermined by 
Tom throughout the novel. From Tom’s underhanded promise to sell Wilson his car to 
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Tom’s affair with Wilson’s wife, and finally to Tom’s facilitation of Gatsby’s murder and 
Wilson’s resulting suicide, we see that Tom is the catalyst for Wilson’s despair and for 
inciting Wilson’s misdirected vengeance towards Gatsby. Thus, like Wilson, Gatsby is 
victimized by Tom as well. But Gatsby does not belong to the caste of the masses in 
either Nietzsche’s or Nick’s view; instead, Gatsby is a victim of another sort. He is 
exempt from Nick’s and Nietzsche’s “scorn” because he is neither a man of the masses, 
nor a man of the aristocracy; instead he, in Nick’s view, aspires to the highest class—
Gatsby aspires to become a self-made “man of efficiency” (Mencken 98). 
 
West Egg and the “True Aristocracy” 
 
Nietzsche called himself an immoralist. He believed that all progress 
depended upon the truth and that the truth could not prevail while men yet 
enmeshed themselves in a web of gratuitous and senseless laws fashioned by 
their own hands. He was fond of picturing the ideal immoralist as “a 
magnificent blond beast”—innocent of “virtue” and “sin” and knowing 
only “good” and “bad.” Instead of a god to guide him, with commandments 
and the fear of hell, this immoralist would have his own instincts and 
intelligence. Instead of doing a given thing because the church called it a 
virtue of the current moral code required it, he would do it because he knew 
that it would benefit him or his descendants after him. Instead of refraining 
from a given action because the church denounced it as a sin and the law as 
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a crime, he would avoid it only if he were convinced that the action itself, or 
its consequences, might work him or his an injury.35 
 
 
In Nietzsche’s hierarchy the immoralist belongs to Nietzsche’s first and highest 
caste, what Nietzsche envisions as an “aristocracy of efficiency”—for Nietzsche, the only 
“true aristocracy” (Mencken 42, 98). In fact, “it was to the aristocrat only,” Mencken 
writes, “that he [Nietzsche] gave, unreservedly, the name of human being” (58). In 
Nick’s hierarchy, Nick envisions Gatsby as Nietzsche envisions his aristocrat: as a man 
who “would stand forth from the herd” of men; a man like Gatsby who, Nick tells us, is 
the only individual in his narrative “exempt” from his usual “scorn” (Mencken 58; 
Gatsby 6). Although the “priest-ridden, creed-barnacled masses,” who submit to 
Christian morality and the man-made laws that enforce this morality, envision Gatsby as 
immoral and criminal—a bootlegger, a murderer, an adulterer, his wealth amassed from 
criminal connections and enterprises—both Nietzsche and Nick venerate the aristocrat for 
his willingness “to pit his own feelings against the laws laid down by the majority” 
(Mencken 93). It is this “gorgeous, fatalistic courage and sublime egotism” the majority 
lacks that separates the “true” aristocrat from “the herd” (Mencken 100). His greatness 
lies in the fact that he “honors his own power” and thus “seeks every opportunity to 
increase and exalt his own sense of efficiency, of success, of mastery, of power” 
(Mencken 60). Significantly, what Nietzsche characterizes of those who aspire to 
“efficiency,” Nick illustrates through Gatsby; yet, where Nietzsche’s descriptions of his 
aspiring superman remain mainly in the abstract, Nick provides us with a living 
                                                 
35 See Mencken p. 57. 
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illustration by putting Nietzschean philosophy in motion. In short, Nick shows us the 
ways in which Gatsby increases and exalts his power and gives us glimpses of “Jay 
Gatsby” in the in the process of becoming.  
Nick’s inclusion of the young Gatz’s “SCHEDULE” and “GENERAL 
RESOLVES” in the latter part of the narrative serves to illustrate, in the particular, how 
the young James Gatz, like Nietzsche’s artistocrat, creates his own scheme for living and 
“exercises strictness and severity over himself” in order to increase his knowledge as well 
as his physical and intellectual efficiency. Although Nick includes this evidence without 
commentary, we see young Gatz strives to increase his physical strength and efficiency 
through daily “Dumbbell exercise and wall-scaling,” as well as “Baseball and sports” 
(181). We see his plan to increase his intelligence by reading “one improving book or 
magazine per week” and by studying “needed inventions” and “electricity, etc.” (181-
182). We see how he attempts to increase his social effectiveness by resolving to give up 
“smokeing” and “chewing,” by resolving to bathe “every other day,” and by practicing 
his “elocution, poise and how to attain it” (181-182). We also see that his aspirations to 
efficiency also include not “wasting time at Shafters or [a name, indecipherable]” and 
saving “$3.00 per week” (181-182). Although there is no evidence of young Gatz’s 
implementation of his schedule and resolves, his aspirations alone show us the young 
Gatz’s “desire to attain and manifest efficiency and superiority” over himself and his 
environment (Mencken 61). Significantly, it is this desire, what Mencken explicates as a 
“yearning” for “glory,” that Nietzsche believes stimulates a man to efficiency. Mencken 
explains:  
  54
It is the desire to attain and manifest efficiency and superiority which 
makes one man explore the wilds of Africa and another pile up vast wealth 
and another write books of philosophy and another submit to pain and 
mutilation in the prize ring. It is this yearning which makes men take 
chances and risk their lives and limbs for glory. (Mencken 61)  
Although Gatz’s schedule and resolves do not reveal a specific “yearning” for “glory,” 
what they do reveal is Gatz’s self-imposed discipline, his creation of his own scheme for 
living, and his early aspirations to efficiency. The result of Gatz’s desire to cultivate his 
powers—his instincts and intelligence, his knowledge and his mastery—is further 
illustrated through Nick’s account of Gatz’s movements after the War; that is, after he 
loses Daisy.  
In Nick’s account of the year leading up to Gatz’s transformation into Jay Gatsby, 
Nick presents Gatz in terms that recall Nietzsche’s aristocrat’s reliance on his own 
instincts, knowledge, and power. Nick tells us that after Gatz returns from the war to find 
Daisy gone, Gatz spends more than a year on the shores of Lake Superior, working just 
enough to provide himself with food and a bed (Gatsby 104). Then, according to Nick, 
one day Gatz’s “instinct toward his future glory” leads him to St. Olaf’s College, but 
“dismayed at its ferocious indifference to the drums of his destiny, to destiny itself” he 
returns to the shores of Lake Superior (105). Although Gatz’s “instinct” led him to St. 
Olaf’s, he could not accept “the janitor’s work with which he was to pay his way 
through” as the path to his imagined destiny (105). Thus, like Nietzsche’s aristocrat, we 
see that Gatz “honors his own power” and believes he has the power to create his own 
  55
destiny; like Nietzsche’s aristocrat, he believes it is his destiny to “progress upward,” 
something “janitor’s work” did not offer (Mencken 60, 114, 65). Dismayed, Gatz leaves 
St. Olaf’s after staying only two weeks and returns to Lake Superior “still searching for 
something to do” when he sees Dan Cody anchor his yacht (105). Although Nick leads us 
to believe that what stimulated Gatz to “efficiency” was his “yearning” for “glory” now 
that the War was over—Cody’s yacht representing “all the beauty and glamour in the 
world” and conjuring visions of travel, adventure, far-off treasure, luxury, wealth, and 
freedom on the sea—what stimulated Gatz to aspire to “efficiency” and to become Jay 
Gatsby is not merely his life-long desire to progress upward (Gatsby 105). Instead, Nick 
reveals that Gatsby is stimulated to “efficiency” by another catalyst Mencken explicates 
from Nietzsche’s writings; that is, aside from the desire to manifest superiority, women 
can also stimulate a man to “efficiency.”   
In Nietzsche’s discussion “Women and Marriage,” Nietzsche argues that women 
are men’s natural opponent and thus capable of stimulating men “to constant efficiency” 
(105). Because women are oftentimes the catalyst which stimulates the “will to power,” 
this power being “responsible for many of the world’s great deeds,” women served as 
“the most splendid reward—greater than honors or treasures—that humanity could 
bestow upon its victors” (Mencken 111). In fact, Mencken explains Nietzsche’s belief 
that “[t]he winning of a beautiful and much-sought woman, indeed, will remain as great 
an incentive to endeavor as the conquest of a principality” (112). Significantly, Nick tells 
us that young Gatz was “excited” by the idea “that many men had already loved Daisy—
it increased her value in his eyes” (156). Nick further reinforces this point by equating 
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Daisy with the most-sought object in history: Nick tells us that the young Gatz “found 
that he had committed himself to the following of a grail” (156). But, although Nietzsche 
envisions women as a great incentive to the “higher man,” Nietzsche also points out that 
women can work “harm to the higher sort of men” (Mencken 105-106). 
For Nietzsche, because women have a limited range of vision, their focus on “the 
present or the very near future,” it is “dangerous” for a higher man “to love too violently” 
or “to be loved too much” (Mencken 106-107). Although Mencken’s explication does not 
provide a clear picture of how women can harm the “higher man,” Mencken suggests that 
women often thwart the higher man’s aspirations. This view is embodied in Gatsby’s 
recollections of his early days with Daisy. According to Nick, Gatsby tells him: 
“I can’t describe to you how surprised I was to find out I loved her, 
old sport. I even hoped for a while that she’d throw me over, but she 
didn’t, because she was in love with me too. She thought I knew a lot 
because I knew different things from her…. Well, there I was, way off my 
ambitions, getting deeper in love every minute, and all of a sudden I didn’t 
care. What was the use of doing great things if I could have a better time 
telling her what I was going to do?” (Gatsby 157)  
Significantly, Gatz’s loss of ambition, the loss of his desire to cultivate and exalt his 
sense of power, is bound to his intense love for Daisy. We see Gatz’s youthful “yearning” 
for “glory,” his desire to “increase and exalt” his powers, is replaced by his yearning for 
Daisy. Gatsby intimates that his love for Daisy is the reason for the loss of his youthful 
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aspirations, yet Nick’s narrative also reveals that after he loses Daisy, Gatsby’s ambition 
eventually returns; it returns because he must win Daisy back.   
 For Nick, the day James Gatz changes his name to Jay Gatsby not only marks the 
beginning of Gatsby’s career, but marks the day that Gatz’s ambitions return. In fact, 
Nick envisions Gatz’s transformation into Gatsby as the moment Gatz, the dreamer who 
merely talked to Daisy of all the things he could do, who spent the previous year 
“drifting” here and there and “loafing” on the beach “searching for something to do,” 
becomes a man of action, “who borrowed a row-boat, pulled out to the Tuolomee and 
informed Cody that a wind might catch him and break him up in half an hour” (104). 
Significantly, Nick’s description of how James Gatz becomes Jay Gatsby also serves as 
an illustration of what Nietzsche discusses in terms of man’s metamorphosis into a higher 
man. According to Mencken,  
[Nietzsche] speaks of three metamorphoses of the race, under the 
allegorical names of the camel, the lion and the child…. The camel, a 
hopeless beast of burden, is man. But when the camel goes into the 
solitary desert, it throws off its burden and becomes a lion. That is to say, 
the heavy and hampering load of artificial dead-weight called morality is 
cast aside and the instinct to live—or, as Nietzsche insists upon regarding 
it, the will to power—is given free reign…. The lion is the ‘higher man’—
the intermediate stage between man and superman…. In the desert comes 
the first metamorphosis, and the ‘thou shalt’ of the camel becomes the “I 
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will” of the lion. And what is the mission of the lion? “To create for itself 
a new creating.” (66) 
Nick envisions Gatz’s transformation into Gatsby in similar terms. The “thou shalt” of  
Gatz is embodied in his confession that he had a “better time” talking about what he was 
going to do rather than actually doing it. The “I will” recalls Jay Gatsby, the man of 
action, who rows out to the Tuolomee and joins Dan Cody. Gatz creates a new self at this 
specific moment, the moment he is stimulated to “efficiency” and becomes a man of 
action. He creates a new self by throwing off the burdens of his past and his heritage; in 
short, he creates a self through which he can give his power free reign and thus create his 
own destiny.36 In Nick’s view, Gatsby’s time with Cody left Gatsby with a “singularly 
appropriate education; the vague contour of Jay Gatsby had filled out to the substantiality 
of a man”—in Nick’s view, a higher man (Gatsby 107). But whether one believes that the 
catalyst for Gatsby’s “becoming” is the result of his “searching for something to do” to 
forget Daisy or to win her back, Gatsby himself reveals that is the thought of Daisy that 
continues to stimulate him to “efficiency.”  
Although Nietzsche, as Mencken reveals, views women as the “natural opponent” 
of men, who serve the “benevolent purpose” of stimulating a man to “constant 
efficiency,” Nietzsche does not provide the specifics of how this is actualized (Mencken 
105). Nick’s narrative, on the other hand, reveals specific instances of how Gatsby keeps 
                                                 
36 Although the details of Gatsby’s days with Cody and his days before reaching West Egg are vague at 
best, Nick tells us that Gatsby served as “steward, mate, skipper, secretary and even jailor” for Cody who, 
throughout the years, entrusts more and more of his business to Gatsby (106). We are led to believe that in 
this time Gatsby continues to increase and exalt his power under Cody’s tutelage; thus, as Gatsby’s power 
increases, his responsibilities increase as well.   
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the thought of Daisy before him and thus suggests how women can stimulate men to 
“constant efficiency” (105). For example, we learn from Nick of the newspaper clippings 
Gatsby collects of Daisy over the years; we learn that from Gatsby’s West Egg mansion 
there is a view of Daisy’s green dock light; and we learn that Gatsby’s open-invitation 
parties have a purpose—he has hopes that Daisy will wander in some evening. For Nick, 
these details reveal how Gatsby keeps the thought of Daisy before him and how this 
thought stimulates him to “efficiency.” In fact, we see that it is the thought of Daisy that 
motivates Gatsby to amass great wealth; it is this thought which brings him to West Egg; 
it is with this thought that Gatsby plans his parties. Yet Nick also reveals how Gatsby, 
like Nietzsche’s courageous aristocrat, is ever-willing to take risks and face danger in 
order for his “yearning” to be actualized. As Mencken explains: “It is the mission of the 
greatest to run risk and danger—to cast dice with death” (62).   
The glimpses Nick gives us of the risk and dangers Gatsby faces throughout his 
“career as Jay Gatsby”—such as his “gonnection” with criminals such as Meyer 
Wolfshiem, his profitable but illegal drug store trade, and his adulterous affair with 
Daisy—all reveal Gatsby’s desire to increase and exalt his own power in order to win 
Daisy at not matter what cost to others and no matter what risk to himself. Yet it is not 
until Gatsby confronts Tom in the Plaza Hotel that we see Gatsby risk everything he has 
created—namely, “Jay Gatsby”—in order to win Daisy and thus satisfy his yearning for 
her. But, in Nick’s eyes, Gatsby fails. He fails because he does not get Daisy to admit she 
“never loved” Tom (139). He fails because Tom makes Gatsby look like “some kind of 
cheap sharper” (159). Nick envisions Gatsby’s failure to win Daisy at the Plaza Hotel not 
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just as the death of Gatsby’s aspirations and his dream, but as the death of “Jay Gatsby” 
himself. “‘Jay Gatsby,’” Nick writes, “had broken up like glass against Tom’s hard 
malice and the long secret extravaganza was played out” (155). Although Nick envisions 
Gatsby’s failure as the existential death of “Jay Gatsby,” Gatsby himself will not admit 
defeat. Nick envisions Gatsby as risking everything when he refuses to leave town after 
Myrtle’s death. In fact, Nick makes it clear that Gatsby is well aware of the danger of 
waiting for Daisy to call. Nick recalls telling Gatsby: “‘You ought to go away,’” I said. 
“‘It’s pretty certain they’ll trace your car’” (155). According to Nick, “He [Gatsby] 
wouldn’t consider it. He couldn’t possibly leave until he knew what she was going to do. 
He was clutching at some last hope and I couldn’t bear to shake him free” (155). 
Although, at the least, Gatsby risks being accused of Myrtle’s death by waiting to hear 
from Daisy, it is Gatsby’s willingness to take risks such as this that lies at the source of 
what Nietzsche envisions as his aristocrat’s courage.  
For Nietzsche, whether the aristocrat’s attempts succeed or fail, whether he is 
victorious or defeated, what he venerates is his aristocrat’s courageous attempt to 
actualize his yearnings. Mencken explicates: 
It is time to die, says Zarathustra, when the purpose of life ceases to be 
attainable—when the fighter breaks his sword arm or falls into his 
enemy’s hands. And it is time to die, too, when the purpose of life is 
attained—when the fighter triumphs and sees before him no more worlds 
to conquer…. The best death is that which comes in battle “at the moment 
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of victory;” the second best is death in battle in the hour of defeat. 
(Mencken 135) 
Although Gatsby risks everything he has created—i.e., “Jay Gatsby”—when he confronts 
Tom in the Plaza Hotel, by waiting for Daisy’s call Gatsby also risks his life. Tragically, 
Gatsby’s risk does not pay off—he experiences existential death at the hands of Tom, a 
death punctuated by his literal death at the hands of Wilson. Yet, in Nick’s view, Gatsby 
dies well; he dies “at the right time” (Mencken 135).  
Significantly, Mencken notes that Nietzsche “was unable to give any very definite 
picture of this proud, heaven-kissing super man”;  yet where Nietzsche fails, Nick 
succeeds in many ways (Mencken 66).37 In fact, Nick not only creates a picture of his 
aspiring “superman” and shows us the specifics of Jay Gatsby’s “becoming,” but he also 
shows us the process of his own becoming and provides a first-hand account of his own 
failures in his aspirations to “efficiency.” Like Gatsby, Nick strives, as he tells us at the 
beginning of his narrative, to increase his own intelligence and his efficiency by 
becoming healthy, well-read, and well-rounded. Like Gatsby, Nick creates a scheme for 
living—to increase his intelligence and “to reserve all judgments”—and rejects man-
made notions of morality and truth.  He strives to “develop and fortify” his powers, to 
achieve a heightened perspective of the world, and focuses on what he learns through his 
own observations and experiences. Yet, when Nick tells us at the end of the novel that 
“the East was haunted for him,” his eyes “distorted beyond” his “eyes’ power of 
correction,” he simultaneously calls attention to the “retinas” and the dilemmas of 
                                                 
37 Mencken writes: “It is only in Zarathustra’s preachments to “the higher man,” a sort of bridge between 
man and superman, that we may discern the philosophy of the latter” (66). 
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modern vision and signals his own failure to maintain the heightened point of view of the 
“higher man” (185). Nietzsche, in fact, addresses the difficulty of becoming and 
remaining a part of the “true aristocracy” in terms that add depth to our understanding of 
Nick’s choice to move West. Mencken writes: “Nietzsche was well aware that his ‘first 
caste’ was necessarily small in numbers and that there was a strong tendency for its 
members to drop out of it and seek ease and peace in the castes lower down” (Mencken 
100). We see that because Nick’s vision becomes distorted in the East, because Gatsby’s 
strivings result in his death, because, as Nick tells us in the beginning of his narrative, 
after leaving the East he felt that he “wanted the world to be in uniform and at a sort of 
moral attention forever,” he has not only failed to become a “superman,” but has chosen 
the “ease and peace” of the Western middle-class life over a life that Nick perceives as 
“haunted” by constant conflict and struggle (Fitzgerald 6). Thus, through Nick’s admitted 
failure to control his perceptions and to reserve his judgments, Nick shows us why proper 
vision, so to speak, is not only essential to prosper, but is essential to one’s existential and 
literal survival in the modern, “civilized” world represented by the East. 
Nick’s narrative serves, in part, as a survival guide to modern times, and through 
the creation of his narrative Nick ensures that his generation and the generations to come 
will benefit from Gatsby’s life and death, as well as what Nick perceives to be Gatsby’s 
strivings and failures. As Nietzsche’s Zarathustra puts it: “Suppose you have failed? Has 
not the future gained by your failure?” (qtd. in Mencken 66). What the future generations 
gain from Nick’s narrative is Gatsby’s sense of power, his courage, his commitment, and 
his faith. Through Gatsby they will learn how to create a scheme for living in order to 
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“fortify and develop” their powers; they will learn they must give direction to the vitality 
of the creative spirit and will learn from Gatsby’s courage that one must take risks in 
order to create their own destiny. This is why Nick feels “responsible” for Gatsby after 
his death: because he is the only one who can tell Gatsby’s story. Nick feels a personal 
and a social responsibility to ensure that future generations will benefit from Gatsby’s life 
and death and from his aspirations and his courage. But for Nick, what he sees as 
Gatsby’s failure is similar to his own failure: both are bound to the dilemmas of modern 
vision. Yet it is Gatsby’s failure and his death that inspires Nick to give direction to his 
own creative spirit, to create his own life and experiences as a work of art, and thus 
become an artist. The “art of living” Nick espouses throughout Gatsby is set against the 
background of the current state of American democracy and America’s social structure, 
what cultural critics such as Mencken and Fitzgerald envision as the incongruous nature 
of American’s social hierarchy and the uniquely American ideals of freedom, equal 
opportunity, and social and economic mobility The American Dream promises. In 
Nietzsche’s vision of the modern, civilized world “There is no wrong in unequal 
rights!”—it is the natural state of modern civilization. What is wrong, according to 
Nietzsche, “lies in the vain pretension to equal rights!”—a view commensurate with 
Nick’s sympathetic view towards Gatsby (qtd. in Mencken 97). For Nick and for 
Fitzgerald, the “vain pretension to equal rights” is the illusion of The Dream, the illusion 
that drives Gatsby’s belief and hope that the self-made American man can rise to personal 
and even national significance. Significantly, it is Nick’s narrative that ensures Gatsby’s 
rise to national significance: it is through Nick that Gatsby becomes what his father 
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envisioned. He becomes a national figure, the embodiment of the courage, hope, vitality, 
and creative spirit that is essential for individual growth and development. Yet what is 
also essential to achieve personal “greatness,” as Nick illustrates through his perceptual 
struggles, is to break all illusions, to see self and world more accurately and clearly. 
Thus, what Nick shows us throughout Gatsby is that perception is central to the survival 
and the success of the modern individual whose aspirations are often thwarted by others, 
but more often thwarted by one’s own clouded vision and blinded by the illusion of The 
Dream.  
 
Fitzgerald’s Eckleburgian Vision for the Modern Individual 
 
Throughout Gatsby Nick shows us modern perception is clouded, thus truth and 
morality are inevitably uncertain. Perception is not only in conflict between the differing 
classes, but is further complicated and clouded by the spectacles imposed on all classes 
by the media of Jazz Age New York. From scantily dressed flappers to jazz musicians, 
from movie starts at wild parties to dazzling wealth, it becomes our moral responsibility 
not to be taken in by grandeur. Doctor Eckleburg’s prescriptive spectacles remind us that 
we need corrective lenses because what we see, like Doctor Eckleburg’s “yellow 
spectacles,” is colored by our own judgments and notions. His “retinas” remind us that 
images we receive are inevitably distorted, that we have inherent blind spots, and that we 
thus naturally fill in the missing gaps to interpret the world around us. He reminds us that 
we must, as Nick connotes with his use of the word “retinas” and his claim that he is 
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“inclined to reserve all judgements,” strive to widen the range and increase the accuracy 
of our perceptions; we must break all illusions and strive to see self and world more 
clearly and truly (5). Yet we must keep in mind that Doctor Eckleburg’s billboard was a 
latter addition to the novel as Fitzgerald’s subjective correlative for what Fitzgerald had 
already written into Gatsby: Fitzgerald had already made Nick an aspiring Nietzschean 
striving to achieve a heightened perspective and constructed a New York in which The 
Wilsons, The Buchanans, and Gatsby play out the roles of their respective Nietzschean 
castes. And it is through these class tensions—between the ashen men, and the East and 
West Eggers—that Fitzgerald illustrates what Doctor Eckleburg is added to advertise: our 
need to correct our own perceptions in order to better understand and overcome the 
competing perceptions of truth and morality that haunt and complicate modern times. 
This dilemma is a moral one. It is the dilemma of modern vision, one that emphasizes our 
personal and social responsibility to see the world around us more clearly for our own 
progress as well as the progress of the nation, a nation that Fitzgerald envisioned as 
heading toward the death of individualism, the death of the individual, and thus the death 
of what is unique to American culture—the vitality of the creative spirit. Thus, we must 
take responsibility for our own lives and our own perceptions; we must take action and 
strive to come to a heightened awareness and understanding of self and world. This is 
Fitzgerald’s Eckleburgian vision of the modern world, his prescriptive vision for the 
modern individual, a complex vision he shares with his contemporaries with the hope of 
guiding them through the dilemmas of modernity and the dilemmas inherent in “Being” 
American.   
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Chapter 3 
Life, Death, and Art: The E(a)rnest Thought of Death and Hemingway’s Death in the 
Afternoon, a Manifesto on the Art of Living E(a)rnestly 
 
The only place where you could see life and death, 
i.e., violent death now that the wars were over, was in the bull ring  
and I wanted very much to go to Spain where I could study it.38 
 
  
Ernest Hemingway’s Death in the Afternoon has been described as experimental, 
“a matchless guide” to Spain and the Spanish bullfight, a “corrective” for writing and 
“various guides to Spain,” a semi-autobiographical memoir of Hemingway’s own 
traumatic wounding and near-death experiences, and “a work of art” through which 
Hemingway directly reveals his philosophies on writing, art, and the art of the Spanish 
bullfight. As apt as these descriptions are, they fail to capture what Hemingway asks us to 
see as the “whole” of his study in Death in the Afternoon (Spilka 132; qtd. in Bredendick 
42). Even Hemingway scholars such as John Killinger, Susan Beegel, Philip Young, and 
Miriam Mandel, who have, in fact, advanced our understanding of the depths and 
dimensions of what Hemingway espouses throughout Death in the Afternoon, have not 
fully explicated the underlying unifying structure—i.e., the “whole”—of Hemingway’s 
                                                 
38 See Death in the Afternoon p. 2. 
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study.39  This “whole,” as Hemingway suggests in the title and tells us in the opening 
pages of Death in the Afternoon, is the study of death, a dark subject Hemingway justifies 
by his “humble” purpose: “I was trying to learn to write, commencing with…one of the 
simplest things of all and the most fundamental…violent death” (DIA 2). Although the 
role of death in Death in the Afternoon seems to be exclusive to the art of the Spanish 
bullfight—since it is “an art,” as Hemingway tells us, “that deals with death”—death and 
art per se are not merely contingently related to Hemingway’s art through his own, 
personal correlative (DIA 99). In fact, throughout Death in the Afternoon, Hemingway 
repeatedly suggests that the study of death is not only central to understanding the 
“whole” of the art of the Spanish bullfight, but is essential to the creation of art as well. 
Significantly, what Hemingway tells us in the opening pages of Death in the Afternoon—
that he is working to capture “the feeling of life and death” in his writing, that he intends 
to learn this from the study of death, that he chooses death as his teacher to assist him in 
his thinking and writing—is an interesting, but by no means an original approach to 
creating art (DIA 3).  
The relationship between death and art—i.e., what the study of death can teach 
the living about being an “artist”—has been a central subject in the philosophic discourse 
of existence philosophers for close to two centuries. In fact, the study of death and the 
creation of art, the art of living and the art of dying authentically are predominate themes 
in nineteenth and twentieth century philosophies of self and self-actualization. For the 
Existentialists in particular, the study of death—i.e., facing up to one’s own death—is 
                                                 
39 See John Killinger’s Hemingway and the Dead Gods, Susan Beegel’s Hemingway’s Craft of Omission, 
Philip Young’s Ernest Hemingway: A Reconsideration, and Miriam Mandel’s Hemingway’s Death in the 
Afternoon: The Complete Annotations and A Companion to Hemingway’s Death in the Afternoon.  
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essential to an individual’s actualization of his/her life and work as “art.” In fact, the 
study of one’s own death teaches the individual to see life as a “whole,” to see what 
his/her life would mean if it ended today. It teaches the individual to see his/her life as a 
“whole” and thus reveals the necessity of creating personal meaning and content for 
his/her own life; it reveals to individuals the importance of “creating their lives as ‘works 
of art’” (Guignon xxxv). Similarly, what Hemingway tells and shows us through the 
whole of his study of death in Death in the Afternoon—that “All art is only done by the 
individual”—reveals that for Hemingway, as for the Existentialists, it is through the study 
of death that the individual recognizes the importance of seeing his/her life “clear and as 
a whole” and comes to understand the necessity, as Hemingway puts it, of making 
“something of his own,” of creating “art” and becoming an “artist” (DIA 100, 278, 101). 
Decades of Hemingway scholars have, in fact, recognized and discussed the role 
death plays in Hemingway’s own life, in his canon of works, and in what has been called 
Hemingway’s own, self-developed “characteristic philosophy” (de Madariaga 18). 
Scholarship that focuses on the role of death in Hemingway’s works has variously 
addressed Hemingway’s interest in death and violence in general, and the bullfight in 
particular, as indicative of Hemingway’s intense “preoccupation” and morbid obsession 
with death and violence and as evidence of Hemingway’s need to exorcise his own 
traumatic, near-death experience on the Italian front (Killinger 18).40 A number of 
Hemingway scholars have also accurately identified the role of death and violence in 
Hemingway’s works as integral to Hemingway’s “ruling philosophy of life” in which the 
                                                 
40 See Philip Young’s Ernest Hemingway: A Reconsideration for Young’s assessment of how 
Hemingway’s own experiences with death relate to his life and his canon of works.   
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Spanish bullfight is a “fixed and indelible” part, “the basis of his elemental philosophy 
which he would carry with him throughout his life” (Castillo-Puche 236). Yet it was John 
Killinger who first turned to existential ideology as a point of departure for understanding 
the role death plays throughout Hemingway’s canon of works, what Killinger insightfully 
identifies in Hemingway and the Dead Gods as “the most immediate key to the 
interpretation of his [Hemingway’s] work” (Killinger 18). Although Killinger accurately 
identifies the similarities between Hemingway’s fascination with death and death as a 
central subject of existential philosophy, he gives relatively scant critical attention to the 
work in which Hemingway most directly addresses the subject of death: Death in the 
Afternoon. Albeit briefly, Killinger does examine Death in the Afternoon and 
Hemingway’s fascination with the Spanish bullfight in terms of existential notions of 
facing death: he discusses death as a revealer of truth and of freedom, “the moment of 
truth” in the bullring as “the moment of existential anguish,” and draws a connection 
between Hemingway’s protagonists and the “existentialist hero” (Killinger 30, 48). 
Although Killinger’s treatment of Death in the Afternoon leaves much to be said, his 
work did, in fact, spur a critical trend in which scholars began to re-examine the role of 
death in Death in the Afternoon and throughout Hemingway’s canon of works through 
the lens of existential philosophy. 
Following Killinger’s lead, numerous Hemingway scholars have identified and 
discussed the underlying philosophies at work in Death in the Afternoon as reminiscent 
of existential notions of death, freedom, and personal meaning, yet critical examination 
of Hemingway’s discourse on death has been limited, for the most part, to discussions of 
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the general existential tendencies in Hemingway’s works. Kathy Willingham, for 
example, discusses Hemingway’s code hero in Death in the Afternoon—the matador-
artist—in terms of  “existential authenticity” and “existential be-ing in the world” 
(Willingham 37). Wayne Kvam, who attributes Hemingway’s popularity in Germany to 
the existential ideology that reverberates throughout Hemingway’s works, dedicates less 
than a dozen sentences to Death in the Afternoon. Yet aside from Manfred Pütz and 
Jacqueline Brogan, who attribute the philosophies Hemingway espouses to specific 
existential philosophers—i.e., Friedrich Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard, respectively—
critical examination of the role of death in Death in the Afternoon continues to be 
discussed for its general existential tendencies, tendencies which have been variously 
attributed to a mixture of existentialisms by Friedrich Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, 
Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus.41  
Significantly, the death epistemology Hemingway espouses throughout Death in 
the Afternoon is, in fact, undeniably consistent with the intellectual and philosophic 
currents of his time. Yet by looking at Hemingway’s focus on death in terms of general 
existential tendencies, critics have neglected to consider the historical moment of Death 
in the Afternoon. Killinger analyzes Death in the Afternoon in terms of Sartre’s concept 
of “nausea,” Heidegger’s discussion of “being-towards-death,” and Camus’ claim that the 
individual must repeatedly face death, for example, concepts that post-date Hemingway’s 
creation of Death in the Afternoon (Killinger 19, 50, 20, 22). In short, Heidegger, Sartre, 
and Camus come too late, but Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, were, in fact, on the American 
                                                 
41 See Manfred Pütz Nietzsche in American Literature and Thought and Jacqueline Brogan’s “It’s only 
interesting the first time; or Hemingway as Kierkegaard.” 
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scene—Nietzsche via H.L. Mencken and Kierkegaard via L.M. Hollander and David 
Swenson.  
Although Nietzsche dominated the American scene in the 1910s and 20s, with 
Mencken’s highly popular explication The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche appearing 
in three different editions between 1908 and 1913, Kierkeggard’s philosophies of life and 
death were gaining currency in the German, French, Spanish, and English-speaking 
worlds during the first quarter of the twentieth century.42 Although much of the cultural 
discourse on Kierkegaard in America preceded English translations of Kierkegaard’s 
canon of works, the growing interest in Kierkegaard and Kierkegaardian philosophy in 
America is not only evident in the sheer number of scholarly articles that discuss 
Kierkegaard in the first quarter of the twentieth century, but is also evident in the early 
appropriation of Kierkegaardian philosophy by some of the world’s most prolific literary 
artists. 43 In his “Introduction” to Selections from the Writings of Kierkegaard (1923), one 
of the first English translation of Kierkegaard’s writings, L.M. Hollander notes that 
Henrik Ibsen’s poem “Brand” “undeniably owes its fundamental thought to him 
[Kierkegaard],” although Ibsen himself admitted that he “had read little of Kierkegaard 
                                                 
42 For the American critical reception of Nietzsche see Manfred Pütz’s “Nietzsche in America: An 
Introduction” and Hays Steilberg’s “First Steps in the New World: Early Popular Reception of Nietzsche in 
America” in Nietzsche in American Thought and Literature. 
43 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries mention of Kierkegaard in journals such as The 
American Journal of Theology, The Philosophical Review, The Biblical World, The American Journal of 
Semitic Languages and Literatures, The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, The 
Philosophical Review, and The Harvard Theological Review, just to name a handful, points to the diverse 
interest in the applicability of Kierkegaard’s writings to American interests and concerns. In the 1920s in 
particular, scholars such as L.M. Hollander and David Swenson began to meet the growing demand for 
English translations and explications of Kierkegaard’s canon. Yet, where Hollander’s 1923 translation of 
Kierkegaard entitled Selections from the Writings of Kierkegaard introduced Kierkegaard to the English-
speaking world as a literary figure and his writings as “literature within a literature,” David Swenson 
discussed the philosophical and theological implications of Kierkegaard’s writings throughout the first 
quarter of the twentieth-century (Hollander 1). 
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and understood less” (1). 44 Notable literary figures such as Franz Kafka were integral in 
introducing Kierkegaard to the literary world, and early literary studies such as Clyde 
Charles Holler’s Boston University Dissertation Kierkegaard's Concept of Tragedy in the 
Context of his Pseudonymous Works (1900), Einar Wulfsberg Anderson’s Master’s thesis 
The Influence of Kierkegaard's Philosophy on the Works of Henrik Ibsen (1926), and 
Edwin Muir’s "A Note on Franz Kafka" (1931), do not merely stand as testaments to 
Kierkegaard’s early influence and importance in the literary and the academic worlds, but 
also stand as evidence of the English-speaking world’s growing interest in Kierkegaard 
and Kierkegaardian thought early in the twentieth century (Kraushaar 562).  
Kierkegaard’s origins in American thought are most commonly attributed to 
American scholars David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Marino). In his work 
Existential America, scholar George Cotkin notes Swenson’s interest in Kierkegaard 
began in 1890 when Swenson first read Kierkegaard’s Unconcluding Scientific Postscript 
in German translation (Cotkin 43). Swenson’s role in the propagation of Kierkegaardian 
thought in America, like Walter Lowrie’s, is traditionally attributed to their highly 
popular English translations of Kierkegaard’s canon of works in the 1930s and early 
1940s, translations, which by the mid-1940s, made Kierkegaard practically a household 
name in America (Cotkin 54). Yet, Swenson’s early discourse on Kierkegaard, both in 
journals and in lectures at the University of Minnesota, L.M. Hollander’s 1923 translation 
                                                 
44 Although Gordon D. Marino cites that the first English translation of Kierkegaard’s works appeared in 
1908, he provides no citation for this work. See Marino’s Biography “About Søren Kierkegaard” on the 
Howard V. and Edna H. Hong Kierkegaard Library site or Marino’s “Making Faith Possible” Atlantic 
Monthly 272.1 (July 1993): 109-113.   
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Selections from the Writings of Kierkegaard,45 Walter Lowrie’s sermons and Princeton 
lectures on Kierkegaard in the late 1920s and early 1930s,46 and the growing consensus 
that Kierkegaardian philosophy pre-dated what had already come to be known as 
existential thought,47 provides evidence that Kierkegaard was, in fact, becoming an 
established part of the academic, literary, philosophic, and religious discourses in 
America at the time Hemingway was writing Death in the Afternoon.   
In the decades before Kierkegaard translations exploded on the American scene in 
the 1930s and 1940s, Kierkegaard was being touted as one of the most important thinkers 
of the nineteenth century. In fact, as early as 1916, David Swenson anticipates that what 
he calls “Kierkegaard’s comprehensive literature of the personality” will assure 
“Kierkegaard’s permanent fame as a thinker” (Swenson, “The Anti-Intellectualism of 
Kierkegaard” 575). Both Hollander and Swenson recognize Kierkegaard’s relevance to 
modern American thought early in the century and both attribute Kierkegaard’s 
importance, in part, to his emphasis on subjective epistemology and his corresponding 
philosophies of self and self-actualization. Swenson, for example, notes that 
“Kierkegaard calls himself a subjective thinker” and appropriately tags Kierkegaard an 
“artistic thinker” (“The Anti-Intellectualism” 568). His method of “indirect 
communication,” which both Swenson and Hollander address, is a method by which the 
author—i.e., Kierkegaard or one of his pseudonymous authors—serves only to assist the 
                                                 
45 Hollander’s translation, published by the University of Texas, includes Fear and Trembling, 
“Diapsalmata” (from Either-Or, Part I), “The Banquet” (from Stages on Life's Road, Part I), Preparation 
for a Christian Life, and The Present Moment. 
46 In March of 1929 Lowrie began his first sermons on Kierkegaard, and in June of 1930 Lowrie returned to 
Princeton to begin an "itinerant ministry." In 1930, he began to lecture on Barth and Søren Kierkegaard. 
See “Walter Lowrie Papers” at <http://infoshare1.princeton.edu/libraries/firestone/rbsc/aids/lowrie.html>.  
47 According to Kierkegaard scholar Charles Guignon, “[m]any of the major themes in secular 
existentialism were first developed by Kierkegaard” (2). 
  74
“disciple” or reader to discover the truth for him/herself (Swenson, “The Anti-
Intellectualism” 568; Hollander, “Introduction”). For Hollander, Kierkegaard’s 
importance to twentieth century thought is not merely bound to Kierkegaard’s turn to 
subjective epistemology but to his message of “individual responsibility,” a message he 
clearly addresses to “my only reader, the single individual” (1). For Kierkegaard, the 
individual, as Swenson explicates, “is a synthesis between the universal and the 
particular,” and the realization of the structure of one’s own human nature is, according 
to Hollander, the “outcome of some severe inner conflict engendering infinite passion,” 
what Swenson calls “experience surcharged with pathos” (Hollander, “Introduction”; 
Swenson, “Anti-Intellectualism” 574). The realization of the structure of one’s nature, 
what Kierkegaard discusses in terms of the “temporal and the eternal,” leads the 
individual to “the realization of his own proper human task”—i.e., the expression of the 
eternal in one’s nature—the part of human nature Kierkegaard believes most crucially 
requires expression (Guignon 7). Significantly, the profound emotional experience which 
accompanies the individual seeing his/her life as a “whole”—as a synthesis of the 
temporal and the eternal—and the individual’s responsibility to create his/her life as “art” 
by expressing the eternal in his/her nature, are particularly relevant to what Hemingway 
espouses throughout Death in the Afternoon as a “whole” and through his detailing of the 
Spanish bullfight in particular. In fact, our understanding of the multifarious depths and 
dimensions of Death in the Afternoon as a “whole”—what I see as Hemingway’s 
philosophical treatise on the impact the thought of death has on life and art—can be 
advanced through an examination of how Hemingway puts philosophy in motion through 
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the only living art “that includes death as part of the spectacle”—the art of the Spanish 
bullfight (Ibán ez 144). Therefore, I will, as Hemingway does in his detailing of the 
Spanish bullfight, present the bullfight and Hemingway’s philosophy of death 
“integrally,” since as both Hemingway and Kierkegaard state, each part is only 
significant as it relates to the “whole” and each part, “if made truly,” as I believe 
Hemingway does through his detailing of the bullfight, “will represent the whole” of 
Hemingway’s study of Death in the Afternoon (DIA 7; 278).48  
 
The Study of Death via the Spanish Bullfight 
 
In the opening pages of Death in the Afternoon Hemingway tells readers that he 
chooses “violent death” as the focus of his study because it is “one of the simplest things 
of all and the most fundamental” (DIA 2). Hemingway suggests the simplicity of “violent 
death” is bound to the fact that “[i]t has none of the emotional complications of death by 
disease, or so-called natural death, or the death of a friend or some one you have loved or 
have hated, but it is death nevertheless” (DIA 2).49 Hemingway admits that although his 
own life experiences have made him familiar with death, he has never been able to “study 
the death of his father or the hanging of some one, say, that he did not know and would 
not have to write of immediately after for the first edition of an afternoon newspaper” 
                                                 
48 See Guignon’s Existentialism: Basic Writings p.4 and Swenson’s “The Anti-Intellectualism of 
Kierkegaard” for explications of Kierkegaard’s view of how the parts of our lives relate to our lives as a 
whole. 
49 Although Hemingway does digress from his study of violent death, most notably in the imbedded tales in 
“The Natural History of the Dead,” his shift of focus to natural death, slow death and the scene of the dead 
after war, for example, serve to further illustrate how differing life-views—personal, professional, and 
religious—cloud one’s ability to see death clearly.    
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without personal, emotional, or professional complications (DIA 3).50 Since Hemingway 
himself strives to see death and the bullfight “clearly” and “as a whole”—that is, without 
emotional or professional interference—he chooses what he sees as the simplest of all 
deaths to study and understand: violent death. His choice of violent death in the bullring, 
in particular, is twofold: one, it is “[t]he only place where you could see life and death, 
i.e., violent death now that the wars were over”; and two, the bullfight is a spectator sport 
in which death is a “fundamental” part (DIA 2).  
Hemingway suggests the fundamentality of violent death in the bull ring is due to 
death being an integral part of the Spanish bullfight, since the bullfight, taken as a 
“whole,” is a performance that “includes death as part of the spectacle” (Ibánez 144). 
Hemingway reinforces the persistence of death in the bull ring as a “fundamental” part of 
the spectacle when he tells readers that “there is always death” in the bullfight, that “there 
is danger for the man but certain death for the animal,” that in the bullfight, “the bull is 
certain to be killed” (DIA 1, 16, 20).  Significantly, Hemingway not only calls attention to 
the certainty of death in the Spanish bullfight as a fundamental premise of the spectacle, 
but he also points to the certainty of death as a fundamental premise of life. Throughout 
Death in the Afternoon, Hemingway reminds us of what is fundamental and certain in our 
own lives, that “our bodies all wear out in some way and we die,” that “no man can avoid 
death by honest effort,” and that “all stories, if continued far enough, end in death” (DIA 
11, 122). The duality of Hemingway’s vision of the certainty of death in the bullfight and 
                                                 
50 Hemingway writes: “It might be argued that I had become callous through having observed war, or 
through journalism, but this would not explain other people who had never seen war, nor, literally, physical 
horror of any sort, nor even worked on, say, a morning newspaper, having exactly the same reactions [to 
what happens to the horses]” (DIA 8).  
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of the certainty of death in life reveals Hemingway’s attempt, as John Killinger notes, “to 
reduce the problem of existence to its lowest common denominator”—i.e., death and the 
certainty of death for all living things (21-22). But not only does Hemingway 
simultaneously call attention to death as a fundamental and certain aspect of the bullfight 
and of life, he also emphasizes the importance of seeing the spectacle of the bullfight and 
of death subjectively (i.e., individually). In fact, Hemingway’s repeated emphasis on the 
certainty of death in the bullfight and of the bullfight as an “individual experience” 
simultaneously points to the epistemological shift to subjectivity and to the loss of all 
certainties—perceptual, moral, emotional, and religious—and reveals that Hemingway 
chooses to study death since it is the only certainty that remains. Death, as Hemingway 
puts it, is an “unescapable reality,” what Beatriz Ibánez recognizes as “the only truth in a 
world of appearances” (DIA 63, 266; Ibánez 145). 51  And the “truth” is that death, which 
is “always an individual experience,” is a fundamental certainty that all living beings 
must consider for themselves (DIA 63).  
 
Hemingway’s Epistemology; or “Hemingway as Kierkegaard”52  
 
The opening pages of Death in the Afternoon not only reveal that Hemingway’s 
epistemology and authorial stance reflect that of Kierkegaard and his various 
pseudonymous authors’ emphasis on the importance that individuals become “subjective 
thinkers,” but they also reveal that Hemingway’s epistemological stance, like that of 
                                                 
51 Emphasis mine. 
52 This title is borrowed from Jacqueline Brogan’s article entitled, “It’s only interesting the first time; or 
Hemingway as Kierkegaard.” 
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Kierkegaard and his authors, is inevitably intertwined with the study of death as a way to 
discover “truth”—subjectively.53 As “subjective thinkers,” Hemingway and Kierkegaard 
reinforce the importance of individuals discovering “truth” for themselves by 
constructing “authors,” narrative voices who do not claim to be “authorities” but who tell 
readers that they, themselves, are striving to discover their own truths (i.e., what is true 
for them and their own lives) through studying death. Hemingway, himself, privileges his 
own subjective epistemology, and by doing so, he not only stresses the importance of 
relying on one’s own powers of observation, one’s own experiences, and one’s own 
feelings, but he also serves to illustrate his epistemological processes—i.e., how he, or 
one, acquires knowledge subjectively. Although Hemingway tells us he knows some 
things about the Spanish bullfight and has written of and witnessed death, he also admits 
he has never studied it before—the Spanish bullfight or death. In fact, Hemingway does 
not claim himself an authority on the subject of the bullfight or of death: he can only “tell 
honestly the things” he has “found true” about them (DIA 1).  Hemingway tells 
“honestly” what he has found “true” by sharing his own observations, experiences, and 
feelings on the subject of death and on spectacle, the art, the cruelty, the danger and death 
in the Spanish bullfight. Although what has been called Hemingway’s “memoir” serves 
to illustrate how he, or one, comes to see the bullfight and the spectacle of death “clearly” 
                                                 
53 Kierkegaard is well-known for his use of differing pseudonymous authors in order to present his readers 
with differing individual life-views—some authentic, some not. For the purpose of brevity, I will hereafter 
simply use “Kierkegaard” rather than engage in distinguishing between Kierkegaard and his pseudonymous 
authors. For a comprehensive discussion of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authors and their significance to 
his work, see M. Hartshorne Holmes’ Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver: The Nature and Meaning of his 
Pseudonymous Writings, New York, Columbia UP, 1990.    
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and as a “whole,” Hemingway also emphasizes the importance that his readers do the 
same; that is, they must privilege their own subjectivity. He tells readers they must feel, 
not as they have been “taught to feel,” but must give credence to their own “reactions,” 
they must discern for themselves what they feel is “good” and “bad,” both morally and 
aesthetically, and they must reserve all judgements of the bullfight until “he, or she, has 
seen the things that are spoken of and knows truly what their reactions to them would be” 
(DIA 1). In short, they must learn to rely on their own observations and experience and 
their own feelings and reactions, and they must create their own standards—both moral 
and aesthetic—that have meaning for their own lives.  
Significantly, Hemingway does not advocate a perspectiveless subjective 
epistemology; in fact, the opening pages of Death in the Afternoon reveal that 
Hemingway employs and encourages a “phenomenological approach” to the study of 
death and the Spanish bullfight (Ibánez 143). Hemingway’s intent, as Anthony Brand 
accurately notes, is “to teach his readers how to look. His book is not a guide on how to 
fight a bull; it is, rather, a guide on how to look at the bull and the bullfighter who is 
fighting him” (Brand 169). To help readers achieve this perspective—what Hemingway 
refers to as seeing “clearly” and as a “whole”—Hemingway does several things to 
“make” his readers, much in the same way Hemingway suggests the matador must “make 
the bull” (DIA 147).   
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Hemingway’s Perspectivism: The “Individual Experience” of Death in the Bullring 
 
In the opening pages of Death in the Afternoon in particular, Hemingway 
addresses several aspects of the bullfight that could complicate the reader’s ability to 
achieve the perspective Hemingway espouses and illustrates throughout his treatise on 
death. In order to help readers learn to see the bullfight and the spectacle of death 
“clearly” and as a “whole,” he demands his readers experience the bullfight first-hand 
and advises they not view the bullfight as a bloodsport, so to speak, but as an “art” in 
which death is only part, although a certain part, of the spectacle. For example, 
Hemingway attempts to explain away the emotional interference caused by what happens 
to the horses in the bullring, and asks readers to withhold from judging parts of the 
bullfight, except as they relate to the “whole” of the bullfight, not just as a spectacle but 
as an art (DIA 1, 8-9). Hemingway himself employs this perspective, shows readers what 
he sees when he is viewing the bullfight “clearly” and as a “whole” and shares the 
significance and meaning the bullfight and the persistence of death in the bullring has for 
him. Significantly, Hemingway’s death epistemology not only embodies the 
perspectivism and turn to subjectivity he advocates but reveals that Hemingway’s 
phenomenological and subjective focus on death as a way to discover “truth” is 
commensurate with Kierkegaardian notions of how and what one can learn from the 
study of death (de Madariaga 18).  
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Hemingway’s epistemology and perspectivism, like that of Kierkegaard’s, is 
bound to the study of death, not just death via the Spanish bullfight. The significance of 
Hemingway’s epistemology of death, like that of Kierkegaard’s, is fourfold. First, 
Hemingway and Kierkegaard focus on the only universal truth—the certainty of death—
as the point of departure for their study. Second, they both stress the importance of the 
study of death, since it is the only certainty in life and the only truth that remains in 
modern times. Third, they both repeatedly call attention to the study of death as an 
individual experience. And fourth, they both attempt to make the reader see death 
“clearly” and as a “whole” by providing examples of authentic and inauthentic 
perspectives on death. For both Hemingway and Kierkegaard the study of death reveals 
that death is the only certainty, that death is a subjective experience, and that one must 
see death “clearly” and as a “whole” in order for the study of death to have an impact on 
one’s life. Hemingway and Kierkegaard focus on death because there is a universal 
“Truth” to death—i.e., death is certain for all living beings. But death is an individual 
experience without universal meaning, feelings, reactions, morality, or ways to die, for 
example. This is the subjective aspect of the “truth” of death of which nothing is certain. 
For example, if there was a universal experience of death, death would be consistently the 
same for everyone. But since there is no equality in death, men can only study ways to 
temporarily prevent it, ease the coming of it, and learn to identify the physical signs of it; 
or they can speculate on it, on the best way to die, the worst, the state that is or is not 
afterlife; or they can moralize on it, on sin, salvation, and the suicide, for example. But as 
Kierkegaard directly addresses and Hemingway illustrates, these are all merely differing 
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and inadequate perspectives of death, what Kierkegaard and Hemingway both denounce 
as inadequate perspectives or life-views of death.54 For both Hemingway and 
Kierkegaard, in order to learn from the study of death, one must have the proper 
perspective; one must learn to see death “clearly” and as a “whole.” Yet, throughout 
Death in the Afternoon, Hemingway is not merely showing readers how to see the 
spectacle of death in the bullfight “clearly” and as part of the “whole”; instead, what 
Hemingway shows readers throughout his detailing of the Spanish bullfight is the 
importance of seeing their own deaths “clearly” and their own lives as a “whole”—as 
towards-death. 
In order to see death “clearly,” to have an “earnest thought of death” as 
Kierkegaard calls it, one must think of his/her own death and resign him/herself to the 
certainty of death as well as the uncertainty of when death will arrive. Because “[w]hen 
death comes… meaning is at an end,” seeing own’s own death “clearly” brings an 
individual to see what his/her life would mean as a “whole” if it ended this very day.  
Through facing the certainty of death the individual sees his/her end “clearly” and his/her 
life as a “whole,” but it is the thought of the uncertainty of death that gives the 
individual’s “life force as nothing else does” (Kierkegaard, “At a Graveside” 83). It is 
through facing one’s own certain death and uncertain hour that the individual comes to 
fear the scarcity of time created by the uncertain hour of death; thus death teaches the 
                                                 
54 Hemingway specifically calls attention to a variety of modern perspectives that are inadequate for the 
study of death, including “a Christian point of view,” an “animalarian” or “humanitarian” perspective, and 
naturalistic or scientific views of death (1; 9; 133). Hemingway’s perspectivism requires that we view the 
bullfight from varying perspectives (from different seats in the bullring, as a spectacle, and as an art, for 
example), and he requires us to leave pre-conceived notions, judgments, and world-views out of our 
assessment of the bullfight so we can come to see the bullfight (and death) clearly, truly, and as a whole.   
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individual “not to fear those who kill the body but to fear for himself and fear having his 
life in vanity, in the moment, in imagination” (Kierkegaard, “At a Graveside” 77). The 
earnest thought of death teaches earnestness in life; because time is both certainly and 
uncertainly limited, this thought motivates the individual to live life bravely and fully 
each and every day since every day may be the day death will come. Like Kierkegaard, 
Hemingway sees facing death—facing the certainty of one’s own death as well as the 
uncertain moment of death’s arrival—as integral to “see life and death” “clearly” and as a 
“whole” (DIA 3). For Hemingway, the bullring provides the perfect arena in which the 
impact of facing the certainty and uncertainty of death can be observed, experienced, and 
studied. In fact, the Spanish bullfight itself not only points to the certainty of death—
death only being part of the spectacle of the bullfight—but to the uncertainty of the 
moment when and circumstances under which death will become part of the spectacle. 
Yet, it is not just through the Spanish bullfight and the spectacle of death that 
Hemingway puts his philosophy of death in motion; Hemingway, in fact, provides a 
living example through his detailing of the matadors of Spain who literally face the 
certainty and uncertainty of death in the bullring on almost a daily basis.  
 
The Matador-Artist and Artistic Failures: 
Pundonor and Cowardice in the Face of Death 
 
Because the Spanish bullfight is the only living art that “includes death as part of 
the spectacle,” it is also the only art in which the artist’s creation of his art is, in part, 
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bound to how he faces death in the bullring (Ibánez 144). Thus, for Hemingway the 
matadors of Spain do not only serve as a living illustration of how facing death with 
courage has an impact on the life and art of the matador, but also, and more often, serve 
to illustrate how matadors fail to create art due to cowardice and fear when facing the bull 
and possible death in the bullring. In fact, Hemingway describes a number of matadors 
and their reaction to the danger of death in the bullring, some earnest, some not. Some 
fear the bull, some fear goring, some fear death, some, Hemingway writes, “started as 
though they might be good matadors and end in varying degrees of failure and tragedy” 
(DIA 224). Significantly, at the time Hemingway writes Death in the Afternoon he feels 
that the majority of bullfighters in Spain are artistic failures. Hemingway writes: “Of the 
seven-hundred and sixty-some unsuccessful bullfighters still attempting to practice their 
art in Spain,” the “brave ones” fail through “lack of talent” and the ones with skill fail 
because of “fear” (DIA 227). Hemingway does briefly note matadors who use “tricks” to 
compensate for their lack of artistic ability and those who “lack artistic ability” entirely, 
but he gives much more attention to those who fail artistically due to uncontrollable fear 
in the face of death. 
Although Hemingway, himself, admits that his own nerves—even after a few 
drinks—failed him in the bullring, the matador, a highly paid professional, is expected to 
face the bull, possible goring, and possible death in the bull ring with courage and honor; 
he is expected to have the courage necessary to work closely with the bull and thus create 
what Hemingway calls “sculptural art” through his performance. 55 Because in the 
Spanish bullfight “the degree of brilliance in the performance is left to the fighter’s 
                                                 
55 See DIA p. 172. 
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honor,” the matador’s honor, Hemingway tells us, “is as necessary to a bullfight as good 
bulls” (DIA 92). Although a bullfighter, Hemingway writes, “is excused for bad work if 
the bull is very difficult,” it is a matter of “pundonor,” or honor, for a bullfighter to do the 
best work he can with every bull (DIA 91). In short, this means that the matador’s 
performance—regardless of the responsiveness of the bull—is judged by how he reacts to 
the danger of death in the bullring. But because the bullfight is a living art, “the only art 
in which the artist is in danger of death,” a matador’s performance is also gauged by his 
effort and ability to create art while facing death. For Hemingway, the matadors of Spain 
not only provide a living illustration of pundonor, but also serve to illustrate what 
Kierkegaard himself discusses as the connection between the earnest thought of one’s 
own death and the creation of art; that is, how one faces death determines their ability to 
create art. Therefore, just as Hemingway emphasizes how facing death in the bullring 
with pundonor is essential to the matador’s creation of art, what Kierkegaard envisions as 
the earnest thought of death is essential for the individual to create his/her life and work 
as “art.”  
Because of the “constant danger of death” for the matador in the bullring, through  
his study of the Spanish bullfight and the matadors of Spain, Hemingway not only finds 
an equivalent for what Kierkegaard characterizes as “earnestness” in the Spaniard’s 
conception of pundonor, but he also finds an equivalent for what Kierkegaard discusses 
as inauthentic perspectives or “moods” towards death in the various displays of 
cowardice in the bull ring (DIA 166, 91; “At a Graveside” 74-75). Where Hemingway 
tells us that “it is a matter of pundonor not to show cowardice,” Kierkegaard describes 
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cowardice as the binding characteristic at the root of most inauthentic moods towards the 
thought of one’s own death that are not earnest. Of the moods towards death Kierkegaard 
illustrates and describes as not being earnest—emotional interference, depression, fear, 
inclinations toward suicide, viewing death as a relief, refusing to acknowledge death 
exists—a lack of courage in facing one’s own certain death is the most common 
characteristic. Similarly, Hemingway’s detailing of the “fake messiahs” and artistic 
failures who fail to actualize pundonor in the bull ring reveals that a lack of courage in 
facing the possibility of their own death is the most prevalent reason.  
Throughout Death in the Afternoon Hemingway exposes and denounces 
matadorian tricks and nerved–up courage in the bull ring and presents individual portraits 
of failed matadors and “fake messiahs,” matadors whose cowardice and fear in the face 
of death is, for Hemingway, a disgrace. Matadors such as Rafael El Gallo who “never 
admitted the idea of death and…would not even go in to look at Joselito in the chapel 
after he was killed” is among those whose fear of death is so pronounced that they refuse 
to think about death at all; they, as Kierkegaard advises against, completely ignore the 
existence of death (DIA 159). Matadors such as Chicuelo and La Rosa, who witnessed 
and could never “completely forget the death of Joselito and of Granero,” became even 
more frightened of the bull, of goring, and of death, what Kierkegaard describes as a 
“fear of those who kill the body,” which is not an earnest fear of death (DIA 74, 243; “At 
a Graveside” 77).56 Although Kierkegaard does not explicitly address physical displays of 
cowardice in his distinctions between earnestness and moods, Hemingway discusses 
                                                 
56 Significantly, for Kierkegaard, “to witness the death of another” and not think of one’s own death is a 
mood (75).  
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matadors whose fear of death is so pronounced that it is visible in the bull ring. He writes 
of Domingo Hernandorena, a matador who “could not control the nervousness of his 
feet” and describes one bullfight in particular in which Hernandorena, in an effort to 
control his feet, “dropped to both knees” and was gored severely (DIA 17- 18). Although 
Hemingway tells us that “[t]o be gored” is “honorable,” Hernandorena received no 
sympathy from the spectators because everyone knows, Hemingway writes, “[t]he knees 
are for cowards” (DIA 19). Hemingway also writes of Cagancho, a matador who is 
“subject to fits of cowardice, altogether without integrity, who violates all the rules, 
written, and unwritten, for the conduct of a matador” (DIA 13). According to 
Hemingway, Cagancho’s “cynical cowardice” at the moment of killing is “the most 
disgusting negation of bullfighting that can be seen; worse even than the panic of Nino de 
la Palma,” whose panic, Hemingway writes, is “cowardice in its least attractive form” 
(DIA 88, 250). On the other hand, when Cagancho is confident, Hemingway writes, he 
“could serve as a model and illustration of perfection in artistic bullfighting” (DIA 250). 
But, Hemingway continues, Cagancho “only performs…if he is certain that there is no 
danger….He does not take chances. He must be certain in his own mind that danger,” or 
death, “does not exist” (DIA 250). In short, he avoids danger and death, as well as the 
thought of his own death, a cowardly mood Kierkegaard describes as fear that prevents 
one from living life fully.   
As Hemingway himself admits, courage when facing possible death is difficult 
enough, but what further complicates facing death in the bullring is the “necessity of 
physical courage to face wounding and possible death after the wounding has become a 
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reality through its first experience” (DIA 88). 57 Thus Hemingway describes matadors 
who, after their first goring, regardless of their previous displays of courage in the 
bullring, were unable to continue to create their “art” in the face of death due to a fear of 
that which “kills the body”—the bull (“At a Graveside” 77). Hemingway writes of 
matadors such as Julian Saiz who, after his first goring, became “the embodiement of 
caution and safety before all things” (DIA 75). Juan Luis de la Rosa, for example, “was 
gored once, frightened forever, and quickly disappeared from circulation” and Manuel 
Jiminez aka Chicuelo, Hemingway writes, “was wonderful until he was first touched by a 
bull” but then was “utterly cowardly if the bull offered any difficulties” (DIA 75-76).58 
Since “[a]ll matadors,” Hemingway tells us, “are gored dangerously, painfully, and very 
close to fatally, sooner or later, in their careers,” it is not “until a matador has undergone 
this first severe wound” that one can discern whether a matador is truly brave and thus be 
able to determine “what his permanent value” as a bullfighter will be (DIA 166). Such is 
the case, Hemingway tells us, with Nino de la Palma aka Cayetano Ordonez, who “in his 
first season as a matador… looked like the messiah who had come to save bullfighting if 
ever any one did” (DIA 88). But then “he was gored severely and painfully in the thigh 
very near the femoral artery” (DIA 88-89). Because of this near-death experience,  
That was the end of him…. He could hardly look at a bull. His fright as he 
had to go in to kill was painful to see and he spent the whole season 
assassinating bulls in the way that offered him least danger…. It was the 
                                                 
57 See DIA p. 172 for Hemingway’s discussion of his own attempts at bullfighting. 
58 Although Chicuelo, according to Hemingway, could occasionally nerve himself up to perform close to 
the bull, his performances became one “of the saddest exhibitions of cowardice and shamelessness it would 
be possible to see” (DIA 76). 
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most shameful season any matador had ever had up until that year in 
bullfighting. What had happened was that the horn wound, the first real 
goring, had taken all his valor. He never got it back. He had too much 
imagination. (DIA 89-90)  
Significantly, Hemingway’s descriptions of Ordonez as having “too much imagination” 
is illuminated by Kierkegaard’s view that “death is indeed not a monster except for the 
imagination” (“At a Graveside” 94). Kierkegaard explains that by practicing the earnest 
thought of death, one 
learned not to shudder at phantoms and human inventions but at the 
responsibility of death, now learned not to fear those who kill the body but 
to fear for himself and fear having his life in vanity, in the moment, in 
imagination. (“At a Graveside” 77) 
Throughout his portraits of failed matadors, Hemingway simultaneously explains what is 
considered to be improper conduct in the bullring and illustrates what Kierkegaard 
characterizes and explicates as inauthentic moods towards the thought of death. Like 
Kierkegaard, Hemingway presents his readers with a variety of inauthentic perspectives 
or moods towards death to help readers discern what pundonor—or earnestness—is by 
showing what it is not. Significantly, what these matadors serve to illustrate is how a lack 
of courage in facing the certainty and uncertainty of one’s own death has an impact on an 
individual’s ability to create art. Conversely, through Hemingway’s portraits of matadors 
such as Belmonte, Joselito, and Maera, Hemingway not only illustrates the importance of 
courage to the creation of art in the bullring, but through these matadors he 
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simultaneously describes and illustrates the importance of pundonor, what Kierkegaard 
discusses as earnestness, in the face of death. 
“In Spain,” Hemingway tells us, “honor is a very real thing. Called pundonor, it 
means honor, probity, courage, self-respect and pride in one word” (DIA 91). 
Significantly, Hemingway shows us throughout Death in the Afternoon that courage in 
the bull ring is essential to pundonor as a “whole” and essential to each “part” that 
comprises the concept of pundonor. For example, Hemingway suggests that courage is an 
essential part of pride: “Pride,” Hemingway writes, “is the strongest characteristic of the 
race and it is a matter of pundonor not to show cowardice” (DIA 91).59 In the name of 
pride and self-respect, a matador, Hemingway tells us, should never run from the bull like 
El Gallo does; he should control his nerves, especially his feet, something Nino de la 
Palma and Domingo Hernanando are unable to do (DIA 157, 250, 18-19). Hemingway 
also suggests that courage is essential to the matador’s probity in the bull ring. It takes 
courage for a matador to adhere to the highest principles and ideals of the bullfight: he 
should not use “tricks” to make it appear that he works close to the bull as Hemingway 
tell us Alfred Corrachano is known to do (DIA 230). In fact, it is a lack of courage that 
precipitates a matador’s use of “tricks” in the bull ring. Courage is necessary for a 
                                                 
59 It is important to distinguish between Hemingway’s conception of the term “pride” and Kierkegaard’s 
conception of “pride” as man’s greatest sin. Even though the Spanish bullfight (and San Fermin, in 
particular) has religious significance in Spain, Hemingway presents a secularized version of the experience 
of the bullfight and of the experience of seeing one’s own death. For Hemingway, the bullfight has an 
“emotional and spiritual intensity” and is “as profound as any religious ecstacy,” although it does not hold 
any religious value for Hemingway (emphasis mine; DIA 207, 68). Further, Hemingway’s use of the word 
“pride”suggests a “consciousness of what befits, is due to, or is worthy of oneself or one’s position”; it is 
self-respect or self-esteem “of a legitimate or healthy kind or degree” (OED). Hemingway’s use of “pride” 
could refer to “vitality, mettle, or spirit,” although this now rare use of the term refers to animals (OED). In 
the context of the bullfight and Hemingway’s discussion of death, it seems that “pride” refers to a respect 
for one’s own life: to have pride in oneself is to cherish or value one’s life, one’s vitality, and one’s creative 
spirit. This is quite different from the sense of the word in Kierkegaard’s canon of works.  
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matador to give an honest, true, and sincere performance, one without faked or tricked 
passes that make him appear to work close to the bull or make a bad kill look clean as 
Hemingway tells us Vincente Barrera does (DIA 248-249). Courage is essential for a 
matador to be able to kill cleanly and properly, going in over the bull’s horns as a 
matador is expected to do. Further, Hemingway suggests that courage is essential to 
honor when he writes: “Once it [cowardice] has been shown, truly and unmistakably 
shown, honor is gone” (DIA 91). In order to have honor in the bullring, a matador should 
conduct himself in the manner befitting a matador and observe the rules of the bullfight. 
In short, a matador must have courage in the face of death to observe those rules, unlike 
Bienvenida and Cagancho, who, Hemingway tells us, “make no pretense of observing the 
rules of killing” (DIA 249). In terms of respect for oneself, a lack of courage reveals a 
lack of confidence in one’s own abilities. It is a matter of self-respect and pride for a 
matador to attempt to perform his best every time, but this also takes courage.  
Because, as Hemingway tells us, “the function of bravery in the bullfight… 
should be a quality whose presence permits the fighter to perform all acts he chooses to 
attempt unhampered by apprehension,” we see that courage in the bullring is as necessary 
as pundonor, or honor, in the bull ring (DIA 94). To have the courage to perform without 
apprehension, this means that the matador does not fear the bull, goring, or the possibility 
of death. He does not use “tricks” because he has the courage to perform close to danger. 
His pride, his honor, and his self-respect demand that he maintain his courage through 
every moment and every fight. Because one must have courage to actualize pundonor in 
the bullring, pundonor, like earnestness, is actualized through how one faces death—with 
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pundonor, honor, and courage, or as a coward. In fact, Hemingway tells us that once “a 
bullfighter can no longer be calm and put danger away after the fight once starts, can no 
longer see the bull come calmly, without having to nerve himself, then he is through as a 
successful bullfighter” (DIA 167). Thus we not only see what the function of bravery or 
courage is in the bullfight, but also see that courage is the binding characteristic of 
pundonor, and what Hemingway describes as the parts of pundonor, are all represented 
by the “whole” of the concept, the “whole” bound together by the necessity of the 
matador’s courage in the face of death.  
. Hemingway shows us through his portraits of failed matadors that cowardice in 
the face of death is often quite visible in the bull ring, but Hemingway also presents 
matadors who have faced death with pundonor and have thus allowed the thought of 
death “to penetrate” their lives, “transform it,” and have a positive impact on their lives 
and art, something that Hemingway both tells and shows us is visible in the bullring 
(Kierkegaard, “At a Graveside” 98). Joselito, Belmonte, and Maera, who are all known to 
work closely with the bull and to kill cleanly and properly without apprehension, even 
after repeated goring, serve as living illustrations of how facing death with pundonor has 
a positive impact on one’s life and art.    
 In terms of the actualization of pundonor in the bull ring, Hemingway presents 
Belmonte and Joselito, who according to Hemingway’s standards were two of the 
greatest bullfighters in the history of bullfighting. Both worked closely with the bull, so 
close that they mark the transition from the original bullfight to the modern one;60 both 
                                                 
60 Because Belmonte and Joselito worked so closely to the bull, bulls were bred down in size. They could 
do more and “finer things with these smaller, easier bulls” (DIA 69-70).  
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always attempted to kill cleanly and honestly; both were repeatedly gored, but their 
performances were not effected negatively; both continued to produce emotion and both 
continued to create their “art” in the face of death.61 But both Belmonte and Joselito 
embody what Hemingway defines as pundonor. Belmonte, Hemingway writes, “was a 
genius,” who could “break the rules of bullfighting” (DIA 68-69). “The way Belmonte 
worked,” Hemingway writes, “was not a heritage, nor a development; it was a 
revolution” (DIA 69). Joselito was a “genius” who “lived for bullfighting” and because 
all of the bulls Joselito fought were easy for him, his pride, his pundonor, required that he 
“make his own difficulties” (DIA 69-70). Although Hemingway lauds Belmonte and 
Joselito as great artists who have gone “beyond what has been done or known” to make 
something of their own and who repeatedly prove their commitment to their art by always 
doing their best, Hemingway dedicates much more space to the evolution of Maera from 
banderillero to matador, a description through which Hemingway most directly illustrates 
what it means to have pundonor or earnestness in the face of death (DIA 99-100; 
Kierkegaard, “At a Graveside” 83).  
 Through Hemingway’s description of Maera, in particular, Hemingway provides 
a living illustration of how facing death with pundonor or earnestness has an impact on 
the life and art of the individual. Like Belmonte and Joselito, Maera’s performances in 
the bull ring reveal that he embodies what Hemingway discusses as pundonor. 
Hemingway tells us that Maera was intelligent, “naturally brave,” and “very proud… the 
proudest man” Hemingway claims he had ever seen (DIA 77-78). He had “a valor that 
                                                 
61 Belmonte was known to be gored numerous times a year, yet “none of his wounds had any effect on his 
courage, his passion for bullfighting, nor his reflexes” (DIA 167). Joselito, Hemingway tells us, “was only 
gored badly three times and killed fifteen hundred and fifty-seven bulls” (DIA 167). 
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was so absolute” that it was “solid part of him” (DIA 78). Significantly, Hemingway tells 
us that not only was Maera one of the best banderillos Hemingway had ever seen, but he 
became one of the best matadors, as well. Even after being gored severely in the neck, 
Maera, Hemingway tells us, was back in the bull ring fighting the next day (DIA 79).62 
During another performance in which Maera broke his wrist attempting to kill cleanly 
and properly, Maera, Hemingway notes, continued to attempt the kill numerous times 
because “his honor demanded” he finish the fight and kill his bull “high up between the 
shoulders” as a matador should; and he did (DIA 81).   
Through Hemingway’s description of Maera, Hemingway suggests that Maera’s 
embodiment of pundonor was evident in his work as a banderillo and after a few years as 
a matador—after correcting his flaws and improving his style—Maera became “an artist” 
(DIA 79). Maera, Hemingway writes, “went to the bulls” without apprehension: 
“arrogant, dominating and disregarding danger” and thus always “gave emotion” to the 
spectators (DIA 79). In fact, Hemingway writes that Maera 
was so brave that he shamed those stylists who were not and bullfighting 
was so important and so wonderful to him that, in his last year, his 
presence in the ring raised the whole thing from the least effort, get-rich-
quick, wait-for-the-mechanical bull basis it had fallen to, and, while he 
was in the ring, it again had dignity and passion. 
… 
                                                 
62 The wound in Maera’s neck, Hemingway tells us, “was closed with eight stitches…[h]is neck was stiff 
and he was furious. He was furious at the stiffness he could do nothing about and the fact that he had to 
wear a bandage that showed above his collar” (DIA 79).  
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But all the last year he fought you could see he was going to die….but he 
paid no attention to the pain. He acted as though it were not there….he 
ignored it. He was a long way beyond pain. I never saw a man to whom 
time seemed so short as it did to him that season. (DIA 78-79) 
Hemingway adds, “I thought that year he hoped for death in the ring but he would not 
cheat by looking for it” (DIA 82). He would not “cheat,” as Hemingway puts it, because 
to long for death, to think death is a relief from suffering, from pain, from life, this is not 
earnestness—this is a mood. As Kierkegaard puts it, “it is an indulgent lethargy that 
wants to go to bed—that is, indulgently wants to sleep itself into consolation, indulgently 
wants to sleep itself away from suffering” (“At a Gravside” 81). Even though during his 
“last six months of life he was very bitter” because “he knew he had tuberculosis,” 
Hemingway tells us that in these last six months Maera “lived with much passion and 
enjoyment” because “bullfighting was so important and so wonderful to him” and 
because “[h]e loved to kill bulls” (DIA 82). Although Maera “took absolutely no care of 
himself” after being diagnosed with tuberculosis, Hemingway attributes this to the fact 
that Maera had “no fear of death”; “he preferred to burn out, not as an act of bravado, but 
from choice” (DIA 82-83). Significantly, Maera’s commitment to living his life with 
passion and intensity, his commitment to the bullfight and to his “art,” and his decision to 
create his “art” until death comes for him, reveals how his pundonor or earnestness in the 
face of death had an impact on and transformed his life as well as his ability to create 
“art.” In fact, Maera illustrates what Kierkegaard describes as the impact the earnest 
thought of death has on an individual’s life and art. As Kierkegaard puts it:  
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Death in earnest gives life force as nothing else does; it makes one alert as 
nothing else does….the thought of death gives the earnest person the right 
momentum in life and the right goal toward which he directs his 
momentum…. Then earnestness grasps the present this very day, disdains 
no task as too insignificant, rejects no time as too short, works with all its 
might… (Kierkegaard, “At a Graveside” 83) 
Through Hemingway’s depiction of Maera, we see a matador who, through facing death 
earnestly or with pundonor, experiences a constant renewal of his urgency to live life 
fully each and every day. Through Maera Hemingway suggests what one can learn from 
the study of death: how the earnest thought of death can come to transform the life and 
art of the earnest individual. Like pundonor, it takes courage for an individual to see 
his/her death clearly and to think of one’s own certain death and uncertain hour. It takes 
courage to recognize the possible scarcity of time the individual has to make a 
commitment to his/her life, work, and art and to do his/her very best every day. And it 
takes courage to face one’s own death again and again and renew one’s commitment to 
life and art on almost a daily basis. Significantly, it is through the study of death the 
earnest individual learns that the “art of dying” is inevitably intertwined with the “art of 
living” Kierkegaard and Hemingway espouse. As Kierkegaard puts it, “To die is indeed 
the lot of every human being and thus is a very mediocre art, but to be able to die well is 
indeed the highest wisdom of life” (“At a Graveside” 76). To die well is to anticipate 
one’s own death, to see one’s own death “clearly” and one’s own life as a “whole,” and 
to allow the thought and experience of one’s own death to have a positive impact on how 
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one lives life; it motivates the individual to create his/her life and work as “art” each and 
every day.   
It is through Hemingway’s detailing of the matadors of Spain that Hemingway 
shows us that it is how a matador faces the possibility of death in the bull ring that 
determines whether or not he will be able to create “art.” If he faces the certainty and 
uncertainty of death earnestly or with pundonor, he not only experiences what 
Hemingway refers to as “the feeling of life and death,” but by working close to the bull 
he gives this feeling to his audience. Significantly, the profound emotional experience 
produced by a man, a bull, and a piece of cloth, what Hemingway describes as being “as 
profound as any religious ecstacy,” recalls the emotional and spiritual intensity 
Kierkegaard describes as accompanying the earnest though of death. For Hemingway, 
the bullfight, taken as a “whole,” is not merely a “living art” but a living illustration of 
the process of “becoming” in which a matador faces the certainty and the uncertainty of 
death and strives to capture and convey the profound emotional experience that 
accompanies facing death earnestly or with pundonor, a “performance” he attempts to 
repeat on almost a daily basis.  
  
The “feeling of life and death and mortality and immortality,”  
and the “moment of truth” in the Spanish Bullfight63 
 
 How a matador faces death in the bull ring determines the emotional experience 
of the bullfight: if he faces death with pundonor or earnestness, the matador-artist goes 
                                                 
63 See DIA p. 1 and p. 68 
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beyond the individual emotional experience and gives this emotion to his audience. This 
emotional experience, what Kierkegaard describes as accompanying the earnest thought 
of death, is bound to the earnest individual’s realization that a “self,” as Charles Guignon 
puts it, “is a tension between the finite and the infinite…the temporal and the eternal,” 
what Hemingway translates as “the feeling of life and death” of “mortality and 
immorality” that the matador-artist produces when he works closely with the bull. 
Kierkegaard’s description of what it means to face death earnestly suggests the 
individual’s realization that his/her “self” is a tension between life and death. 
Kierkegaard writes: “Earnestness is that you think death, and that you are thinking it as 
your lot, and that you are then doing what death is indeed unable to do—namely, that you 
are and death also is” (“At a Graveside” 75). It is through facing the certainty and 
uncertainty of one’s own death an individual comes to realize his/her nature as a 
synthesis of life and death, of the finite and the infinite, of the temporal and the eternal. 
Kierkegaard explains the temporal aspect of an individual’s life as signifying the separate 
moments of his/her life, what Hemingway discusses in terms of the “parts” of the 
bullfight experience; the eternal, on the other hand, “signifies the overarching unity” or 
“whole,” which “has the potential of providing the separate moments of our lives with the 
kind of meaning and significance they lack without this unity” (Guignon 4). Because 
there is always tension between the temporal and eternal in an individual’s life, the 
expression of the eternal in one’s nature is not only difficult but “it comes only with a 
struggle” (Guignon 7). In the bullfight, this struggle, this tension, is literal, the bullfight 
serving as a living illustration of individuals who are caught up in this tension and who 
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attempt to express the eternal through their commitment to the creation of their “art.” 
Thus, for Hemingway, the expression of the eternal, the expression of this unity, is found 
in the emotional experience of the bullfight at the “moment of truth,” the moment when 
life and death, mortality and immortality, the temporal and eternal exist simultaneously 
for the audience to see.    
 What Hemingway refers to as the emotional experience of the bullfight, an 
“ecstacy,” Hemingway writes, that is “as profound as any religious ecstacy,” recalls the 
emotional and spiritual intensity Kierkegaard discusses as accompanying the “earnest 
thought of death,” an emotional experience Hemingway describes as occuring at “the 
moment of truth” (DIA 68). Although Hemingway does distinguish between the “original 
moment of truth”—the moment of “the final sword thrust, the actual encounter between 
the man and the animal”—and “the modern moment of truth”—the faena—his 
descriptions of the emotional intensity produced at these moments are consistent. In both 
instances, it is the “feeling of life and death and mortality and immortality” that the 
matador experiences and then gives to the crowd (DIA 4).  
 In the original moment of truth, “the beauty of the moment of killing,” 
Hemingway tells us, “is that flash when man and bull form one figure as the sword goes 
all the way in, the man leaning after it, death uniting the two figures in the emotional, 
aesthetic and artistic climax of the fight. That flash never comes in the skillful 
administering of a half a blade to the bull” (DIA 247).64 Although Hemingway suggests 
the union or synthesis of the two figures—and of the temporal and the eternal—many 
critics continue to focus on the kill in the bullfight not as a combination of “mortality and 
                                                 
64 Emphasis mine. 
  100
immortality,” of creation coming from destruction, of life being motivated by the earnest 
thought and experience of death but as lacking any value beyond cruelty and violence. 
Although critics persist in interpreting Hemingway intense interest in the art of killing in 
the bullfight in terms of senseless violence, destruction, defiance against death, and a 
display of man’s power over death—as an “art” it is necessarily creative, as well. Facing 
death is creative for the matador just as facing death earnestly is a creative force in the 
individual’s life in terms of motivation, meaning, and purpose. What Hemingway 
attempts to convey is not a rebellion against death—that is antithetical to his 
philosophy—but a oneness with death, one that is found in the emotional intensity of the 
bullfight.  
 The modern “moment of truth,” on the other hand, although it occurs before the 
moment of killing, evokes the same emotional experience from the matador and the 
audience. In fact, Hemingway tell us, that “It is impossible to believe the emotional and 
spiritual intensity and pure, classic beauty that can be produced by a man, an animal and 
a piece of scarlet serge draper over a stick” (DIA 207). The modern “moment of truth”—
the faena—Hemingway writes, “takes a man out of himself and makes him feel immortal 
while it is proceeding…gives him an ecstasy, that is, while momentary, as profound as 
any religious ecstasy, moving all the people in the ring together and increasing in 
emotional intensity as it proceeds” (DIA 206).65 Through this description, Hemingway 
suggest that during the faena, just as during the moment of killing, the emotional 
                                                 
65 Hemingway also writes the following of the faena: “Now the essence of the greatest emotional appeal of 
bullfighting is the feeling of immortality that the bullfighter feels in the middle of a great faena and that he 
gives to the spectators” (DIA 213).  
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experience is bound to the matador’s expression of the eternal through his “art.” Further, 
Hemingway writes:  
He is performing a work of art and he is playing with death, bringing it 
closer, closer, closer, to himself, a death that you know is in the horns 
because you have the canvas-covered bodies of the horses on the sand to 
prove it. He gives the feeling of his immortality, and, as you watch it, it 
becomes yours. Then when it belongs to both of you, he proves it with the 
sword. (DIA 213) 
To think death and think of it as your own—this is earnestness (“At a Graveside” 75). 
This is what Hemingway suggests when he writes that “the feeling of immorality” the 
matador creates “becomes yours” (DIA 213). Thus we see that what Hemingway not only 
attempts to show his readers how to see the bullfight, but like Kierkegaard, he attempts to 
show readers how to come to see their own death earnestly. Hemingway attempts to 
actualize what Kierkegaard requests of his readers when he writes:   
…if you, my listener, will fix your attention on this thought [of death] and 
concern yourself in no other way with the consideration than to think 
about yourself, then this unauthorized discourse will become an earnest 
matter also with you. To think of oneself as dead is earnestness; to be a 
witness to the death of another is mood. (“At a Graveside” 75) 
Hemingway intends for his reader to come to understand the nature of pundonor and 
earnestness for their own lives, and it is through Hemingway’s description of how a 
matador gives “the feeling of immortality”—i.e. expresses the eternal in his nature 
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though his creation of art—that Hemingway not only illustrates what earnestness in the 
face of death is, but shows how the earnest thought of death “motivates” one’s life. What 
Hemingway’s desriptions of the Spanish bullfight reveal is Hemingway’s conscious 
merging of image (the bullfight) and philosophy (of life and death), a complex 
philosophic subjective correlative that shares the necessity of repetition of one’s 
commitment to one’s life, one’s work, and to one’s art. This philosophy focuses on the 
individual emotional experience that accompanies the “earnest thought of death,” an 
emotion the matador produces, gives to his spectators, and proves his earnestness (i.e., 
proves his commitment to his art) by working close to the bull, by controlling his 
nervousness, his feet, and his fear, and by repeating his performance in earnest on almost 
a daily basis.  
 
The Ritual and Repetition of the Bullfight 
 
The significance of the ritual and repetition of the bullfight in terms of the 
matador’s actualization of pundonor or earnestness in the bullring is two-fold. First, 
Hemingway tells us that it is repetition within the bullfight that makes a bullfighter and 
an artist when he writes of a pass called “the natural” (DIA 208). The natural, 
Hemingway writes, is “the most dangerous to make and the most beautiful to see” (DIA 
208). Hemingway tells us that it takes courage, serenity, and great ability to perform this 
pass and that “repeating this [pass] three or four or five times takes a bullfighter and an 
artist” (DIA 209). Second, Hemingway tells us that it is the repetition of the matadors’ 
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performance—on an almost daily basis—that shows a matador’s repeated and renewed 
commitment to his art when he writes of the matador’s “detachment” (DIA 56). 
Hemingway writes: 
The matador, from living every day with death, becomes very detached, 
the measure of his detachment of course is the measure of his imagination 
and always of the day of the fight and finally during the whole end of the 
season, there is a detached something in their minds that you can almost 
see. What is there is death and you cannot deal in it each day and know 
each day there is a chance of receiving it without having it make a very 
plain mark. It makes this mark on everyone. (DIA 56)  
This “detached something in their minds,” Hemingway tells us, is “death.” The “detached 
something” Hemingway “can almost see” in the matador comes from the matador’s 
knowledge that “each day there is a chance of receiving it [death]” (DIA 56). 
Significantly, what Kierkegaard discusses as faith or repetition “combines psychological 
detachment with acceptance” (Guignon 16). This means that an individual recognizes and 
accepts the paradox of existence—that is, his/her existence as a unity of the temporal and 
the eternal—and understands that he/she must repeatedly face death, must repeatedly 
commit him/herself to life, work, and/or art for death to have an impact on life each day.  
 Although the matador proves his earnestness and his art, for example, at “the 
moment of truth,” to actualize earnestness or pundonor for one’s “whole” life requires 
repetition. The matador’s life and art “acquire retroactive power” through repetition, 
through a repeated commitment to his work, his art (“At a Graveside” 97). Significantly, 
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the ritual and repetition of the bullfight requires that the matador literally repeat his 
performance on almost a daily basis; he must repeatedly face his own death. John 
Killinger reveals his own recognition of the significance of repetition in terms of the 
bullfight when he writes: “For both Hemingway and the existentialists, the choice is 
never made finally, but must be made again and again, as if it had never been made 
before” (98). Hemingway’s description of Maera’s repeated attempt to kill his bull with a 
broken wrist, for example, suggests that it is through repetition that an individual 
actualizes the “whole” of his/her life by repeating his/her commitment to life and art, 
living and trying one’s best “This very day!” and everyday (“At a Graveside” 83). 
 
Hemingway’s Manifesto on the “Art of Living” Earnestly 
 
Although decades of Hemingway critics agree that the bullfight is Hemingway’s 
correlative for art, writing, and how to live life, that is just the tip of the ice-berg. Just 
below the surface, the characteristics Hemingway finds most admirable in the matador 
reveals that what has been called Hemingway’s “ruling philosophy” of how we should 
live in this world is akin to that of Kierkegaard’s (Broer, Spanish Tragedy 55). In fact, 
even Hemingway’s method of dissemination, like that of Kierkegaard’s, forces readers to 
wade through examples of cowardly behavior, tricked emotion, and false posturings 
toward the thought of death, which forces the reader to search the text and him/herself to 
more accurately discern the nature of earnestness for his/her own life. In fact, throughout 
Death in the Afternoon, Hemingway, as Anthony Brand aptly notes, “gives us 
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representative images of both good and bad bullfighting to support, illustrate, and expand 
his exposition,” yet what Brand refers to as Hemingway’s “exposition” on the Spanish 
bullfight serves as more than a “guide on how to look at the bull and the bullfighter who 
is fighting him” (169). It serves as a guide on how to distinguish between earnestness and 
cowardice in the face of death, between real emotion and “tricks,” between artists and 
“fake messiahs” (DIA 86). Under the guise of a guide to Spain and the Spanish bullfight, 
Hemingway serves as guide for his generation beyond how Wayne Kvam envisions  
Hemingway “as a guide…for writing, bullfighting, boxing, a job ethic, or simply 
achieving a sense of humor” (29). Although Hemingway does, in fact, serve as a guide 
for his generation in all of these capacities, in Death in the Afternoon Hemingway serves 
as a guide on how and what one can learn about actualizing one’s life and art from the 
study of death via the Spanish bullfight. In fact, Hemingway’s emphasis on the individual 
experience of the bullfight is reinforced by Kierkegaard’s view that “earnest instruction is 
recognized precisely by its leaving to the single individual the task of searching himself 
so it can then teach him earnestness as it can be learned only by the person himself” (“At 
a Graveside” 76). As Kierkegaard claims, Hemingway is “merely letting you witness just 
as he himself is doing, how a person seeks to learn something from the thought of death” 
(“At a Graveside” 102).  
Lawrence Broer suggests that as early as “The Undefeated” (1925), Hemingway 
“introduces not another emobodiment of the passive hero, but a man who will teach the 
hero how to live in a world of death and destruction—who will pass on to him the 
necessary rules for survival” (Spanish Tragedy 46). Although Broer argues that the 
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Spanish matador, for Hemingway, is this “new embodiment” of heroism without 
abstraction, Hemingway, himself, is also this hero, this guide, the matador serving as 
another living illustration through which Hemingway puts his philosophy of life, death 
and art in motion. Although Hemingway acts as student of death—he tells the reader he 
has never had the opportunity to “study” death before, thus he can only record his 
observations of what he finds to be “true”—this is just an act, a way Hemingway can 
present his philosophy of life, death, and art without cramming it down his reader’s 
throats (DIA 1-3). His passion for the bullfight is obvious enough, but his passion for life 
and art—how to live life and how to create art—and his need to share this knowledge is 
veiled by Hemingway’s consciously constructed, controlled narrative stance. Thus, it is 
not only through Hemingway’s detailing of the Spanish bullfight and the matadors of 
Spain that Hemingway finds a living illustration of what earnestness is, but it is through 
his stated aspirations as a writer and the actualization of his own art that Hemingway 
provides another living example of what one can learn from the study of death.  
It is not surprising that “Hemingway was dismayed that many reviewers found 
Death in the Afternoon marred by a morbid ‘preoccupation with fatality’ and a tendency 
to ‘he-manish posturing’” (Baker 243). In fact, what has been consistently glossed over in 
criticism, if given a mention at all, is that Hemingway’s continual attempt to redefine and 
adapt the values of bravery, courage, and dignity, for example, is not indicative of what 
many critics believe to be Hemingway’s espousal of exclusively masculine values; 
instead, in Death in the Afternoon Hemingway shows us the actuality that these 
“abstractions” can only be discovered individually—i.e., subjectively (Fuchs 437). Thus 
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Hemingway’s philosophical treatise on how pundonor in the bull ring and how 
earnestness in the face of death are essential to the creation of art and to the expression of 
the eternal in one’s nature not only deserves the moniker of “art,” but deserves to be 
reread, again and again, for its relevance to its historic moment, as well as its enduring 
relevance to the bullfight, to life, and art today.   
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Chapter 4 
A “Professor” of Existential Psychology: 
Mailer’s Existential Psycho-Therapist and the American Existential Experience 
 
 Although Mailer scholars have relentlessly probed Mailer’s canon of works in an 
effort to discern the roots of what Mailer himself calls his own brand of American 
existentialism, they have consistently failed to recognize An American Dream as a work 
essential to our understanding of the specific philosophical basis from which Mailer’s 
vision of a uniquely American brand of existentialism grows.66 In fact, because Mailer 
has repeatedly claimed that his existentialism is not the existentialism of his European 
philosophic predecessors,67 critical investigation of the philosophy that drives An 
American Dream has been limited to discussions of existentialism in general terms.68 The 
problem with reducing Mailer’s appropriation of existentialism to a general existential 
trend is that this reduction fails to take into account the historic moments of An American 
Dream and existential philosophy in America, a moment when Mailer’s own demand for 
a “new psychology” to understand American experience was met by the growing 
                                                 
66 See Laura Adams Existential Battles: The Growth of Norman Mailer, p. 38, 52-55, Stanley T. Gutman’s 
Mankind in Barbary: The Individual and Society in the Novels of Norman Mailer, p. 102 and 211, Michael 
Glenday’s Modern Novelists: Norman Mailer p. 2, and Mailer’s Advertisements for Myself p. 292-293 in 
which Mailer explicates his early form of American existentialism.  
67 See George Cotkin’s chapter on Mailer in his book Existential America, specifically p. 184-187 and  
Mailer’s essay “Existentialism: Does It Have a Future?” collected in The Big Empty. 
68 See Laura Adams’ Existential Battles, Stanley T. Gutman’s Mankind in Barbary, and George Cotkin’s 
Existentialism and American Literature for differing critical discussions of Mailer’s existentialism. 
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popularity and practice of a European-based existential-oriented psychotherapy (Glenday 
120; Lennon 300).  
  What the historic moment of An American Dream reveals is that Mailer’s 
philosophic contemporaries were successfully developing and teaching existential-
oriented approaches to psychotherapy in America and world-wide. At this time, two main 
schools of thought—one based on Martin Heidegger’s 1927 Being and Time, and one 
based on Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1943 Being and Nothingness—had been translated into 
psychologies and had begun to replace the more traditional, instituted Freudian and 
Jungian psychoanalytic approaches. Significantly, Heideggerian-based existential 
psychology was “the first model of an existentially oriented therapy,” decades ahead of 
Sartre’s own development of psychoanalyse existentielle (Cohen xviii).69 Although 
Mailer criticizes both Heideggerian and Sartrean existentialism because they do not 
explore the possibilities for the self after death, he explicitly denies an allegiance to 
Sartrean existentialism; in fact, Mailer contends that Sartre is the one responsible for 
derailing existentialism (Mailer, “Existentialism—Does It Have a Future” 203).  
Yet Mailer was not only critical of his philosophic contemporaries, he was also 
critical of the prevailing psychoanalytic approaches to understanding the human psyche.  
In his 1959 Advertisements for Myself, Mailer denounces psychoanalysis—Freudian and 
Jungian approaches in particular—for promoting what Laura Adams refers to as 
                                                 
69 In the years 1959-1969, Heidegger became personally and actively involved with Swiss therapists 
Medard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger, and Gion Condrau, who had been actively developing, teaching, and 
practicing Heideggerian-based psychotherapy for almost three decades. Although Boss, Binswanger, and 
Condrau began working from a Heideggerian model in the late 1920s, their psychology was not dubbed 
Daseinsanalyse until 1941. Psychoanalyse existentielle, on the other hand, was based on Sartre’s 1943 
work Being and Nothingness (translated into English in 1956), in which Sartre first introduced the tenants 
of what would become his version of existential psychology,  
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“socialization-along-acceptable-lines” (31). Existential psychology, on the other hand, 
offered a psychology of “Being” in which social conformity is not only discouraged, but 
is considered a threat to the “self.” In existential psychology Mailer found a 
psychotherapy—not a psychoanalysis—that promoted growth and individual expression, 
not social conformity and behavior modification along socially acceptable lines. In fact, 
Mailer’s distinction between the aims of the novelist and the aims of the psychoanalyst in 
his 1959 Advertisements for Myself reveals Mailer’s aims as a novelist as commensurate 
with the aims of an existentially-oriented psychotherapy. That is, where Mailer sees the 
psychoanalyst as “a regulator concerned with Being,” he sees the novelist as “a rebel 
concerned with Becoming” (qtd. in Adams 31; Mailer, Advertisements 282). What this 
distinction reveals is that Mailer’s concerns are, in fact, the concerns of existential 
psychology: both Mailer and the existential psychotherapies are concerned with an 
individual’s tendency toward “falling” into the roles and behaviors endorsed by the 
“they” of society and, more importantly, both are concerned with the individual’s growth 
and the process of “Becoming” one’s “true” or authentic self,” which is achieved, in part, 
through the individual’s recognition of the structures of society that shape identity and  
thwart individual development (Heidegger, Being and Time 298).  
Significantly, throughout Mailer’s early canon of works, Mailer repeatedly voices 
an existentialist view of the threat society poses to the authentic development of the 
individual with particular reference to Americans and American culture. In fact, in 
Mailer’s recent claim that, “The modern form of oppression is nuanced; it gets into your 
psyche; it makes you think there’s something wrong with you if you’re not on the big 
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capitalist team,” Mailer simultaneously voices his concern with the psychological climate 
of America and points a finger at American capitalism, a sentiment that echoes Mailer’s 
subtle critique of American culture in An American Dream (Mailer, The Big Empty 128). 
Yet Mailer does not merely critique what he sees as oppressive in American culture; he 
seeks to do something about it. What Mailer admittedly sets out to do is create “a new 
psychology, a new consciousness” (qtd. in Glenday 120). His goal: to make “a revolution 
in the consciousness” of his time, one which would meet the demands of the historic 
moment and address what Mailer envisioned to be the unique, psychological experience 
of “Being” American (Mailer, Advertisements 15). This “revolution,” Michael Glenday 
notes, “was to involve him [Mailer] in a mighty assault upon the American psyche” 
(Glenday 16).  
For Mailer, existential-based philosophical and psychological perspectives 
provided him with the tools for this “assault” on American culture and America’s mass 
consciousness. Because Mailer believes that American culture “gets into your psyche” 
and is thus psychologically oppressive, his goal in writing An American Dream was to 
“clarify a nation’s vision of itself” (Mailer, The Big Empty 128; Cannibals and Christians 
98).70 What Mailer sought to “clarify” was what mass culture endorsed as “Being” 
American was devoid of significant meaning for the individual. What Mailer sought to 
clarify was the oppressive nature of American culture and its tendency toward mediocrity 
and conformity. What he sought to clarify was how American culture absorbs the 
individual and thus hinders growth and progress. In short, Mailer sought to “clarify” the 
                                                 
70 Significantly, Mailer believes that “to clarify a nation’s vision of itself” is the highest purpose of 
literature. See Mailer’s Cannibals and Christians p. 98 and Laura Adams Existential Battles p. 31. 
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“nation’s vision of itself” by exposing what American culture offered was not superior 
but oppressive and false.   
Whether Mailer succeeded in making a “revolution in the consciousness” of his 
time with An American Dream is questionable, especially in light of accusations that 
Mailer was no more than an American pornographer, socially irresponsible, and acutely 
immoral (Wenke 98; Harwick 146). Yet what Mailer does accomplish through An 
American Dream is a response to his historic moment, what Michael Glenday aptly 
recognizes as the “first extraordinary response by an American writer to the national 
sickening,” a successful dramatization of “the national mood” (Glenday 91, 88). It is how 
Mailer expresses this mood throughout An American Dream that is the concern of this 
study. In fact, what Mailer views as “the national sickening” and how he seeks to remedy 
it through purging America’s psyche are not only essential to our understanding of 
Mailer’s message and his goals in the 1950s and 1960s, but essential to our understanding 
of Mailer’s goal for An American Dream in particular.  
In light of Mailer’s intense concern for the psychological well-being of the nation, 
a natural point of departure for understanding Mailer’s An American Dream is an 
investigation of the psychological perspectives from which Mailer launches his “assault” 
on American culture. Yet, Mailers call for a “new psychology” and a “new 
consciousness” coincide with his development of his own brand of existentialism. Thus, 
an exploration of the specific foundations from which Mailer’s psychology and his 
existentialism grow will illuminate what Mailer views as “the national sickening” he 
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seeks to remedy and provide a basis understanding Mailer’s psychological and 
philosophical vision of America in An American Dream.  
 
The Philosophy and the Psychology:  
An American Dream and the Basis of Mailer’s Vision 
 
Mailer’s depiction of An American Dream’s narrator Stephen Richards Rojack as 
a Professor of existential psychology not only reflects Mailer’s own rejection of 
psychoanalysis and his admitted preference for self-analysis, but also reflects Mailer’s 
call for a “new psychology” that addresses the concerns of Mailer’s historic moment (qtd. 
in Glenday 120). Because existential psychology is concerned with an individual’s 
awareness of the ways in which he/she is shaped by the social world, Mailer gives Rojack 
the ability to deconstruct the culture in which he is absorbed. Rojack’s heightened 
awareness of self and world, for Mailer, serves as his vehicle to raise the nation’s 
awareness of itself, and, more importantly, it is through Rojack’s practice of self-analysis 
that Mailer provides readers with the tool for their own self-analysis. But not only does 
Rojack, by example, serve to bring readers to an awareness of their own blind absorption 
in American culture, he also serves to illustrate the process through which one frees 
oneself from absorption in “the everyday social world” and attempts to discover one’s 
“true” or authentic “self” (Guignon 197). The depth of Mailer’s vision—call it genius—is 
evident in his choice to publish An American Dream in eight installments in Esquire 
Magazine, a choice that made An American Dream an “ongoing ‘event’” reflective of 
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Rojack’s process of “Becoming” and provided the perfect medium through which Mailer 
could speak to his intended audience—“that horde of the mediocre and the mad” who 
were absorbed in American culture (Glenday 86; AAD 2).71 What Mailer presents in his 
first installment of An American Dream—namely Rojack’s recognition of the cultural 
conspiracy of mediocrity and conformity and his recognition of the distance between his 
“public” persona and his “true self”—not only serves as the basis of Mailer’s attack on 
the psychologically oppressive nature of American culture, but also serves to introduce 
the philosophic perspecitive from which Mailer launches his attack (AAD 7). 
 
The Philosophic Foundations of Existential Psychology 
 
Like Mailer’s An American Dream, Martin Heidegger’s discussion of an 
individual’s “being-in-the-world” in his work Being and Time not only serves as a 
commentary on and a critique of modern society’s tendency to thwart individual 
development, but also serves as critique of the individual’s tendency to become absorbed 
in the mediocre, “everyday social world” (Guignon 197). According to Heidegger, by 
“falling” into socially approved roles, following social norms and engaging in the idle 
chit chat of the “they” of society, an individual becomes absorbed in the corrupted, public 
“everydayness” of Being (Heidegger 307). For an individual to become aware of his/her 
“fallenness” or “lostness in das Man” is one of the goals of existential psychotherapy. 
That is, an individual must become aware of how he/she is absorbed in and shaped by the 
public world of the “they.” As existential psychotherapy is concerned with the 
                                                 
71 The original publication of An American Dream ran in Esquire from January to August of 1964.  
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individual’s “Becoming” a “true” or authentic “self,” the patient must first come to 
recognize his/her tendency toward “falling” into the roles and behaviors society endorses 
and see more authentic possibilities for the “self” (Heidegger 298). By “falling” in step 
with society, the individual becomes alienated from his/her “true” or authentic “self” 
because the individual’s absorption in the everyday mediocrity and conformity of the 
social world conceals the individual’s “basic situation in life” and thus conceals the 
individual’s “true” or authentic “self” (Yalom 207). According to Heideggerian-based 
existentialism, what can free us from “this complacent drifting through life is the mood of 
anxiety (Angst)” (Guignon 197). Because anxiety brings an individual to the recognition 
that the socially approved roles of the “they” do not guarantee meaning for his/her life, 
this leads an individual to confront his/her “basic situation in life,” what existential 
psychotherapist Dr. Irvin Yalom refers to as the individual’s confrontation with the 
“givens” or “ultimate concerns” of existence (Yalom 8, 207). These “givens” of 
existence—the certainty of our deaths, our inherent aloneness and isolation in the world, 
the lack of meaning in our lives, and our ultimate freedom to choose how we will live our 
lives— are concealed from the individual who is absorbed in the corrupted, public 
“everydayness” of Being (Heidegger 307). Society conceals these “givens” from the 
individual through its consensus of what views, acts, thoughts, and feelings are socially 
acceptable and within social norms, what Mailer sees as views endorsed by the social 
world and reaffirmed by the psychoanalyst. In “falling,” our absorption in society 
conceals these “ultimate concerns” from the individual by endorsing certain social roles, 
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views, and acts as socially acceptable and by punishing those—socially, legally, 
economically, and/or psychologically—who choose other possibilities for themselves.  
Because existential psychotherapy is a dynamic psychotherapy—that is, it is 
based on the belief “that there are forces in conflict within the individual”—existential 
psychotherapy focuses on the existential conflicts within the individual, conflicts that Dr. 
Irvin Yalom notes flow “from the individual’s confrontation with the givens of existence” 
(8). According to Dr. Yalom, an “individual’s confrontation with each of these facts of 
life”—death, meaninglessness, isolation, and freedom—“constitutes the context of the 
existential dynamic conflict” (8). Existential-oriented therapy thus focuses on an 
individual’s awareness of the “givens” or “ultimate concerns” of existence and the 
anxiety the individual experiences over his/her “basic situation in life” (Yalom 8, 207).  
Dr. Yalom explicates the bases of the individual’s existential conflicts with death, 
freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness as “core” conflicts that are the source of an 
individual’s anxiety over his/her “basic situation in life” (Yalom 207). Facing the 
certainty of one’s own death, according to Yalom, is “a core existential conflict,” one in 
which the “tension between the awareness of the inevitability of death and the wish to 
continue to be” is the source of an individual’s anxiety in the face of death (8). The 
“existential conflict” inherent in an individual’s certain aloneness and isolation in this 
world, according to Dr. Yalom, is “the tension between our awareness of our absolute 
isolation and our wish for contact, for protection, our wish to be part of a larger whole” 
(Yalom 9). Yet, if we realize “there is no preordained design for us,” that “each of us 
must construct our own meaning in life,” then the “existential conflict” inherent in the 
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lack of meaning in this world “stems from the dilemma of a meaning-seeking creature 
who is thrown into a universe that has no meaning” (Yalom 9). In existential terms, 
freedom, according to Dr. Yalom, “refers to the absence of external structure…. the 
human being does not enter (and leave) a well-structured universe that has inherent 
design” (Yalom 8-9). What this means is that the individual is wholly “responsible for—
that is, is the author of—his or her own world, life design, choices, and actions” (Yalom 
8-9). Yalom notes that freedom in the existential sense “has a terrifying implication: it 
means that beneath us there is no ground—nothing, a void, an abyss” (Yalom 9). Thus, 
an individual’s anxiety in the face of his/her freedom is due to the “clash between our 
confrontation with groundlessness and our wish for ground and structure” (Yalom 9). It is 
through a probing of a patient’s anxiety and his/her conflict with these “givens” of 
existence that serves as the point of departure for existential psychotherapy (Yalom 8). 
Existential psychotherapy focuses on the anxiety of the individual and his/her 
“being-in-the-world” because anxiety, Charles Guignon writes, “can make us realize that 
our normal tendency to throw ourselves into publically approved roles is actually a form 
of fleeing or evasion” (Guignon 198). What we are running from is the fact of our 
finitude, a fleeing from the certainty of our own death. Yet, if we face our own death, if 
“we face up to our ‘being-toward-death,’ we are forced to confront the fact that it is up to 
us to make something of our lives as a whole” (Guignon 198-199). Thus, what anxiety 
brings us face to face with is the fact that “our social roles are really anonymous, 
‘anyone-roles’”; we see that in “playing our normal public roles, we are not really 
ourselves” and that we are ultimately “responsible for making something of our own 
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lives” (Guignon 198). In anxiety, an individual confronts his/her own “naked Dasein” as 
being-towards-death, free, alone, and without ground or meaning (Heidegger 394).72 For 
Heidegger, recognizing that we are finite beings—which reveals we are alone, free, 
meaning-making creatures—and accepting our responsibility for making something of 
our lives as a whole, “can bring about a transformation in our way of living”—i.e., 
authentically (Guignon 198). Charles Guignon explains: 
To become authentic, we must first accept the fact that we are 
ultimately responsible for what our lives are adding up to. If you face up 
to your finitude and take responsibility for your own existence, Heidegger 
thinks, you will achieve a level of clear-sightedness and intensity that was 
lacking in inauthentic everydayness. (199)  
What this means is that facing up to one’s own finite existence (facing up to one’s 
“being-towards-death”) reveals to the individual that he/she is responsible for creating 
ground and meaning for his/her own life. It also reveals to the individual that his/her 
everyday modes of being absorbed in the world are inauthentic, a false basis for personal 
meaning. Thus, through facing up to one’s “being-towards-death,” an individual 
confronts his/her own “naked Dasein” as groundless, alone, meaningless, and free; and it 
reveals the freedom and possibilities for the “self” beyond what “they” offer in 
“everydayness” (Heidegger 307, 394). 
                                                 
72 “Dasein” is the word Heidegger uses for human being. The word itself is not complex, what is complex 
is what Heidegger envisions as what makes up a human being. See Charles Guignon and Derk Pereboom’s 
Existentialism: Basic Writings, specifically the introduction to the selections of Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, p. 175-202.  
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 In terms of the individual psyche, this process is a journey of self-discovery, a 
quest for one’s “true” or authentic “self,” a process in which the “self” vascillates 
between its authentic and inauthentic modes of being in what Jon Mills calls “the endless 
search” for one’s “true self” (Mills). To discover one’s “self,” to become an authentic 
“self,” is a struggle, a “violent process” which requires an individual wrench him/her 
“self” free from the corrupted, public “everydayness” of Being and thus free one’s “self” 
to see beyond the limited possibilities society offers for the “self” (Mills). This is why 
authenticity is often envisioned as being profoundly immoral—because authenticity calls 
for an awareness of the forces of one’s society that thwart individual growth and 
development, forces which seek to smother the individual in conformity. Thus the 
authentic individual, in theory, is often interpreted as immoral, self-indulgent, 
irresponsible, deviant, and is often times considered either “mad” or at minimum 
psychologically “disturbed” or “unsound.” This view of authenticity is echoed in Mailer’s 
claim that “if you’re not on the big capitalist team” they make “you think there is 
something wrong with you” (Mailer, “Courage” 128). Significantly, what both Mailer 
and Heidegger highlight is the tempting and corrupting nature of modern society and the 
individual’s need to see through the trappings of society in order to free one’s “self” from 
“complacent drifting through life” (Guignon 197). 
  Significantly, in An American Dream we see that the concerns of our Professor of 
existential psychology—Stephen Richards Rojack—are the concerns of existential 
psychotherapy; in short, his recognition of his absorption in society leads him to a 
confrontation with the “givens” of existence society has concealed from him. According 
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to Dr. Irvin Yalom, a probing of a patient’s anxiety over these “givens” or certainties of 
existence—death, aloneness, freedom, and meaninglessness—“contain the seed to 
wisdom and redemption” (Yalom 5). We thus see Rojack repeatedly face his anxiety 
towards death, his aloneness, his freedom, and the lack of significant meaning in his life 
in an effort to find his “true self.” What Mailer sets up in the first installment is the notion 
that one must save one’s “self” from annihilation first by recognizing one’s inauthentic 
modes of everyday being and move toward more authentic possibilities for the self. Thus, 
what Mailer presents in his first installment reveals both Mailer and Rojack’s view of 
society as the enemy of the individual. It oppresses the individual and stifles individuality 
by endorsing certain roles and punishing individuals who choose other possibilities for 
themselves. Yet Mailer’s focus on what in American culture is psychologically 
oppressive—the imperative to strive for fame, power, prestige, and immense wealth, for 
example—leads Mailer to an assault on the oppressive nature of one of our most 
cherished cultural myths: The American Dream. Through Rojack Mailer shows us that 
this myth is imbedded in our psyches, a myth which is part of our identities as 
Americans—singularly and collectively—and which, for Mailer, limits possibilities for 
every American. In fact, for Mailer, the freedom associated with The Dream is the 
antithesis of the authentic existential cry, “Freedom!”   
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Mailer’s Appropriation of the Psychology and the Philosophy  
“Falling” into the Myth of The American Dream 
  
Heideggerian philosophy and psychology finds expression in what Mailer claims 
as his own American brand of existentialism through Mailer’s invocation of the The 
American Dream and his presentation of the effect of that illusory Dream on the 
individual and the culture at large. The title—An American Dream—points to the 
disparity between The collective American Dream and An individual American Dream. 
Like Heidegger, Mailer not only shows how the individual gets lost in the collective 
“they-self” of society, but shows how an individual American Dream is lost in and 
inseparable from the collective American Dream. Americans’ insistence that The 
American Dream is real, that America offers limitless possibilities for the self is, for 
Mailer, the binding myth of American experience. In fact, throughout the opening 
chapters of An American Dream, Mailer reveals his belief that this myth is imbedded in 
the American psyche, and he thus calls for a psychology not only to explain how this 
myth shapes American experience, but how it corrupts the American psyche. Mailer’s 
social-mindedness—although few of his contemporary critics may agree—is evident in 
his concern that his fellow Americans need a psychology through which they can come to 
recognize America’s myths of itself and move toward a more authentic American 
experience, a sentiment that lies at the heart of the novel.  
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Rojack’s “Failure,” His “Fall,” and His “Freedom”:  
An American Existential Perspective 
 
For Mailer’s American readers, Mailer seems to infuse a sense of irony in 
Rojack’s perception that despite his status as a war hero and recipient of the 
Distinguished Service Cross, his PhD in psychology, his term as a Congressman, and his 
popularity as a television personality, he “had come to decide” that he “was finally a 
failure” (AAD 8). In terms of American cultural conceptions of success, Rojack has 
achieved more than most individuals dream of—he is a famous war hero and intellectual 
who has political power and wealth. Yet this “dream” is just that: it is a mythic dream 
endorsed by the “they” of society. This “dream” is not Rojack’s dream; it is the 
inauthentic dream of others, a general consensus of success and happiness advanced and 
reinforced by the society in which Rojack is absorbed. This collective “dream” turns 
individual selves into “actors” in “anyone-roles,” like Rojack who confesses that he had 
looked into the “abyss” of meaninglessness and realized that his “personality was built 
upon a void” (Guignon 198; AAD 7). By “falling” into this myth, by buying into this 
Dream—that money, fame, and power are inextricable bound to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness—one conceals his/her “true self” in favor of The Dream. In Rojack’s 
view, he is “a failure” because he has failed to become an “authentic” self; that is, he 
realizes his lostness in socially approved roles and thus recognizes his inauthentic modes 
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of Being. With this realization comes Rojack’s departure from politics, a departure 
necessitated by his feeling that if he did not quit, he would be “separated from” his 
authentic self “forever” (7). Significantly, Rojack does not simply quit politics; instead, 
he runs on the Progressive ticket and loses. In short, Rojack shifts allegiance from mass 
society, representative of his process of pulling away from what he refers to as “that 
horde of the mediocre and the mad” (AAD 2). Critical studies by American scholars that 
address Rojack’s perception of American culture oftentimes use psychoanalysis as a lens 
for understanding Rojack’s departure from mass American culture and his persistent 
struggle against forces that oppress him, a critical oversight that has led critics to 
conclude that Rojack is simply mad, insane, an American psychopath on a violent 
rampage. Yet, critic John Whalen-Bridge aptly notes that Rojack’s “self-knowledge 
indicates, however, that he is relatively sane, and the novel is full of suggestions that 
society has gone mad” (80). In Rojack’s and Mailer’s existentialist view, society has gone 
“mad”—“they” blindly follow the paths and dreams of the collective self and strive to 
conform to what society prescribes as the formulas for happiness and success. In fact, it is 
through Mailer’s appropriation of existential-oriented psychology and philosophy to 
American interests and concerns, that Mailer exposes The Dream as one of the myths 
through which society conceals the certainties of existence from the individual and thus 
alienates the individual from his/her “true” self. For Rojack and Mailer, this is madness, 
especially coming from a nation that prides itself on individual freedoms and the 
individual’s actualization of his/her own freedoms and dreams. Significantly, the 
disparity between the myth and the reality of The American Dream is that although the 
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freedom The American Dream connotes is existential and authentic—that is, it promises 
individual freedom, liberty, life, limitless possibilities, and the pursuit of one’s own idea 
of happiness, in reality, The Dream is a myth that stands in conflict with the existential 
notions of freedom the myth purports to embody. For Mailer, this is the “core existential 
conflict” of “Being” American (Yalom 8). 
As the point of departure for Rojack’s recognition of his inauthentic modes of 
“Being” American, Rojack’s discovery of the myth of the Dream, embodied in his 
realization that he was a “failure,” brings Rojack to the realization that if he did not quit 
politics, he would be separated from his “true self” forever. This fear of the annihilation 
of the “self” brings Rojack to confront the certainties of his own existence, “givens,” 
“ultimate concerns” that society’s endorsement of the reality of The Dream has kept 
concealed from him (Yalom 8). Thus, throughout the opening chapters of An American 
Dream, we not only see Rojack’s recognition of his absorption in the myth of The Dream 
as an inauthentic mode of Being, but we also see his attempt to navigate between his 
“true” or authentic “self” and his “false,” inauthentic modes of being absorbed in the 
public, social world. In fact, in the opening chapter of An American Dream Rojack shares 
his recognition of his inauthentic modes of being—such as his secret ambition to return to 
politics, his role as a husband in a marriage that reads like a five-act play, and his 
realization that he was an “actor” whose “personality was built on a void”—modes that 
brings Rojack to conclude he “was finally a failure” (AAD 7-8).  
Rojack’s rejection of his manufactured, public “self” and his search for more 
authentic possibilities for the “self” outside of the roles and contexts offered by American 
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culture are at the root of Rojack’s crisis. This crisis is, in fact, an existential one, one in 
which Rojack suggests his “failure” is bound to his realization that his “personality was 
built upon a void,” on nothingness, on a Dream which promises, but does not deliver, 
fulfillment and happiness (AAD 7). This realization brings Rojack to a confrontation with 
the “givens” or certainties of existence, “core existential conflicts” that existential 
psychotherapy addresses as both the source of a patient’s anxiety and the cure. In fact, as 
a Professor of existential psychology, Rojack’s perspective and his epistemology are 
bound to his belief that “the seeds of wisdom and redemption” are found within (Yalom 
5). That is, through an exploration of his own anxieties over the certainties of existence—
death, aloneness, freedom, and meaninglessness—Rojack believes he will not only be 
able to resolve the tension between his authentic and inauthentic modes of being, but will 
also discover his “true self” and thus be able to create authentic meaning and content for 
his life as a whole. Yet Rojack’s rejection of American culture as a false basis for 
personal meaning, his internal and external struggles to free himself from the pervasive 
force of America’s myth of freedom and limitless possibilities, and his repeated need to 
face up to his own death, has led decades of critics to conclude that Rojack’s perspective 
is bound to his World War II experience, an experience that leaves him death-obsessed 
and traumatized. In fact, critics continually cite Rojack’s admission of his “frightened 
romance with the phases of the moon” and his conversation with the moon in particular, 
as indicative of Rojack’s descent into madness (AAD 7). Yet Rojack’s “frightened 
romance with the phases of the moon” not only reveals that Rojack’s perspective and 
epistemology are bound to Heideggerian notions of self and society, but it also reveals 
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that his “romance” is inevitably intertwined with his quest to discover his “true” or 
authentic “self.”  
 
Rojack’s Romance with the Moon:  
“Being-towards-death” and “Becoming” Whole 
 
Rojack’s admission, “I wanted to depart politics before I was separated from 
myself forever” is, in part, due to what he calls his “secret frightened romance with the 
phases of the moon” (AAD 7).73 By distinguishing his “public” self from the “self” who is 
involved in a “frightened romance” with the moon, Rojack simultaneously distinguishes 
his “false,” corrupted, inauthentic “self” from his “true,” “lost in a private kalaidescope of 
death” “self”  (AAD 7). For Rojack, his romance with the moon—“frightened” because 
the full moon seems to be the catalyst for Rojack’s anxiety and fear over his own death—
a “romance” because the full moon also reminds Rojack of the “wholeness” he lacks in 
his inauthentic modes of Being—embodies Rojack’s “core existential conflict” (Yalom 
8). Through Rojack’s narrative we learn that this conflict is retrospectively rooted in 
Rojack’s World War II experience, an experience in which he faced death alone and 
without fear under the “fine stain” of a full moon (AAD 3).  
Rojack’s narrative of his World War II experience is retrospectively colored by 
his current perspective as a Professor of existential psychology, but it is that perspective 
that gives current significance and meaning to what Rojack experienced when he was 
threatened with annihilation under the light of the full moon. What is most prominent in 
                                                 
73 Emphasis mine 
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Rojack’s memory of his combat experience—the “perfectly blue and mad” eyes of the 
fourth German soldier, which Rojack describes as eyes that go “deep into celestial vaults 
of sky”—suggests that, for Rojack, there is a correlation between what he sees in the 
soldier’s eyes and what he sees in the full moon. Rojack tells us that those eyes 
“contained all of it”—the war, the struggle, death, and destruction—a description that 
simultaneously suggests that what Rojack saw in those eyes was his own “basic situation 
in life” as a war, a struggle (Yalom 207). Rojack suggests that what he saw in those eyes 
that caused him to falter “before that stare, clear as ice in the moonlight” was a glimpse 
of “the abyss” of meaninglessness and groundlessness (AAD 2, 5). The fact that Rojack 
“faltered,” “not knowing” if he could continue to fight, signifies the fleeting nature of 
authenticity (AAD 5). Rojack tells us, “suddenly it was all gone, the clean presence of it, 
the grace, it had deserted me in the instant I hesitated, and now I had no stomach to go, I 
could charge his bayonet no more” (AAD 5). Rojack hesitates because in those eyes he 
sees “that death is a creation more dangerous than life”; he sees death is not “everyone’s 
emptiness” (AAD 7). What Rojack suggests throughout his experience with the fourth 
German soldier is that through facing up to his own death with courage, Rojack gets a 
glimpse of “the abyss” and sees that Being has a “null basis”; that is, he suggests that 
what he sees is that his own existence is groundless and meaningless, that he is alone in 
this world and free to form his own basis for Being (AAD 2; Heidegger 333). Rojack 
suggests that what facing death authentically reveals is not “zero,” death is not 
“everyone’s emptiness”; it is a glimpse of an individual’s possibilities for his/her own life 
outside of the “they” (AAD 7).  
  128
What is significant about Rojack’s description of what he sees to be his first 
authentic experience is that the setting for this experience is a literal war, one that recalls 
the “violent process” through which an individual “self” attempts to wrench his/her “true 
self” free from the “false” everyday “self” and from the forces that oppress and thwart an 
individual’s realization of and development of a “true” or authentic “self.” Rojack also 
espouses the view that facing one’s own death authentically and thus facing the facts of 
our existence in this world requires unfaltering courage. In particular, what Rojack’s 
retrospective account of his combat experience reveals is that for Rojack, what he sees in 
the eyes of the fourth German soldier that makes him falter is what he later sees “in those 
caverns of the moon” that makes him falter—“the abyss” (AAD 2, 11). In fact, the 
glimpse Rojack gives us of his “secret frightened romance” with the moon reveals that 
what Rojack sees in the soldier’s eyes he later comes to understand through his romance 
with the moon.   
Rojack’s description of his “frightened romance” with the moon, an experience 
Rojack describes as occurring on a balcony on the night of a full moon, serves to 
illustrate Rojack’s process of “Becoming” authentic. Rojack’s description of this 
process—of facing up to his “being-towards-death” through which he gains an 
understanding of the moon and is brought face-to-face with his own “raw Being”—
recalls the process Heidegger discusses throughout Being and Time in terms of finding 
and Becoming one’s “true” or authentic “self” (AAD 11-12). In particular, what this scene 
illustrates is what Heidegger discusses as “the call of conscience,” a call which calls the 
individual hearer back to his/her “true” or authentic “self” (Heidegger 312).   
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What Rojack experiences in his perceived conversation with the moon not only 
illuminates Rojack’s understanding of his own “basic situation in life,” but is central to 
our understanding of Rojack’s fascination with the full moon (Yalom 207). In fact, 
Rojack’s description of the night he stared at the full moon, alone on a balcony, and heard 
a “voice” from the moon recalls the process through which Heidegger believes one 
discovers his/her own “true self” (AAD 11). Rojack writes:  
I had a moment then. For the moon spoke back to me. By which I do not 
mean that I heard voices, or Luna and I indulged in the whimsy of a 
dialogue, no, truly it was worse than that. Something in the deep of that 
full moon, some tender and not so innocent radiance traveled fast as the 
thought of lightning across our night sky, out from the depth of the dead in 
those cavern of the moon, out and a leap though space and into me. And 
suddenly I understood the moon. (11)   
Rojack’s description of what he experiences when the moon speaks to him recalls 
Heidegger’s description of “the call of conscience” (Heidegger 312).74 In fact, Rojack’s 
admission that although he did not actually hear “voices” in the literal sense, he gained an 
understanding of the moon, serves to illustrate what “the call of conscience” reveals to 
the individual “self” who hears the call.  
Embodied in Rojack’s perception that the “voice” he hears is the voice of the 
moon is Heidegger’s notion that the “voice” one hears when being called “is unfamiliar 
to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice” (Heidegger 321). Rojack 
attributes this “voice” to the moon not only because the “voice” is alien, but because the 
                                                 
74 See Heidegger’s Being and Time p. 312-348 for his complete discussion of “the call of conscience.” 
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“voice” comes “from afar unto afar”; it comes “from me and beyond me” (Heidegger 
316, 320). According to Heidegger the “voice” comes from the “true self,” the “self” that 
has been covered-up and alienated through absorption in the “they.” What is of particular 
significance is that Rojack makes the distinction that he does not actually hear a “voice”; 
he does not “indulge in the whimsy of a dialogue” with the moon (AAD 11). Rojack’s 
admission that the “voice” said nothing recalls Heidegger’s explication of what “the call 
of conscience” says. “The call,” according to Heidegger, “does not report events; it calls 
without uttering anything. The call discourses in the uncanny mode of keeping silent” 
(322). “Uncanniness” or not feeling at home in the world, Heidegger writes, “is the basic 
kind of Being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday way it has been covered up. Out 
of the depths of this kind of Being, Dasein itself, as conscience, calls. The ‘it calls 
me’…is a distinctive kind of discourse for Dasein” (322). Again, although Rojack notes 
that he did not actually hear a voice, he suggests that what leaped “through space and 
into” him—the voice—brings him to “understand” the moon, an “understanding” 
Heidegger distinguishes as well (AAD 11). Heidegger writes: 
We take calling as a mode of discourse. Discourse articulates 
intelligibility…. Vocal utterance, however, is not essential for discourse, 
and therefore not for the call either; this must not be overlooked…the 
‘voice’ is taken rather as a giving-to-understand… (316) 
For Heidegger, an “authentic understanding… ‘follows’ the call” (324). The voice, 
Heidegger writes, “calls Dasein back to its thrownness so as to understand this 
thrownness as the null basis which it has to take up in to existence” (333). As a “giving-
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to-understand,” what the call reveals to the hearer is that he/she is “thrown” into a world 
not of his/her own making, that he/she is groundless, alone, free, and responsible for 
creating her/her own ground and meaning (Heidegger 316). What Rojack suggests he 
understands of the moon is that the moon is the same “kind of Being” Rojack sees 
himself to be. The moon, like Rojack, is not at home in this world. In the moon’s literal 
groundlessness, its “dead” caverns, which go deep into “the abyss of meaninglessness,” 
the phases through which the moon must pass to become “whole,” Rojack finds a kindred 
Being. “The only true journey of knowledge,” Rojack writes of the knowledge that 
leaped into him from the moon, “is from the depth of one being to the heart of another” 
(AAD 11). Rojack’s understanding of the moon as the same “kind of Being” as he is, 
brings Rojack face to face with his own naked Dasein, what Rojack calls his “raw Being” 
(AAD 11-12).   
 Rojack suggests that he authentically hears the call and the result is an authentic 
understanding, not just of the moon, but of his own “self.” Rojack tells us that after he 
gained an understanding of the moon, he “was nothing but open raw depths at that instant 
alone on the balcony, looking down on Sutton Place, the spirits of the food and drink I 
had ingested wrenched out of my belly and upper gut, leaving me in raw Being” (AAD 
11-12). He tells us at this moment he “could feel” his “Being” (12). Rojack then “looked 
into” his “Being,” and saw “lovely light and rotting nerve and proceeded to listen” (12). 
What Rojack tells us he sees when he looks into the depths of his “raw Being” is the 
“lovely light” of possibilities for the “self” and the “rotting nerve” of his certain physical 
demise, of his “being-towards-death” (AAD 11). What is of particular significance is that 
  132
Rojack notes he “looked into” his “Being” and “proceeded to listen” to his “raw Being,” 
to his “true self” (12). This suggests that Rojack not only hears the call, but he listens, 
understands the call as coming from his “true self” and understands his “true self” is 
calling him back from his absorption in the “they.” 75 Jon Mills explains:  
Dasein comes to find itself through the disclosure of conscience as an 
inner voice. The receptivity of the voice calls Dasen to a “giving-to-
understand” the authentic self in which the call “passes over” the they-self 
and finds its true home in its enlightened understanding of itself. (12)  
This “enlightened understanding” of the “self” is embodied in what Rojack understands 
when he looks into and listens to his “Being”—he understands his “Being” as a “null 
basis,” as groundless, alone, towards death, and free to form his own basis for Being.  
Rojack goes on to distinguish between “the part” of him “which spoke and 
thought and had its glimpses of the landscape of” his “Being” and his physical body. The 
“voice” which calls “Come to me” is Rojack’s “true self” calling him back to his “self” 
(AAD 12). Thus, Rojack believes his physical body would drop from the balcony, but his 
“true self,” would transcend his thrownness in this world, “would soar, would rise, would 
leap the miles of darkness to that moon…. I knew I would fly” (12). In this moment, 
Rojack faces his “being-towards-death”; that is, he faces the certainty of his own death, 
sees open possibilities, feels the freedom that accompanies the recognition that one can 
                                                 
75 According to Heidegger, the “authentic understanding which ‘follows’ the call” is an understanding of 
one’s “lostness in the ‘they,’” a recognition that one’s false, public “self” is distanced from one’s “true self”  
(333). This understanding reveals Dasein as a “null basis for its null projection” of future possibilities for 
the “self” (333). In short, one understands the “self” as “Being-towards-the-end”—“something which in the 
depths of its Being, every Dasein is” (365). The call summons Dasein’s self from its lostness in the “they” 
and calls the “self” to its “ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self”; the call brings the “self” out of its 
“hiding–place” in the “they” and “gets brought” to its “Self” by the call (320).  
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form his own, meaningful basis for “Being.”76 Yet, Rojack’s authenticity is fleeting; 
when faced with the moment of choice, Rojack stands face to face with his “core 
existential conflict”; that is, he faces the conflict between his recognition that he can’t 
“die yet” because he has not “done his work” to become an authentic “self” and his 
recognition that he has thus far lived his life inauthentically and is thus “dead with it” 
(13). In short, what Rojack understands is that the life he has been living is inauthentic, 
that he has been corrupted by and absorbed in the “they,” that his existence is 
meaningless and groundless, and that he cannot die until he has “done his work” of 
wrenching himself free from his “lostness” in the “they” (13). Rojack tells us he then 
“slipped back over the rail” and slips back into anxiety, which Rojack describes as an 
“illness” (13). Rojack’s describes his anxiety in the face of his realization of his 
inauthentic modes of being absorbed in the “they” as a “tension” between his authentic 
and inauthentic modes of being, one “which develops in your body” and “makes you 
sicken over a period” (AAD 8). For Rojack, the “illness” is his tendency to be lost in the 
“they’; the “false self” is ill, sick, corrupted by its “fallenness.” Rojack describes “[t]his 
illness” as “an extinction,” a perception that reveals what Rojack’s “soul” told him, so to 
speak, was that he must wrench his “self” free from the “they” or his “true self” will be 
annihilated, will be consumed by the cancer of the “they-self” (AAD 13). Rojack 
describes how this “tension” and this “illness” return to him when he loses his courage to 
remain on the balcony, poised over “the abyss” of meaninglessness. Rojack tells us that 
his “courage,” as it did during his combat experience, leaves him; he tells us that his 
                                                 
76 For Heidegger, the call reveals the “self” as “being-towards-the-end”—with limited time to embrace 
one’s authentic possibilities for the “self” and limited time to live a meaningful, authentic life (365). 
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“ambition,” his striving for authenticity and wholeness, and his “hope” for the 
possibilities for the future leave him and rise up to the moon beyond his grasp. In contrast 
to the “illness” Rojack speaks of, Rojack sees his authentic “courage,” “ambition and 
hope” as what is good or “noble” in him (AAD 13). Rojack suggests that without the 
“courage” to face his death, without the courage to accept the “self” as a “null basis,” 
nothing “noble” in him remains. That is, once Rojack feels what is “noble” in him leave, 
the tension inherent in his “core existential conflicts” over being-towards-death, alone, 
groundless, and free, are illustrated through his compulsion to call Deborah, the one thing 
that continues to impose meaning and provide a basis for Rojack’s life.  
 
Existential and Physical Violence: Rojack’s Struggle for Freedom 
 
 Rojack’s need to call his estranged wife Deborah illustrates Rojack’s fleeing in 
the face of his aloneness, yet his need to see her after his experience on the balcony also 
reveals that for Rojack, Deborah is his “whole.” “Without Deborah,” Rojack tells us, his 
“parts” “did not add to any more than another name for the bars and gossip columns of 
New York…probably I did not have the strength to stand alone” (AAD 18). Rojack 
describes how all of a sudden “all of my substance fell out of me and I had to see her. I 
had a physical need to see her as direct as an addict’s panic waiting for his drug” (AAD 
19). Yet, when Rojack goes to see Deborah, the tension between his “self” as a “null 
basis” and Deborah’s oppressive and thwarting presence returns. This is illustrated 
through Rojack’s response to Deborah’s statement that she did not love him anymore. 
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Rojack writes: “I thought again of the moon and the promise of extinction which had 
descended on me. I had opened a void—I was now without center. Can you understand? I 
did not belong to myself any longer. Deborah had occupied my center” (27). The void 
Rojack opened—that is, his understanding of his existence as a “null basis”—brings 
Rojack to recognize his inauthentic modes of being and brings him to an understanding 
that he must wrench his “self” free from the forces that corrupt and distance him from his 
“true self.” What Rojack suggests in his response is that Deborah—the embodiment of 
the corrupt, oppressive force of American culture—is “fused” at the “center” of his being 
(AAD 28). What Rojack understands is that with Deborah as his “center,” life is merely 
“a series of means-end strategies”; that is, Deborah serves and has served as the means to 
Rojack’s dreams (Guignon 196). “I thought the road to President,” Rojack writes, “might 
begin at the entrance to her Irish heart” (2). As his “center,” at the “center” of Rojack’s 
dreams and aspirations in life, Deborah, like the culture Rojack rejects, threatens 
annihilation of Rojack’s “self.”77 Rojack couples this fear of annhiliation of his “self” 
with his literal fear of Deborah. She “was violent,” Rojack tells us, “I was afraid of her. 
She was not incapable of murdering me” (23, 25). When Rojack’s thoughts return to “the 
moon and the promise of extinction,” Rojack not only suggests a connection between 
Deborah and the moon, but also between Deborah and the Nazi soldiers. In fact, for 
Rojack, Deborah, like the Nazi soldiers Rojack faced, presents a double threat, one that is 
both literal and existential. He fears literal death in that she, like the Nazi soldiers, is 
                                                 
77 Deborah threatens Rojack’s sense of “self” by suggesting he is a coward, an easily replaceable lover, and 
that without her, he is nothing. See pages 23-25.  
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capable of killing him; existentially, Deborah, like Nazi culture, threatens to and is 
capable of annihilating Rojack’s “true self.”  
Significantly, not only do the Nazi-soldiers literally threaten Rojack’s physical 
“being,” but the Nazis also represent the most corrupt and oppressive of cultures, a 
culture, if victorious in the war, would threaten to annhiliate Rojack’s “self”—his “self” 
in the eyes of the Nazis, nothing more than a mixed-race Jew. Like the Nazis, “Deborah 
had prejudices…. Her detestation of Jewish Protestants and Gentile Jews was complete” 
(AAD 34). Thus Rojack’s crisis over Deborah occupying his “center” is an existential 
crisis, a fear of existential annihilation of the “self,” as well as a literal one. Because 
Deborah threatens Rojack’s “self” literally and existentially, he violently struggles with 
her in order to transcend this “throwness”; that is, he struggles to wrench himself free 
from the world in which he has been “thrown,” he struggles to free himself from his 
absorption in the “they”—which Deborah represents—and free himself from her 
oppressive, corrupting, and pervasive force. According to Jon Mills, when the authentic 
self “finds itself in its lostness,” it recovers “its authenticity in its freedom” (Mills). 
Rojack not only illustrates this process, but during his literal physical struggle with 
Deborah he sees he must kill her to achieve his freedom.  
Throughout Rojack’s description of his physical struggle with Deborah, what 
Rojack experiences is a struggle for his freedom. He describes the mental picture he sees 
as his arm tightens around her neck: “I had the mental image I was pushing with my 
shoulder against an enormous door which would give inch by inch to the effort” (31). 
Rojack writes: 
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I released the pressure on her throat, and the door I had been opening 
began to close. But what I had had a view of what was on the other side of 
the door, and heaven was there…and I thrust against the door…and crack 
the door flew open and the wire tore in her throat, and I was through the 
door, hatred passing from me in wave after wave, illness as well, rot and 
pestilence, nausea, a bleak string of salts. I was floating. I was as far into 
myself as I had ever been and universes wheeled in a dream. (31) 
What Rojack sees on the other side of the “door”—“heaven”—is his freedom from the 
“they-self” within the “self”; he sees his freedom from Deborah who stands at the center 
of his Being (AAD 31). What he catches a glimpse of is his freedom from his lostness in 
the “they”; what he sees is “heaven”—his freedom from early forces and constraints—
and the authentic possibilities for the “self” that transcends its thrownness in this world.   
Rojack describes his “transcendence”—his freedom from his lostness in the 
“they”—in terms of illness leaving him; his “transcendence” feels like “floating” (AAD 
31). Since Rojack has wrenched his “self” free from the “they” by killing Deborah, 
Rojack feels as he did on the balcony: groundless, free, as if he could “fly” (12). He tells 
us he was “as far into” himself as he “had ever been” and his “flesh seemed new,” since 
by freeing himself free from the “they,” he transcends his “thrownness” and frees himself 
to form his own basis for Being (31-32). Further, after he frees himself from Deborah, 
Rojack is progressively freed from his public roles as her husband, a t.v. personality, a 
professor, a psychologist, and a socialite. Significantly, we must see “selfhood,” 
according to Jon Mills, “as a development on a continuum of authenticity, in a state of 
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becoming, as emerging freedom” (12). This view of the authentic development of the 
“self” is what Mailer illustrates throughout the opening chapters of An American Dream. 
Yet what is of particular significance is that what Rojack struggles to achieve—his 
freedom—stands in direct opposition to the myth of “freedom” embodied in the idea of 
The American Dream.  
 
Authentic American Freedom: Mailer’s View 
 
Because Mailer sees the pervasiveness of The American Dream as a form of 
psychological oppression, one that is uniquely American, his goal to “clarify a nation’s 
vision of itself” is achieved, in part, through Mailer’s exposure of the nation and its 
vision of itself an inauthentic (Wenke 3; Mailer, Cannibals 90).78 Significantly, what 
Mailer emphasizes is that the nation see itself from a different light, more clearly, both as 
individuals and as individuals within American culture. Specifically, what Mailer intends 
to clarify is that the idea of the Dream is rooted in the history of American polticial and 
social life as American democracy. What Mailer sets up in the first chapter in 
particular—Rojack’s struggle for authentic freedom—serves to illustrate the pervasive 
force of the myth of The Dream and to show that to wrench one’s self free from one’s 
“lostness in das Man,” which oppresses and thwarts the development of one’s authentic 
                                                 
78 Joseph Wenke writes in his “Introduction” to Mailer’s America: 
For Mailer’s subject is preeminently America: throughout his work he is involved in 
trying to discover our identity as a nation by relating the promise and the basement of the 
millennial idea of America to the complexities of the contemporary American scene. In 
doing so, he has pursued through his writing what he believes to be the highest purpose 
of literature, which is to “clarify a nation’s vision of itself. (3) 
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personality, identity, and values, involves a violent struggle. Significantly, Rojack’s 
struggle for authentic freedom recalls the founding ideals of life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of one’s own idea of happiness. In fact, what Mailer shows us is that Rojack’s struggle 
for authentic freedom does not differ from the “revolutionary” ideals America was 
founded upon; his violent struggle for his freedom is intertwined with America’s 
historical consciousness. Rojack, like our Founding Fathers who violently struggled to 
free themselves from the oppressive constraints of the British system, reenacts this war—
The Revolutionary War—in order to achieve what he sees to be the authentic freedom of 
our Forefathers.  
Mailer returns to the founding ideals of America as a nation and exposes the 
hypocrisy of The Dream. Significantly, Mailer’s recovery of the founding ideals of the 
country reflects Heidegger’s notion that authenticity is “a mode of existence that brings 
about a transformed understanding of one’s historical context” in which an individual 
“grasps the past of one’s community as a ‘heritage’ or ‘legacy’” (Guignon 202). Guignon 
explains: “According to Heidegger, the lucid awareness of one’s complicity in the ‘co-
happening’ of one’s community can lead to a way of existing he calls ‘authentic 
historicity’” (202). Guignon cites Martin Luther King’s attempt to “recover an 
appreciation of the biblical ideals central to American culture in order to achieve equality 
for all humans” as an example of what Heidegger means by “authentic historicity” (202). 
Thus, Mailer’s attack on the myth of The American Dream is not merely a critique of The 
Dream at his present, historic moment. In fact, in order to make a “revolution in the 
consciousness” of his time, Mailer must himself understand and address the historical 
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consciousness of “Being” American and expose Americans’ “complicity in the ‘co-
happening’” of American culture. Yet what Mailer sees as an inseparable part of 
America’s historical consciouness—the ideal of The American Dream—is itself founded 
on the democratic foundations of America as a sovereign nation. Thus, for Mailer, the 
foundation from which The Dream is born is not only bound to the struggle, the war our 
Founding Father’s fought to achieve the ideals of freedom and democracy, but is also 
rooted in the American religious experience which is historically prior, yet inextricably 
bound to America’s vision of itself and to the formation of the myth of The Dream.  
 
Exposing the Myth of America’s Vision of Itself 
 
For Mailer, just as The American Dream embodies the historical consciousness of 
America to his present day and beyond, America’s religious history persists in his present 
American culture. Our money, for example, claims “In God we trust.” We pledge our 
allegiance to nation and God as we are “one nation under God,” but indivisible, “with 
liberty and justice for all” (The Pledge of Alligence). Our democracy is one with and 
endorsed by God; our economic viability is entrusted to God; our nation, our collective 
and individual identities as Americans are “indivisible” from God. Thus, not only is the 
Dream inseparable from God, but what is significant is that America’s religious 
consciousness, although historically prior to our democracy and thus prior to the 
American myth of The Dream, is that it is based on another myth which dates back to the 
Christian world’s “discovery” of America. This myth, which is central to America’s 
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vision of itself as a land of opportunity and limitless possibilities, and which Mailer sees 
as inseparable from the myth of The Dream and from America’s historical and 
psychological consciousness, is our nation’s vision of ourselves as American Adams in 
the “New World garden” of “limitless possibilities” (Wenke 70).  
 
Rojack’s “Fall” and the “Fall” of Adam:  
Temptation, Evil, and the Allure of The Dream 
 
Although Mailer makes a clear connection between the loss of self that results 
from an individual’s absorption in the myth of The American Dream and Heidegger’s 
notion of blindly “falling” into the culturally endorsed roles of the “they,” Mailer 
simultaneously imbues Heidegger’s notion of “falling” with religious significance 
through his invocation of the Judeo-Christian myth of the “Fall” of Adam.79 Mailer 
brings this Christian myth to the forefront of modern American experience by invoking 
The American Dream and presenting its allure as a temptation even Adam could not 
withstand. In doing so, Mailer also engages with American’s unique view of themselves 
as American Adams, what Laura Adams aptly notes as the central myth of the American 
novel. This myth, Adams writes,  
is that of Adam in the New World Garden and his expulsion after the Fall, 
the reenactment of man’s encounter with an innocent land and the evil 
                                                 
79 See Laura Adams Existential Battles and Joseph Wenke’s Mailer’s America for differing interpretations 
of the Adamic myth in Mailer’s works. 
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within himself; its characteristic theme that of the American Dream, its 
virtues, its flaws, and its effect on the American character. (Adams 23) 
But for Mailer, Americans’ vision of themselves as new world Adams is not only a 
central myth of the American novel; he sees this myth as American’s cultural “heritage,” 
a “legacy” for modern Americans (Guignon 202).  
Through Mailer’s recovery of the Adamic myth, Mailer reenacts this myth by 
connecting Rojack’s recognition of his “fallenness” to a recognition of his own 
inauthentic modes of being, yet he also connects Rojack’s recognition of his “fallenness” 
to a recognition of “evil” within himself. Rojack suggests that this evil is a cancer, a 
cancer which consumes and annihilates the “true” self. In fact, Rojack’s belief that “as 
your soul died, cancer began,” reveals that Rojack connects the death of soul to the death 
of the “true self” (AAD 68). The evil within, for Rojack, is discovered through his 
recognition of his inauthentic modes of being-in-the-world; that is, Rojack associates evil 
with the false, inauthentic “they-self” which consumes and threatens to annihilate what 
Rojack sees as what is good in him—his soul, his “true self.” Thus, not only do Mailer 
and Rojack connect authenticity to “goodness”—to the “true self” and the soul—they 
also connect inauthenticity to the “evil” within—to the “false self’ and the corruption of 
the soul. Through Rojack Mailer suggests that an individual must recognize his/her 
“fallenness” and thus see the evil within his/her self in order to expel the evil within. As 
Rojack shows us, this is an ongoing struggle, a violent process, a process Rojack 
envisions as a war between his authentic and inauthentic modes of being, between what is 
“good” and “evil” within his “self.” Mailer translates Rojack’s personal war into an 
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external struggle against what is evil, oppressive, and corrupt in American culture, a 
struggle against the forces that threaten to annihilate Rojack’s “self” and his soul. For 
Rojack, this evil on earth not only manifests itself in the form of an oppressive American 
culture, but is also manifest in the form of Deborah, the temptress, the embodiment of 
The Dream and its empty promise of happiness.   
Through Mailer’s recovery of the Adamic myth, Mailer presents Deborah as the 
American Eve who tempts Rojack with the promise of power, money, status, and fame; 
she tempts him with the promise of The Dream: “the road to President” (AAD 2). In 
doing so, Mailer associates Rojack’s temptation and his “fall” with his blind absorption in 
American culture and with the corruption of his “self” and his “soul,” a corruption 
Rojack associates with Deborah, who tempted him with a lie.80 This lie—of The 
American Dream—is the lie of the serpent: the apple does not transfer the infinite 
knowledge of God to Adam or Eve, nor does The Dream provide infinite opportunities 
and possibilities for the individual “self”; in fact, both corrupt those who believe the lie. 
Yet Rojack’s “loss of innocence” occurs when he comes to an awareness of the lie of The 
Dream and of his “failure” in life. Mailer and Rojack envision “innocence” as an 
existential “innocence,” which has a negative connotation: “innocence” suggests blind 
absorption in the social world, the covering-up and hiding of one’s “true” self. In 
existential and religious terms, after his “fall,” Rojack acquires knowledge of the evil 
within and of free will, and he comes face to face with his existential situation in life: he 
                                                 
80 In fact, Mailer not only presents Deborah as an American Eve, the temptress who is rife with the promise 
of power and possibilities, he also presents Kelley as the serpent-father who, through his incest with Eve, 
devours the innocence of the child-Eve—an image that appears on Kelly’s self-created coat of arms. 
Further, Kelly suggests to Rojack that Deborah’s corruption has been passed on to Rojack, just as Eve 
passes her corruption onto Adam. See p. 232-238.   
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must choose his own basis for “Being”; he must choose whether his life will be lived for 
good or for evil. Mailer suggests through Rojack that Adam became aware of his own 
existential situation in life after eating the apple: Adam became aware of his freedom, his 
free-will, his ability to make choices for his own life. Mailer suggests the knowledge both 
Adam and Rojack acquire—of the evil within and of their freedom—is a loss of 
innocence that is necessary to become self-aware and to come to a heightened awareness 
of the world and of others. Through Mailer’s merging of philosophy with his recovery 
and translation of the Adamic myth, Mailer positions Adam as the first human being to 
come to an existential awareness of self and world. For Mailer, Adam is the first “Being” 
to lose his innocence and gain self-awareness that innocence is ignorance; he is the first 
“Being” to become aware of his freedom to choose how he will live his life. Thus, Mailer 
not only recovers, but re-envisions the Adamic myth in An American Dream as 
existential and as a literal and existential war on earth between the forces of good and evil 
within and without. By bringing the Christian myth of the “fall” of Adam to the forefront 
of American experience, Mailer not only suggests that as Americans this war between 
good and evil, between God and the Devil, is our “legacy,” but that our “legacy” is 
existential (qtd. in Guignon 202). As our “legacy,” like Adam and Eve we are “thrown,” 
as Heidegger puts it, into a world and a war not of our own making; but our choices and 
actions, as Mailer envisions, not only contribute to, but could end this war within 
ourselves and end this war on earth. 
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Mailer’s Vision of an American Existentialism of and for America 
 
 Mailer’s vision of the existential foundations of America builds on and departs 
from Heideggerian existentialism through his views that 1) there is a God, and 2) that 
God depends on human action (Adams 38). It is at this point that Mailer’s existentialism 
departs from Heidegger’s and takes on religious significance. Although Heidegger’s 
existentialism is consistently secular, Mailer builds from Heidegger’s view that “whether 
God is God is determined from within the constellation of Being”; that is, the existence of 
God depends on the individual (qtd. in Henry 4). Mailer builds from Heidegger’s notion 
that God depends on the individual and “enlarges the meaning” of Heideggerian 
existentialism through his view “that God depends on the outcome of human action” (qtd. 
in Adams 38; qtd. in Glenday 111-112). Ultimately, Mailer’s view is an outgrowth of 
Heideggerian existentialism. Mailer connects Heidegger’s view of “falling” to the “fall” 
of Adam and envisions the tension between authenticity and inauthenticity as a war 
between good and evil in the individual. Further, because authenticity depends on an 
individual’s thoughts (i.e., his/her recognition of his/her inauthentic modes of being 
“fallen” or “lost”) and depends on individual action (i.e., how the individual chooses to 
live his/her life and how the individual actualizes his/her authentic possibilities for 
“Being”), Mailer’s view “that God depends on the outcome of human action” could read, 
“God depends on the outcome of human thought and action” (qtd. in Adams 38; qtd. in 
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Glenday 111-112). Further, Mailer couples his view that there is a war between good and 
evil on earth with the view that God is engaged in a war with the Devil here on earth, a 
war for souls that began in The Garden of Eden. Throughout An American Dream, 
Rojack engages in this war on varying levels. This war exists internally and externally, 
existentially and literally. It involves expelling evil from within the self and expelling evil 
from the world, an evil on earth Rojack believes is embodied in the form of Nazi soldiers 
and in the form of “the Devil’s daughter,” Deborah (AAD 204). It is a religious war and a 
personal war for existential and literal freedom. It is a national and cultural war in which 
the individual struggles for freedom from an oppressive government and social structure, 
a struggle against the increasingly totalitarian values of America that breed, nay demand, 
conformity and submission. On a nationalistic level, Mailer envisions this war as a 
Revolutionary War, one in which Rojack, like his forefathers, struggles to free himself 
from an oppressive political, legal, and social system, another American “legacy” Mailer 
recovers and shows is as part of the experience of “Being” American in his present 
historic moment.    
 
The American Existential Experience and Mailer’s Vision of America 
 
For Mailer, our “legacy” as children of a Revolutionary War is existential, a 
“legacy” Mailer suggests we must recover in order to fully understand how we arrived 
and the present, historic moment, not just as individuals, but as a culture. Significantly, 
this legacy is and once was a revolution in the consciousness of its time, a revolution 
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which became a war—a Revolutionary War—to achieve freedom from an oppressive 
British system. Yet not only was this freedom achieved through war, but the physical and 
spiritual characteristics of America itself provided the place and the context for the 
foundations of America and American’s new found existential freedom. 
Before America’s founding as a nation, America was a void, and abyss, a “null 
basis” from which individuals could make a new start. Early Americans were free— 
infinite possibilities stood before them in this New World. They were free to form their 
own basis for “Being” as individuals and for “Being” American. From this foundation, 
American democracy was born. The existential vision of our forefathers is evident in our 
founding mottos—“Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” and “Freedom and 
Justice for All”—and in their vision of America as an uncorrupted and fertile land of 
opportunity. Mailer recovers these possibilities from our collective American past and 
reinforces the idea that we must understand where we were, are, and could be in order to 
take authentic action in the present and thus project new possibilities for the future, a 
future Mailer sees at his historic moment as moving toward the total annihilation of the 
individual. 
Through Mailer’s complex vision of the existential foundations of “Being” 
American, Mailer suggests that America and Americans need to recover the existential 
possibilities the individual and the nation were founded on—before it is too late. This is 
the vision Mailer presents throughout An American Dream: he shows us what America 
once was, what it is in his present moment, and through Rojack’s extreme and violent 
response, Mailer shows us what could soon come to be. Mailer, in fact, does not promote 
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violence as many critics believe: he merely shows us the possibilities for our future if 
Americans and America, itself, continues to smother individuals in conformity. It is 
through Rojack that Mailer expresses his view that “If society stifles an individual, 
smothers him in conformity, then he cannot act in any moral way” (PP 270). This is the 
morality and the philosophy of An American Dream—that we, as individuals, are 
responsible for facing-up to our own lives before we are so submerged in our inauthentic 
modes of “Being” American that our struggle for freedom becomes a violent retaliation 
against the world in which we are absorbed. For Mailer, the increasing violence and 
oppression visited upon the individual by the culture at large in his historic moment will 
either lead to the complete annihilation of the individual, of individualism, and the 
vitality of the human spirit, or, as he shows us through Rojack, it will lead to a violent 
response from the individual. Through Rojack Mailer shows us how urgent our need to 
reform ourselves and our culture is. As individuals, we must accept our responsibility to 
strive to discover a more authentic way of living for our own futures as well as for the 
future of our nation. For Mailer there is much at stake. On a nationalistic level, what is at 
stake is the future possibilities of and for the individual American as well as the nation as 
a whole; on a spiritual and religious level, what is at stake is the soul of humanity and the 
existence of God, all of which Mailer envisions—past, present, and future—as bound to 
the existential experience that is unique to “Being” American. We must, Mailer suggests, 
recover the existential possibilities for ourselves and our nation and we must strive to 
discover a more authentic way of living for ourselves and our culture. This is Mailer’s 
“American Dream,” if he has one: that authentic individuals will contribute to the 
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formation of an authentic community, an authentic culture, and an authentic American 
experience that will free us from the collective and individual violence of the past and 
present. In Mailer’s view, the future of the individual, the nation, and God depend on it.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The American Existential Tradition: Tracing the Influence of  
Fitzgerald and Hemingway on Mailer’s Philosophy and Art 
 
 In a 1964 interview published in the Paris Review, Norman Mailer cites the 
authors from whom he has “learned the most from, technically,” as the interviewer puts 
it, as E.M. Forester, James Farrell, John Dos Passos, John Steinbeck, Ernest Hemingway, 
F. Scott Fitzgerald, and Thomas Wolfe (18). Yet the influence of F. Scott Fitzgerald and 
Ernest Hemingway on Mailer’s works goes beyond the realm of technique; in fact, their 
philosophic visions of modernity, their translation of existentialisms to American 
interests and concerns, and their existential concerns with the effects of an increasingly 
oppressive American system on the individual and the culture at large, reverberate 
throughout Mailer’s cultural criticism and his literary works. Although Hemingway is 
often cited as the literary artist who influenced Mailer the most—in part, due to the fact 
that Mailer repeatedly cites Hemingway in his works—in terms of Mailer’s philosophic 
vision of America, both Fitzgerald and Hemingway are central to Mailer’s vision of 
America and the American existential experience of his life and times. In fact, in An 
American Dream Mailer reveals his development of “a coherent view of life” in the form 
of his own American brand of existentialism, a vision of the unique psychological 
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experience of “Being” American that grows from the American existential foundations 
laid by Fitzgerald and Hemingway in the first half of the 20th century (Paris Review 18; 
Foster 220).   
 Significantly, critical studies of Fitzgerald and Hemingway continually refer to 
these authors as innocents of philosophy even though evidence such as reading lists, 
letters, library collections, and the author’s works themselves reveal that Fitzgerald and 
Hemingway were, at least, minimally versed in the philosophic discourse of their time.81   
Critics repeatedly discount works of philosophy in Hemingway’s reading collection, 
claiming that Hemingway most likely never read them; and, Fitzgerald’s copy of H.L. 
Mencken’s The Philosophy of Frederick Nietzsche, a work his letters and interviews 
reveal he highly valued as well as his admission that Nietzschean ideology had a 
profound influence on his thought and writing in his early to mid twenties, are rarely 
considered in critical studies of Fitzgerald’s canon of works (Bruccoli, Conversations 44, 
83).82 Yet, as Ronald Berman notes, because “the decade of the twenties was 
philosophically explosive,” it is hard to image that Fitzgerald and Hemingway, who were 
both known to emphasize their reading of a range and variety of works as essential to 
their art, would have overlooked the main intellectual currents of their time—the 
                                                 
81 Richard Foster and Manfred Putz are among the scholars who discuss Fitzgerald and Hemingway’s 
existentialism, yet they both argue that Fitzgerald and Hemingway were not versed in philosophy. 
Specifically, see Foster’s article “Mailer and the Fitzgerald Tradition,” p. 229 and Putz’s Nietzsche in 
American Thought and Literature, p. 7.   
82 Works of philosophy found in Hemingway’s reading collection such as The Twilight of the Gods (1911), 
Thus Spake Zarathustra (1926), Problems of Philosophy (1926), Time and Man (1928), Nietzsche en Italie 
(1929), Philosophy 4 (1929), as well as philosophically founded texts such as the works of Andre Gide and 
Fydor Dostoevsky, just to name a few, reveal that Hemingway was, in fact, interested in the philosophic 
currents of his time from the teens into the thirties. See Michael Reynold’s Hemingway’s Reading, 1910-
1940. As for Fitzgerald studies, David Ullrich is one of the few scholars who investigates the specific 
influence of Nietzschean ideology on Fitzgerald’s works. Specifically, see his article on Fitzgerald’s short 
story “The Ice Palace” entitled “Memorials and Monuments…” 
  152
explosion of European philosophy on the American scene. If Fitzgerald and Hemingway 
had not commented on every facet of culture in both their fiction and their non-fiction—
from history, politics, and social issues to literature, art, and prevailing ideologies of their 
historic moments—their innocence of the philosophic currents of their time would be 
more likely, even a reasonable assumption. Yet, European philosophies were being 
translated, explicated, and appropriated to American interests and concerns, not only in 
the highest intellectual circles, but in academia, in social criticism, in cultural 
commentary, in journals and on the pages of some of America’s most popular magazines. 
Significantly, the two American authors whom I find to have the most developed and 
articulate existential visions of modern times and who take responsibility through their art 
for working out the philosophical dilemmas of modernity—Fitzgerald and Hemingway—
have yet to be fully understood as two of the most important early literary voices who get 
to the core of the existential experience of “Being” American, voices whose 
reverberations are felt by Mailer in his younger years and are still felt today.   
 
Fitzgerald’s Philosophic Vision of America 
 
Hailed “as the interpreter of the youth of the Jazz age,” the “spokesman” of “the 
dancing, flirting, frivoling, lightly philosophizing young America” and as the 
“delineator” and liberator of “the American girl,” by the close of 1922, Fitzgerald was the 
authoritative voice of an age and a generation (Bruccoli, Conversations 82, 75). He not 
only names and defines his age—the Jazz Age—but also captures the vitality of this age 
  153
like no other author of his time. Although the vision of modernity Fitzgerald presents in 
his early short stories and novels earns Fitzgerald instant renown as of one of the most 
important chroniclers of Jazz Age America, critics who have recognized the existentialist 
impulse in Fitzgerald’s work see Fitzgerald not only as a chronicler, but more importantly 
as a thoughtful and insightful social critic who is working out the “dilemmas of 
philosophy” in his art. (Berman, World 9).83  
Significantly, only a handful of scholars have examined the depth to which 
Fitzgerald’s thought and writing is influenced by the philosophic currents of his time. 
Fitzgerald scholar David Ullrich, for example, identifies the existentialist impulse in 
Fitzgerald’s early works in Fitzgerald’s focus on identity and cultural memory as socially 
constructed. Ullrich argues that this existentialist impulse is embodied in Fitzgerald’s 
existentialist critique of America’s tendency to erect “memorials and monuments” as a 
way of shaping cultural memory, regional and personal identity, and thus “assuring 
conformity and thwarting the possibility of envisioning ‘individuality’” (Ullrich, 
“Memorials” 2). Fitzgerald’s early concern with America’s creation of mythologies 
through which the identities of the individual, communities, regions, and the nation are 
shaped, and what Richard Foster identifies as Fitzgerald’s characters’ “search for 
selfhood” in a culture which threatens to annihilate the individual, forms the basis of 
Fitzgerald’s early “‘existential’ vision” of modern, American experience (228). Foster, in 
                                                 
83 In The Great Gatsby and Fitzgerald’s World of Ideas, Ronald Berman argues that the characters in The 
Great Gatsby “are working out a dilemma of American philosophy” (36). Although Berman does discuss 
the influence of Nietzschean philosophy on Fitzgerald’s art and thought, he attributes this influence to 
American cultural critic H.L. Mencken and his translation of Nietzschean philosophy to an American 
context. 
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fact, implies that Fitzgerald’s “‘existential’ vision” of modernity positions Fitzgerald as 
the first modern American author to interpret American experience existentially.84 In fact, 
Fitzgerald is heralded as “the first author to chronicle the younger generation at the 
moment when youth was becoming supreme and defiant,” an assessment that not only 
points to Fitzgerald’s extreme sense of contemporaneity and his keen social eye but also 
points to Fitzgerald’s historic moment, the moment when the modern sensibility was 
born, when the Victorian public conscience is replaced by the modern epistemological 
shift to subjectivity, the moment when the American youth rebelled against the values of 
the increasingly conformist modern society in which they lived (Bruccoli, Conversations 
60; Berman, Fitzgerald 53).  
Fitzgerald’s complex vision positions him as a chronicler and an existentialist, the 
philosophy he explores and espouses inseparable from the historic moment he puts in 
motion through his art. In fact, throughout his early short stories and novels, Fitzgerald 
addresses and captures the existential center of his times by showing how the 
individualist values of Americans conflict with the increasingly oppressive and 
conformist values of the culture at large. Fitzgerald’s “The Ice Palace,” for example, 
serves as critique of the American political and social structures that seek to ensure 
individuals’ loyalty to regional and national values and thus ensure individuals’ 
conformity (Ullrich, “Memorials” 2). In “The Diamond as Big as the Ritz,” Fitzgerald 
presents a stark picture of the implications of America’s emphasis on the value of wealth: 
                                                 
84 Although Foster claims Fitzgerald’s existentialism is a recovery of the American existentialism critic 
Martin Green attributes to Ralph Waldo Emerson—who Green calls “the classical voice of a curiously 
American ‘existentialism’”—Fitzgerald’s existential vision, which grows in depth and dimension in the 
early to mid 1920s, is a Neitzschean-inspired existential-philosophic vision of the Jazz Age and the Jazz 
Age scene (Foster 219; Green 53). 
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wealth and the protection of one’s wealth, Fitzgerald suggests, had become the most 
important individualist endeavor, more important than human life. Although Fitzgerald 
critiques different aspects of American culture in these stories, they both reveal 
Fitzgerald’s existentialist view that the values American culture espouses are antithetical 
to the individual; in fact, he suggests that the direction American culture is heading is not 
only toward the death of the individual, but to the eventual death of American culture. 
Fitzgerald repeats this sentiment in his early novels This Side of Paradise (1920) and The 
Beautiful and Damned (1922) through presenting characters who are lost, who are broken 
both physically and spiritually and thus unable, impotent to act, what Fitzgerald envisions 
as the implications of his culture’s desire for conformity: the death of the creative spirit 
and vitality of the individual. Yet Fitzgerald’s vision of modernity, as pessimistic as it 
may seem, does retain a sense of hope for the individual and for American culture. For 
Fitzgerald, the first step is to come to a heightened awareness and understanding of self 
and world. At the end of Fitzgerald’s “The Ice Palace,” for example, Sally Carrol Happer 
comes to what David Ullrich identifies as an “existential awareness” of self—“that real 
growth is inevitable and painful” (Ullrich 9). This Side of Paradise closes with Armory 
Blaine’s admission that he knows himself, nothing more, suggestive of Armory’s growth 
and his existential awareness of self. “Diamond” ends with Kismine and John who escape 
the island to avoid “execution” for their knowledge of the secret diamond at the source of 
Kismine’s family wealth. Fitzgerald suggests that Kismine and John come to an 
awareness that love and human connection are more fulfilling than wealth; they also 
come to an awareness of the implications of revering wealth—the death of the 
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individual—a sentiment Fitzgerald punctuates by the deaths of those who visit and 
inhabit the island. And although The Beautiful and Damned ends with a sentiment similar 
to “Diamond”—the perception that that wealth is more important than human life—it 
also ends by lauding courage and an individualist ethic through Anthony Patch’s proud 
vision of himself. He does not “submit to mediocrity”—“ I didn't give up,” Anthony says 
to himself, “and I came through!” (BD 795). For Ullrich, the importance of Fitzgerald’s 
early short stories and his first novel, This Side of Paradise, is that they reveal 
Fitzgerald’s formation of a “complex philosophy of culture,” a philosophy Ullrich claims 
Fitzgerald had already developed by 1919-1920, a philosophy Ullrich argues informs 
Fitzgerald’s critique of American culture in his later works. Although I agree that the 
philosophy of culture Fitzgerald espouses in his early works recurs throughout his canon, 
Fitzgerald’s own admissions that Nietzsche’s works, as well as Mencken’s Nietzschean-
inspired social commentary of the 1920s, had a profound influence on his thought and 
writing in the first half of the 1920s, suggests that Fitzgerald was still formulating—or 
refining—his existentialist philosophy of culture and the individual in the years leading 
up to The Great Gatsby. In fact, Fitzgerald’s 1922 claim to Maxwell Perkins that he 
wants “to write something new” suggests Fitzgerald thinks he has something new to 
write, something that is not only different from his own works, but something different 
from the artistic endeavors of his contemporaries (qtd. in Lehan, Limits 28).  
Critics such as Richard Lehan argue that the new novel Fitzgerald had already 
begun to envision in 1922, what would become The Great Gatsby, “was to be 
consciously different” (Limits 28). In fact, in a 1924 interview Fitzgerald reveals one of 
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the ways in which Gatsby was to be different from current trends in American literature. 
In this interview Fitzgerald claims a shift in the intellectual and literary climate of his 
time and presents his observation that, “five years ago the new American novels needed 
comment by the author…. But now that there is a intelligent body of opinion guided by 
such men as Mencken, Edmund Wilson, and Van Wyck Brooks, comment should be 
unnecessary” (qtd. in Bruccoli, Conversations 68). What Fitzgerald suggests in this 
interview is that not only was he well-versed in the American cultural discourse of his 
time—much of which was Nietzsche-inspired—but that this discourse was not limited to 
intellectual and literary circles; it dominated American public discourse. Berman cites a 
series of essays Mencken wrote in the years 1920-1927 in which Mencken questioned 
“the nature of democracy” and offered his view of “some of its current problems” 
(Berman, World 9). Ronald Berman writes that in these essays Mencken captures “the 
sense of opposition between individuals and groups of the early twenties” and formulates 
“one issue” Berman sees as “central to Fitzgerald’s writing”—the inadequacy of the 
“legal aristocracy” as the ruling class in America.85 Critic Robert Emmett Long attributes 
Mencken’s influence on Fitzgerald’s vision in Gatsby to Mencken’s “concern with the 
illusion of national myth” and the “worship of ‘success,’” as well as his written attacks on 
“our great national myth of ‘success’” and the optimism that stood behind it (Achieving 
38). Mencken repeatedly expresses themes Berman and Long see as part of the fabric of 
                                                 
85 I have discussed what Nietzsche refers to as the “legal aristocracy” at length in Chapter 2. In short, in 
Nietzsche’s class system, the “legal aristocracy” is the class of inherited wealth, prestige, and power, and is 
also the class Nietzsche despises the most since they reinforce and perpetuate the forces in society that 
thwart individual growth, development, and expression. 
  158
Fitzgerald’s Gatsby. In fact, Long claims that it is through Fitzgerald’s writing of Gatsby 
that Fitzgerald “finds his vision” (Long, Achieving 180).  
Fitzgerald’s vision in Gatsby, what I see as a complex mixture of history, politics, 
religion, social issues, and philosophy, not only embodies the cultural and philosophic 
dilemmas of his time, but separates Fitzgerald from the literary-artistic endeavors of his 
contemporaries. For example, where postwar writers—as a whole—tended to write 
pessimistically about the state of American democracy and American culture, content to 
expose and criticize America’s myths of success, equality, and unhindered individual 
freedom, Fitzgerald’s Gatsby departs from this body of opinion and shows Fitzgerald 
views American culture as capable of reconstructing itself more authentically. In fact, 
Fitzgerald’s pessimism toward American culture is evident in his early works, a 
pessimism retained in Nick Carraway’s disdain for the blind masses and the “legal 
aristocracy,” yet in Gatsby, as critics such as Martin Green and Wright Morris argue, 
Fitzgerald’s philosophy is positivistic, optimistic, affirmative in nature (Foster 219). 
Further, what is also distinctive about Fitzgerald’s philosophic vision in Gatsby, as 
Ronald Berman aptly notes, is found in Fitzgerald’s presentation of “the dilemmas of 
philosophy in anecdotes of social life,” philosophies that Berman argues are inspired by 
the philosophic discourse of Fitzgerald’s time (World 9). These philosophies, which 
“seemed simple to Mencken and to other editorialists,” Berman writes, “became more 
complex” in the “novelistic form” of Gatsby (World 9). The complexity of Fitzgerald’s 
existential-philosophic vision of modernity, according to Wright Morris, is found in 
Fitzgerald’s optimistic-absurdist vision of contemporary experience. This vision, Morris 
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claims, positions Fitzgerald as “the first American to formulate his own philosophy of the 
absurd,” a philosophy that takes shape during Fitzgerald’s conscious attempt to write 
something new, something different from the works of his contemporaries and from his 
own early artistic endeavors, something contemporary that also captures the “dilemmas 
of philosophy” and presents a remedy for living in Jazz Age modernity (Berman World 9; 
Morris, “The Function of Nostalgia” 26-27).  
Although Fitzgerald’s philosophic vision, as I have traced thus far, is existentially 
Nietzschean in origin, a vision that radically Americanizes and adds depth to the existing 
American-oriented Nietzschean musings of fellow chroniclers such as H.L. Mencken, we 
can not fully understand Fitzgerald’s absurdist vision by relying exclusively on a 
Nietzschean frame. In fact, Nietzsche is only part of Nick’s story and Fitzgerald’s 
complex philosophy. Yes, Nick is an aspiring Nietzschean, yet Nick never suggests that 
Gatsby’s sees as he does. In fact, as Nick comes to see more of how Gatsby sees, Nick 
comes to realize that Gatsby’s faith—like that of Søren Kierkegaard’s “young swain who 
falls in love with a princess,” yet knows the impossibility of this love—is a faith in the 
absurd. It is Gatsby’s vision, his commitment to Daisy, his faith, hope, and courage in the 
face of impossibility that not only reinvigorates Nick’s faith, but forms the basis of the 
absurdist vision Fitzgerald presents in Gatsby.  
To understand Fitzgerald’s—what becomes Nick’s—absurdist vision of 
contemporaniety is to understand Gatsby as an outsider to the Nietzschean civilization 
Nick envisions as his own. He is “exempt from” Nick’s usual “scorn” because Nick 
comes to see that Gatsby, unlike Myrtle and George Wilson, is not blind or deluded; 
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instead, he is aware from the outset that he was in Daisy’s house by “colossal accident” 
(156). Because of his fear, that his “invisible cloak of a uniform” might fall off at any 
moment and Daisy may find out that he was not “a person from much the same strata as 
herself,” Gatsby “made the most of his time” with Daisy, an admission that suggests the 
“penniless young man without a past” is aware of the impossibility of winning Daisy 
(156). Gatsby’s quest—to amass great wealth and create a past for himself in order to win 
Daisy—is, in part, achieved. He risks everything—his life and his creation of “Jay 
Gatsby”—for the possibility of achieving what was once, and may still be, the 
impossible. For Nick, it is Gatsby’s infinite hope, his faith that the absurd is possible, that 
makes Gatsby’s vision different from his own. I have discussed Nick’s admiration for 
Gatsby’s absurdist vision in length in the Fitzgerald Review in terms of Gatsby as 
Kierkegaard’s “great” knight of faith. As my understanding of both Kierkegaard and 
Fitzgerald has continued to grow, there are, of course, points in the article I would 
explicate more precisely, but my message—Fitzgerald’s message—is the same: 
Fitzgerald’s view—that “hope keeps the world beautifully alive”—forms the basis of 
Fitzgerald’s absurdist vision (qtd. in Lehan 72).86 It is this element of Gatsby’s character 
that Nick describes as his “romantic readiness,” his “extraordinary gift for hope,” and his 
“sensitivity to the promises of life” (6). It is Gatsby’s striving, his “extraordinary gift for 
                                                 
86 What is see to be Fitzgerald’s absurdist philosophy is bound to the fact that we live in a world absent of 
absolute “Truths” and absolute objectivity, thus our choices, commitments, beliefs, values, and standards 
are not based on any rational, clearly demarked foundations. We must make choices in spite of the 
irrationality of life; we must make commitments in spite of the impossibility of achieving our ends; we 
must decide meaning and purpose for our lives in spite of the absence of meaning and direction in this 
world. In short, we must commit ourselves to our choices, we must choose what we think is best for our 
lives, and we must have faith that our choices, our commitments, and our values will prove to be the right 
ones. The absurdity of life is that we must make choices and commitments without knowing whether we 
have made the right choices.  
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hope” and his courage in the face of his adversaries (i.e., Tom and the social forces that 
block the upward mobility of the American self-made man) that Nick admires (6). It is 
Gatsby’s hope and the authentic vitality of his creative spirit, not a “flabby 
impressionability which is dignified under the name of the ‘creative temperament’” that 
Nick suggests separates Gatsby from the majority of men (6). Yet, what is unique about 
Gatsby, what separates him from “the herd” is that Gatsby embraces his creative spirit 
and gives direction to his vitality through his commitment to Daisy.87 In fact, Gatsby 
embodies the American spirit Fitzgerald sees as part of the American character that can 
save the individual and culture from the direction it is heading: toward the death of the 
individual and the creative spirit, and thus the death of what Fitzgerald sees to be 
uniquely American.    
 Thus, Gatsby embodies Fitzgerald’s hopeful vision for the individual: that hope, 
faith, commitment, and courage will keep the world “beautifully alive” (qtd. in Lehan 
72). This is what Nick memorializes through writing The Great Gatsby: he memorializes 
the one uniquely American characteristic that has survived the times—the vitality of the 
American spirit—and shows his generation that there are authentic possibilities for the 
individual who gives authentic direction to this vitality of spirit. It is this uniquely 
American spirit that Nick sees in Gatsby and that he feels “responsible” for sharing with 
his generation, a spirit whose physical embodiment is destroyed by the “careless” and 
                                                 
87 Although Gatsby’s commitment to Daisy is often discussed in terms of Gatsby’s tragic failure to see 
Daisy’s corruption—i.e., her valuing of wealth, aristocratic status and power—what Nick venerates is 
Gatsby’s absurdist faith that he can overcome the forces of society that thwart individuals who pursue 
interests outside their class of birth. What makes Gatsby “great” is his vitality, his courage, his faith, and 
his commitment, even though the direction he gives to his creative spirit is often regarded by critics as a 
tragically misplaced direction. 
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irresponsible, but a spirit Nick suggests—nay, ensures—will live on in the hearts and 
minds of his fellow and future Americans.   
Through Fitzgerald’s creation of his own coherent view of American culture and 
the individual’s place in culture, Fitzgerald puts his philosophy in motion through Gatsby 
with the intention of clarifying “a nation’s vision of itself” (Mailer, Cannibals and 
Christians 98).88 What Fitzgerald seeks to clarify is that the direction American culture is 
heading is toward the death of the individual. What can save us, Fitzgerald suggests, is to 
see more clearly, to retain a sense of hope, to grow, to be responsible, not “careless.” For 
Nick, Gatsby both serves as an example and a warning to modern Americans: his hope, 
faith, courage, and commitment are laudable, but his vision lacks the hardy skepticism  
Nick practices in his pursuit of “truth.” Gatsby, as Nick envisions him, has an absurdist 
faith in the impossible; but, for Nick, what Gatsby sets his sights on—Daisy—is not 
worthy of his love, his hope, and commitment. Although Fitzgerald’s own belief “that 
hope keeps the world beautifully alive” is illustrated through Gatsby, Fitzgerald also 
shows us that we must break all illusions and come to see the world more clearly and 
truly; we must take responsibility for developing and refining our own vision. In fact, it is 
Gatsby’s hope, his vitality, his creative spirit, as well as what Nick sees as Gatsby’s 
inability to see self and world clearly, that stirs Nick’s creative spirit and inspires him to 
take responsibility for Gatsby and for sharing his own heightened awareness and 
understanding of the world with his fellow Americans. It is Gatsby’s vitality and hope 
that inspires Nick to give direction to his own creative spirit, a commitment to the 
                                                 
88 For Mailer, the highest purpose of literature is “to clarify a nation’s vision of itself,” a vision Mailer 
consciously strove to achieve through An American Dream (CC 98; Adams 31; Wenke 3). I see 
Fitzgerald’s vision in Gatsby to have the same purpose. 
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memory of Gatsby through which he simultaneously creates art, becomes an artist, and 
espouses an “art of living” for modern times.     
 
Hemingway’s Philosophic Vision of America 
 
 Hemingway’s vision of modernity is commonly attributed to the formation of his 
own philosophies of life, death, and art in what has come to be known as Hemingway’s 
“characteristic philosophy”—the “Hemingway Code” and Hemingway’s “Code Heroes” 
(de Madariaga 18).89 Decades of critics have explored Hemingway’s development of his 
“Code Hero” in his early works—from Nick Adams, Jake Barnes, and Fredric Henry to 
his early portraits of the Spanish matador—and have described both Hemingway’s 
philosophy and that of his characters as existential-oriented. Wayne Kvam, who explores 
the popularity of Hemingway’s early works in Germany in the twenties, notes that 
“existentialist critics naturally felt immediate kinship with a writer who recognized death 
as the only absolute,” a sentiment Kvam interprets as a major theme of Hemingway’s 
early works (Kvam 154). John Killinger attributes Hemingway’s early “literary 
popularity” to his “extreme sense of contemporaneity,” which Killinger notes reflected 
the “rigorous philosophical movement” of his time—existentialism—and like Kvam, 
Killinger recognizes Hemingway’s repeated exploration of death in his early canon of 
works as Hemingway’s attempt to “reduce the problem of existence to its lowest common 
denominator” (21-22). Jose Castillo-Puche claims the Spanish bullfight as essential to 
                                                 
89 See Philip Young’s 1959 Ernest Hemingway and his 1963 Ernest Hemingway: A Reconsideration for the 
first discussions of Hemingway’s “Code” and “Code Heroes.” 
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Hemingway’s formation of a coherent philosophy; he claims that after Hemingway saw 
his first bullfight in 1923, the bullfight “was to remain fixed in him and indelible, the 
basis of his elemental philosophy which he would carry with him throughout his life” 
(qtd. in Broer, Spanish Tragedy 55). In fact, Castillo-Puche writes, “From the very first 
moment” Hemingway “tended to see in the matador a superhuman power that was more 
than religious—something almost divine” (206). Lawrence Broer insightfully notes that 
“in the image of the matador” Hemingway “found a symbol of the best a man can be in a 
violent and irrational world—a model of manhood and integrity after which he would 
pattern his major fictional heroes” (Broer, Spanish Tragedy vii). This pattern began in 
embryonic form in 1923 when Hemingway saw his first bullfight and immediately 
recognized the “transcendental value of the bullfight” (Broer, Spanish Tragedy 55).     
 In the nine years between Hemingway’s first bullfight and his publication of his 
Spanish bullfight manifesto, Death in the Afternoon, Hemingway writes of the Spanish 
bullfight in articles and in essays, in prose and poetry form. Yet, Miriam Mandel notes 
that Hemingway’s first piece on the Spanish bullfight was written before he saw his first 
bullfight. Mandel writes: “When Mike Strater, Gertrude Stein, and Alice B. Toklas spoke 
to him about the bullfight, he immediately recognized its literary possibilities” and wrote 
“The First Matador Got the Horn,” which Mandel notes “reads like an objective, 
journalistic eyewitness account, but it is a mix of hearsay, imagination, and reading, a 
crafted exercise in voice and point of view” (Companion 7-8). After Hemingway saw his 
first bullfight on March 27, 1923, he immediately began sharing his first-hand 
experiences and his insights into the Spanish bullfight with his American readers 
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(Mandel, “The Birth of Hemingway’s Afición” 142-143). In 1923 Hemingway published 
three essays on the bullfight: “Bullfighting, Sport, and Industry,” “World Series of Bull 
Fighting a Mad, Whirling Carnival,” and “Tancredo is Dead.” In the same year, 
Hemingway writes poetry and prose on the bullfight: “Maera Lay Still” was published in 
In Our Time, and his poetry, “The Soul of Spain with McAlmon and Bird the Publishers” 
and “Part Two of the Soul of Spain with McAlmon and Bird the Publishers” were 
published the following year. In 1924 Hemingway produced more bullfight poetry— 
“The Poem is by Maera” and  “[Some day when you are picked up…]”—and in 1926 he 
writes “To a Tragic Poetess.” The bullfight in Hemingway’s fiction includes “The 
Undefeated” (1925), The Sun Also Rises (1926), “Banal Story” (1927), which is another 
tribute to Maera, and “The Mother of a Queen,” which was composed in 1931-1932 and 
published in Winner Take Nothing in 1933 (Mandel, Companion 13).  
In these years—1923-1932— not only does Hemingway bring the bullfight to 
Americans and serve as his readers’ guide to Spain and Spanish culture, he also guides 
them through “Trout Fishing in Europe,” through fishing expeditions between Key West 
and Havana; he brings them the American expatriate experience in Paris and repeatedly 
brings them back to the war on the Italian front using all genres of writing available to 
him. But what Hemingway finds in Spain greatly differs from what he finds in other 
cultures of the world—Paris included. What Hemingway finds is a country, a people, and 
a national spirit, untouched by the First World War and free from the overcrowding and 
modernization that Hemingway saw spoiling his own native land as well as some of his 
favorite cultures of the world. Spain serves as a contrast to America where the “values” 
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of courage, bravery, honor, and patriotism hold little or no significant meaning for the 
individual. What Hemingway grasps to be the dilemmas inherent in “Being” American—
his is a generation rendered impotent by war directionless, disillusioned, a “lost 
generation” smothered by the conformist values of American culture—he finds the 
answers to in Spain. What Hemingway finds in Spain is esteem for the individual. In fact, 
it is the rebel, the individualist, the artist, who is celebrated in Spain and celebrated 
through the national art of the Spanish bullfight. It is a country which encourages the 
growth of the individual and cherishes what is uniquely their own—their culture, their 
view toward life and death, the sculptural art of the Spanish bullfight. It is in this 
context—Spain—that Hemingway, by contrast, comes to see what is universal in the 
particulars of Spanish culture. They, like Hemingway’s post-war generation, live with the 
thought of death everyday.  
 By the time Hemingway starts writing Death in the Afternoon, Hemingway’s 
distrust of his own culture—which he sees as espousing abstract material values that 
distort identity and thwart the individual by smothering him/her in conformity—has 
brought Hemingway to a deep appreciation of the spiritual superiority of Spain. It had all 
the essential characteristics of an authentic, individualistic culture that America did not. 
Its values, firmly set and visibly performed through the Spanish bullfight, Hemingway 
tells us, are embodied in one word—“pundonor” (DIA 91).90 It was a culture that faced 
death everyday with a vitality of spirit Hemingway saw as essential to the life of the 
                                                 
90 “Pundonor,” Hemingway tells us, “means honor, probity, courage, self-respect and pride in one word” 
(91). In terms of the matador, Hemingway emphasizes the fact that he “is not always expected to be good, 
only to do his best” by adhering to the highest standards of bullfighting, by working closely with the bull, 
and by performing honorably in the bull ring. 
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individual and to the life of a nation. The philosophy that grows from what Hemingway 
sees to be the superior qualities of Spanish culture is a philosophy through which 
Hemingway attempts to clarify the vision of his nation, of his fellow Americans. This 
philosophy calls for a new awareness, a new understanding of self and world; it calls for 
a new consciousness for the individual American and for the nation as a whole. The basis 
of this philosophy, that we must, as Susan Beegel puts it, “look realistically at war and 
death, and…abandon all romantic notions of them,” concentrates on individual 
experience and feeling and on what Sidney Finkelstein refers to as the “essential 
question” of individual “existence” (Beegel, “That Always Absent” 75; Finkelstein 294). 
In the act of writing Death in the Afternoon, the voice of an American adventurer and a 
chronicler of American experience becomes the cultivated voice of a spokesman-
philosopher for modern times whose focus is not merely American existence, but human 
existence.    
 In Death in the Afternoon Hemingway’s existentialism and his coherent view of 
life as a whole takes shape. Hemingway shows that individuals must renounce capitalistic 
values and concentrate on their own individual existence. He presents a “philosophy of 
life in the lap of death” and illustrates this philosophy through the matador, an individual 
Lawrence Broer sees as the new “embodiment” of Hemingway’s “Code Hero,” a hero 
Kathy Willingham sees as “grounded in the existential be-ing in the world” and who 
strives for “existential authenticity” through his creation of the art of the Spanish 
bullfight (Reynolds 41; Broer, Spanish Tragedy 46; Willingham 34, 37). For 
Hemingway’s American audience, because the bullfight and correlatively the philosophy 
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Hemingway had been formulating, was radically foreign to the American mind, to 
understand the bullfight Hemingway calls for a new awareness and a new understanding, 
not just of the bullfight, but of self and world. Hemingway tells readers they must learn to 
“see clearly and as a whole”; they must reserve all judgments until they have seen the 
things he has spoken of for themselves; they must create their own standards, decide what 
is “good” and “bad” and let nothing confuse these standards; and they must allow 
themselves to feel, not what they have been “taught to feel,” but must see their own 
feelings and emotional reactions as epistemologically valid (DIA 2). In short, he 
emphasizes that readers must take responsibility for their own perceptions, feelings, and 
morality and for their own thoughts and actions. Through teaching readers how to see, 
judge, and feel the Spanish bullfight, Hemingway attempts to bring readers to a 
heightened awareness and understanding of their own existential situation in life—as 
towards death. For Hemingway, this situation requires that we break all illusions and face 
the stark realities of life, that every individual be brave in his/her own way, that every 
individual take responsibility for creating meaning and content for his/her own life as a 
“whole,” and that every individual face his/her own death in order to live life with clarity, 
integrity, purpose, and meaning; in short, one must face the reality of death with 
earnestness or pundonor in order to live life earnestly.  
 What American critics often consider a fatalistic philosophy, a death-haunted, 
morbid fascination with the darker side of life, existentialist critics see as a prophetic 
optimism and an absurdist vision that places Hemingway in the ranks of a “guide for his 
generation,” a “prophet of those who are without faith” (Kvam 29; Fadiman 64). 
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Hemingway’s is a philosophy of the absurd, a philosophy in which one must “think 
death” and think of “it as your lot,” and do “what death is indeed unable to do—namely, 
that you are and death is also,” a philosophy that calls for a union of the temporal and the 
eternal, of life and death, a philosophy through which the individual recognizes that life 
must be lived with passion and intensity and with clarity and purpose since death may 
come at any moment (Kierkegaard, “At a Graveside” 75). For Hemingway, to unite the 
temporal and the eternal is to choose an overarching meaning for one’s life as a whole 
and to live with and renew this commitment every day. Like the matador, who faces 
death on an almost daily basis, who makes a commitment to his work and his art and 
strives to unite the temporal and eternal in his art, Hemingway is also committed to unite 
the temporal and the eternal in his art. Like the matador, and like Hemingway, we must 
have courage and faith in the face of death to commit to an overarching purpose for our 
lives as a “whole.” The basis for Hemingway’s absurdist philosophy of life—that we 
must unite life and death, the temporal and the eternal, in order to express the eternal in 
our lives—finds its most articulate expression in the greatest of the matador-artists’ union 
of “life and death” through their art, a living illustration of the necessity of pundonor and 
earnestness at a time when the faith and courage of Hemingway’s generation faltered.  
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Fitzgerald and Hemingway: American Existentialists 
 
 Like the existentialists who “rose in revulsion against the corruption of values in 
capitalist society” and whose “basic conviction was that the evils it perceived were to be 
ascribed to the very concept and existence of society,” Fitzgerald and Hemingway 
recognize the inadequacy of American democracy in an increasingly commercial and 
consumer culture and reject the capitalistic values, identities, and norms prescribed by 
and reinforced through the increasingly oppressive social and political structures of 
American culture. For Fitzgerald and Hemingway what is at stake is the individual, the 
creative spirit, and the life of the nation. This sentiment echoes throughout both authors’ 
early works, a sentiment manifest in their portraits of lost, directionless, impotent, and 
emotionally unfulfilled characters. Significantly, both Fitzgerald and Hemingway 
expatriated themselves in 1924 and 1921 respectively since they felt America no longer 
provided an environment for the authentic growth of the individual or for the cultivation 
of the creative spirit, something Europe, and Paris in particular, not only offered, but 
encouraged and held in high esteem.  
Although Fitzgerald and Hemingway sought an environment that encouraged 
artistic experimentation and had a vital intellectual and artistic scene in which they could 
cultivate their own art, they never abandoned America or their hopes for America 
entirely. In fact, both Fitzgerald and Hemingway’s repeated explorations into the 
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dilemmas of American modernity and their attempts to find an authentic remedy for the 
individual—i.e., how to live in modernity—reveals that their concern with the 
inadequacy of American democracy and American culture goes beyond their own 
personal concern of finding an environment that encourages individual growth and 
expression. Although Fitzgerald and Hemingway’s concern for the individual American 
and for the nation as a whole is evident in their early portraits of wounded, directionless, 
and impotent Americans who are smothered in conformity and lost in a value system that 
speaks for them, not to them, by the time Fitzgerald is writing The Great Gatsby and 
Hemingway is writing Death in the Afternoon, they have each developed a philosophy, a 
coherent view of life through which the individual and the nation can be revitalized and 
given authentic direction. Their philosophies, which embody an individualistic ethic and 
an existential-artistic vision of the creative spirit and of life and art, are only part of what 
distinguishes The Great Gatsby and Death in the Afternoon from Fitzgerald and 
Hemingway’s earlier works. In fact, Fitzgerald and Hemingway both admittedly set out 
to create something new in The Great Gatsby and Death in the Afternoon and do so by 
responding to—and also by subtly defying—the literary currents of their time. They defy 
the Eliot cult’s cry “Art for Art’s Sake!” in favor of creating art that is social-minded, 
didactic, and useful. Importantly, Fitzgerald and Hemingway’s “art” is not subordinate to 
their subtle and indirect didacticism; the existential “art of living” they espouse in The 
Great Gatsby and Death in the Afternoon comprise part of the artistic genius of these 
authors. In fact, in The Great Gatsby and Death in the Afternoon, Fitzgerald and 
Hemingway not only focus in on the universal, existential-philosophic concerns of 
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existence, but the perspective they espouse is that of the “artist,” of the creative spirit 
who breathes life into art and makes art out of life. Understanding and engaging their 
perspective is so essential to Fitzgerald and Hemingway’s philosophies that they both 
begin their narratives by introducing readers to their narrative points of view; they give 
their readers a direction from which they can begin to refine and cultivate their own, 
personal vision and their own “art of living” for modern times. But the philosophies 
Fitzgerald and Hemingway espouse throughout The Great Gatsby and Death in the 
Afternoon are not merely existential-oriented; in fact, the philosophies they espouse are 
absurdist, philosophies that require the individual to have the courage to risk everything 
in the face of impossibility to win back life and love.  
Where Fitzgerald puts his absurdist philosophy in motion through Gatsby’s 
commitment to what he knows to be an impossible love affair—he knew he was in 
Daisy’s house by “colossal accident”—Hemingway puts his absurdist philosophy in 
motion through the Spanish matador’s commitment to creating art in the face of death, an 
absurdist vision in which the matador must have the courage to do the impossible—unite 
life and death. For Fitzgerald and Hemingway, courage, commitment, hope, and faith are 
the materials for the impossible to become possible, an absurdist and optimistic vision for 
modernity through which they simultaneously get to the core of the existential experience 
of existence and espouse an “art of living” in the face of absurdity. This requires, as 
Fitzgerald and Hemingway emphasize, a new vision, a new awareness, and a new 
understanding of our existential predicament in life, a vision through which Fitzgerald 
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and Hemingway address the universal human dilemmas of modernity and show us they 
are our own.    
Fitzgerald and Hemingway’s conscious striving to find solutions to the dilemmas 
of modernity for themselves and for their fellow and future Americans position Fitzgerald 
and Hemingway as guides for their generation. Yet, they do not only provide 
existentialist critiques of their American moments, nor do they merely capture the texture 
and feel of these moments; instead, The Great Gatsby and Death in the Afternoon serve 
as responses to and offer remedies for the existential predicament of “Being” American 
in their time. They guide their generation not just through the particulars of American 
experience with a sense of contemporaneity often considered unmatched in their time, but 
they guide their generation through the process through which one negotiates their own 
existence and creates significance and meaning for their own lives as “a whole.” In The 
Great Gatsby and Death in the Afternoon, both Nick and Hemingway offer themselves as 
explorers, pioneers of places foreign to them and to most Americans, not just 
geographically, but philosophically, psychologically, and spiritually. They are explorers 
of the human psyche, of the materials of existence, of the authentic possibilities for 
themselves, for their contemporaries, and for their nation. But first and foremost they are 
“artists,” in the literal and the existential sense. In fact, it is through their merging of 
philosophy and art that Fitzgerald and Hemingway add depth and dimension and give a 
meaningful direction to their art.   
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Mailer and the Fitzgerald-Hemingway Tradition 
 
Like Fitzgerald and Hemingway, Mailer repeatedly voices his concern for the 
psychological and existential well-being of his fellow Americans throughout his canon of 
works. His concerns are Fitzgerald and Hemingway’s: they are concerned with the 
annihilation of the creative spirit, in part due to the rising power of the totalitarian power 
structures of society that thwart development, growth, and creative, artistic, and 
individualistic expression. Like Fitzgerald and Hemingway, Mailer believes that cultural 
reform begins with the individual, and he believes in the possibility of an authentic 
American experience supported by an authentic American culture.91 It is this existential 
and absurdist impulse in Mailer’s canon of works that brings Richard Foster to the insight 
that “Mailer’s work constitutes an imaginative advancing of Fitzgerald’s”—and we must 
add Hemingway’s—“kind of vision” (Foster 224). Nowhere is this more evident than in 
Mailer’s An American Dream where Fitzgerald and Hemingway are referenced, invoked, 
and literally woven into the fabric of Mailer’s novel.  
In the opening paragraph of An American Dream, Rojack’s invocation of 
Fitzgerald’s short story, “The Diamond as Big as the Ritz,” simultaneously brings 
Fitzgerald’s critique of America’s cult of success and his preoccupation with the illusion 
that wealth, status, and prestige bring happiness to the forefront of the narrative. By 
                                                 
91 Mailer has even drawn up plans for constructing cities that would contribute to the authentic 
development of individuals and the culture as a whole. See Mailer’s “Rebuilding the Cities,” which is 
collected in John P. Rasmussen’s The New American Revolution; the Dawning of the Technetronic Era.   
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invoking “Diamond,” Rojack not only points to his own early obsession with status and 
wealth, but he also suggests that in his own cultural moment the materialistic values 
Fitzgerald sought to expose and denounce in the 1920s still have a hold on the American 
consciousness in his time. Significantly, Rojack invokes “Diamond” in reference to 
Deborah—“a girl,” Rojack writes, “who would have been bored by a diamond as big as 
the Ritz” (AAD 1). In this context, Rojack’s reference to “Diamond” not ony points to 
Gatsby’s Daisy Faye, a perpetually bored young aristocrat who once tossed a $100,000 
string of pearls into the trash, but it also suggests that Deborah, like Daisy, is a member 
of the American aristocracy with the social, political, and economic power and 
connections to provide access to “The Dream.” Through this reference, Rojack thus 
positions himself as a post-modern Gatsby whose pursuit of “The Dream”—“the road to 
President”—is entangled with his pursuit of an American heiress (AAD 1-2). Richard 
Foster identifies the correlation between Gatsby’s Daisy and Rojack’s Deborah: both 
serve “as promissory images of value and possibility,” an assessment punctuated by 
Gatsby’s description of Daisy’s voice as “full of money” and Rojack’s description that 
Deborah “smelled like a bank” (Gatsby 127; AAD 34). Yet where Mailer’s critique of 
American culture and Rojack’s vision of Deborah as his access to “The Dream” are 
Fitzgeraldian, Rojack’s recollection of his World War II experience and his death-
haunted point of view are Hemingwayesque.  
 Rojack’s reference to “a particular hill in Italy” echoes Hemingway’s own war 
experience on the Italian front, as well as Hemingway characters Jake Barnes and 
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Frederic Henry’s near-death experiences and woundings on the Italian front.92 Rojack’s 
wounds—to his thigh and pelvis—are the wounds Hemingway and Jake Barnes received 
in Italy. Yet, unlike Barnes’ wound, Rojack’s wound does not leave him physically 
impotent, although Rojack suggests that he experiences temporary psychological and 
existential impotence. Rojack writes: “where any other young athlete or hero might have 
had a vast and continuing recreation with sex, I was lost in a private kaleidoscope of 
death” (AAD 7). Significantly, Rojack’s pelvis is split, which is not only suggestive of 
Rojack’s split selves—what he distinguishes as “the distance between” his “public” self 
and his “lost in a private kaleidoscope of death” self—but it is a wound that will heal 
(AAD 7). Like Hemingway, the death-haunted Rojack not only studies his own near-death 
experience and repeatedly faces-up to the possibility of his own death, he also publishes a 
study of death. This study—“The Psychology of the Hangman”—“a psychological study 
of the styles of execution,” like Hemingway’s study of death in Death in the Afternoon, is 
a study of “violent death,” the forum of the executioner, the only place Rojack can study 
death in America (DIA 2). Significantly, Rojack’s claim that his study of death would 
“turn Freud on his head,” echoes what Susan Beegel identifies as Hemingway’s rejection 
of Freudian interpretations of the Spanish bullfight in Death in the Afternoon in favor of 
an existential interpretation of the experience of death and of the Spanish bullfight (AAD 
17; Beegel Hemingway’s Craft of Omission 61).93   
                                                 
92 See Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises and A Farewell to Arms. 
93 Susan Beegel writes of Hemingway’s dislike for Waldo Frank’s “infatuation with the works of Sigmund 
Freud, manifested in passages like this description of a bullfight”: 
And now another change in the beauty of their locked encounter. The man 
becomes the woman. This dance of human will and brutish power is the dance of death 
no longer. It is the dance of life. It is a searching symbol of the sexual act. The bull is 
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In the opening pages of An American Dream, Mailer presents Rojack’s 
Fitzgeraldian awareness of the myth of The American Dream through Rojack’s 
realization that he is a “failure,” and he presents Rojack’s view toward death, the study of 
violent death, and his own death, as Hemingwayesque. Yet the focus of the first few 
pages of Rojack’s narrative is under the guise of explaining his “frightened romance with 
the phases of the moon,” which Rojack tells us was full the night he met Deborah and full 
the night he killed four German soldiers. The symbolic value of the moon for Rojack is 
both Fitzgeraldian and Hemingwayesque; it is Rojack’s own personal correlative and 
catalyst for his heightened awareness and understanding of his existential situation in life. 
Like Doctor Eckleburg, who looms large over a vast wasteland and reminds Nick of the 
need to break all illusions and see more clearly, the full moon not only watches over what 
Rojack envisions to be an American wasteland, but the moon’s light, like Doctor 
Eckleburg’s corrective spectacles, illuminates Rojack’s vision. Yet the full moon does 
not merely clarify Rojack’s vision of self and world; it is the catalyst for Rojack’s 
understanding of the need to transcend his existential situation in life as towards death. 
For Rojack, the full moon also functions much as the Spanish bullfight does for 
Hemingway: it reminds him he must see “clearly” and, like the full moon, “as a whole”; 
it reminds him of the need to face-up to his own death, since the full moon, which is 
“towards-the-end” of being full, reminds Rojack of his own existential situation in life 
(DIA 278; Heidegger 299). In fact, he recognizes the full moon as a kindred being, one 
                                                                                                                                                 
male; the exquisite torero, stirring and unstirred, with hidden ecstacy controlling the 
plunges of the bull, is female. (qtd. in Beegel, Hemingway’s Craft of Omission 61). 
See also Waldo Frank’s Virgin Spain, p. 235. 
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that is groundless, alone in this world, and heading “towards-the-end” of “Being-a-
whole” (Heidegger 299, 280).94 What Rojack understands is that he needs to see his 
“self” “clearly and as a whole,” and he must create structure and meaning for his life “as 
a whole,” both of which are embodied in Hemingway’s vision of the Spanish bullfight 
(DIA 278).95 Thus, the full moon functions much as Hemingway suggests the bullfight 
does for him—it reminds him of the need to face his own death and to see his life and the 
life of the world “clearly,” truly,  and as “a whole” (DIA 278). Further, Rojack’s 
description of his World War II experience suggests that he knows, like the matador, that 
transcendence comes with facing one’s own death with pundonor, and like Hemingway’s 
matador, Rojack experiences this transcendence when Deborah charges him “like a bull” 
(AAD 30).  
The most direct, and I think most obvious, reference to Hemingway in An 
American Dream is the scene in which Deborah’s admits to Rojack of a bullfighter lover 
in her past. Deborah’s “admission,” that she was once in love with a bullfighter—“No… 
someone far better than a bullfighter, far greater”—comes at the end of Deborah’s almost 
methodical attempt to psychologically emasculate Rojack (28). She calls him a “bloody 
whimperer,” questions his courage and status as a war hero, “confesses” to sexual acts 
with other lovers, and mentions her affair with a great man—a bullfighter or greater (23, 
                                                 
94 See Heidegger’s discussion of “Being-towards-the-end,” “Being-towards-death,” and “Being-a-whole” in 
Being and Time, Division Two, Section I (p. 279-304). 
95 Although the full moon is Rojack’s personal correlative for facing death and reminds him of his need to 
transcend his thrownness in this world, Mailer points to the full moon as a complex cultural configuration, 
as well. For example, it evokes superstitions, full moon lore, magic, witchcraft, the feminine, and suggests 
it has healing qualities ,as well as the power to inspire madness, just to name a few of the cultural 
conceptions of the full moon in Mailer’s time. Further, Rojack’s “romance” with the moon is historically 
pertinent in the wake of Kennedy’s “Man on the Moon” Address in 1961. Rojack, like America and the 
recently assassinated John F. Kennedy, aspires to understand the moon (AAD 11).  
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28-30). Those familiar with Hemingway’s canon of works will recall Brett Ashley’s 
affair with bullfighter Pedro Romero and Jake Barnes’ physical emasculation. Rojack, 
unlike Barnes, suggests he can not “take it” and slaps Deborah in the face. Faced with 
existential death, he lashes out at Deborah. Her response: she charges him “like a bull” 
(AAD 30). Yet Deborah’s psychological emasculation of Rojack escalates to a physical 
threat when Deborah tries, as Rojack puts it, to “mangle” his “root” (AAD 30). Faced 
with existential and literal emasculation, threatened with the end of creative possibilities 
for the self, Rojack, like the matador, delivers “a cold chop” to “the back of the neck,” 
which drops Deborah “to a knee” (30). Rojack then hooks his arm around her neck; yet 
Deborah, Rojack tells us, “had almost the strength to force herself up to her feet and lift 
me in the air” (30). At this moment Rojack kills Deborah like a bull: he cracks her neck 
like the bull’s spinal column is severed in a clean kill. This clean kill brings Rojack, like 
the matador, to transcend his thrownness in this world, which Rojack suggests through 
his vision of “heaven,” the feeling of “new grace,” and the “honorable fatigue” he 
describes (31-32). Rojack’s struggle with Deborah is the life and death struggle of the 
matador and the bull. He knows the matador’s transcendence and the courage it takes to 
face the bull, but Rojack also comes to understand—as Hemingway’s Catherine Barkley, 
Frederic Henry, and Fitzgerald’s Nick Carraway understand, that courage is also required 
in love; that love is a commitment, a vow; a commitment Rojack hopes and envisions he 
can make to Cherry.  
What Rojack envisions on the balcony at Kelley’s is that he must make a 
commitment to Cherry; he must risk everything—i.e., his life—for Cherry. The full moon 
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takes on Fitzgeraldian and Kierkegaardian significance when Kelly invokes Kierkegaard 
and then Rojack attempts to walk the parapet for love. Like Gatsby, who Nick suggests 
continually reaffirms his vow and commitment to Daisy, Rojack knows he, too, must 
have the courage to risk everything to win Cherry. He must walk the parapet, he must 
choose while “poised over the abyss of meaninglessness,” and at this moment create and 
overarching meaning—as a “good husband” and a “good father”—and structure—a 
marriage, a family—for his life. Like Gatsby, Rojack must risk everything for love. But 
Rojack also understands that he must walk the parapet twice, he must make 
Kierkegaard’s double movement of faith, once to give up Cherry and once to win Cherry 
back. But Rojack, like Gatsby, is thwarted: Gatsby by Tom and Wilson and Rojack by 
Kelly, who tries to push Rojack off the parapet with Shago’s umbrella. Because Rojack 
fails at the moment of choice, because he is thwarted in his attempt to walk the parapet 
twice, he loses Cherry, a loss Mailer punctuates with Cherry’s violent death. Left without 
a viable base for meaning or structure in his life, Rojack leaves America, what he 
envisions to be both the vast wasteland of the desert and the glittering and alluring, but 
corrupt American city of Las Vegas. Rojack envisions that the only environments in 
America that exist now that the frontier is closed—the barren wasteland and the corrupt 
cities—are not environments that nurture, nor contribute to, the authentic growth and 
development of the individual. Rojack’s rejection of American culture is due, in part, to 
Rojack’s desire to be free and brave, something he can not do in a place that is no longer 
“the land of the free and the home of the brave.” Thus, An American Dream ends with 
Rojack heading for an environment capable of nurturing the growth and expression of the 
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creative spirit, a place where he can embrace his freedom and cultivate his courage: he 
heads for the “green breast” of Guatemala and the Yucatan (Gatsby 189). Like 
Hemingway, who favors Spain and Spanish culture, its national art of the Spanish 
bullfight, and its virgin lands to the overcrowded, modernized face of America and 
American culture, Rojack heads for Guatemala—another home of the bullfight—and 
toward “virgin land”—the unspoiled jungles of the Yucatan.  
 
The “Art of Living” Existentially: Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer’s  
Call for an Authentic American Experience 
 
Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer’s emphasis on subjective epistemology are 
similarly embodied in their perspective that we need to break all illusions and come to 
see self and world more clearly and as a whole. They call for a heightened awareness of 
self and world through which individuals can begin to create their own meaning and 
structure, their own “art of living” in their times. They show us the importance of living 
artistically, of creating life as art, of becoming an artist, a sentiment punctuated by their 
narrators’ process of creating art and “Becoming” artists.96 We must, as Fitzgerald, 
Hemingway, and Mailer suggest, strive not to conform, but to create. For these authors, 
the authentic growth and development of the individual, the need to give direction to the 
                                                 
96 Significantly, both Nick and Rojack’s narratives serve to illustrate the process through which one 
becomes an artist. Although their paths highly differ, what is consistent is that their experiences, their 
awareness and understanding of self and world, inspire both Nick and Rojack to create literary art in the 
form of their narratives. Hemingway, on the other hand, is a literary artist, but one who strives to become a 
superior artist. Hemingway strives not just to create art, but to create enduring art, a striving for immortality 
in a world without an afterlife.  
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vitality of the human spirit, and the need for the expression of the creative spirit, should 
be the common goal of humankind. In fact, the most important thing they ask readers to 
do is to take responsibility for what their own lives are amounting to; they urge readers to 
take responsibility for themselves as artists and to see their lives as works of art. But as 
artist, voices of their own generations, Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer do not only 
take responsibility for their own lives as artist, they also feel a sense of responsibility to 
their readers and their nation.  
Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer present their readers with an “art of living” 
for their times, for their readers’ own, undeniably subjective lives. They show us that we 
must, as Nietzsche advises, break from “the herd” and create our own morality and our 
own scheme for living. We must, as Kierkegaard advises, stand for from “the crowd”; we 
must come to understand ourselves, commit to an overarching purpose for our lives, and 
live life “This very day!” (“At a Graveside” 83). We must, as Heidegger advises, free 
ourselves from the “they,” we must strive for a more authentic existence for ourselves, 
for others, for the formation of an authentic community, and correlatively, for an 
authentic American experience. We must, as Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer espouse 
and illustrate, make a commitment to and for our lives and thus give direction to the 
vitality of our creative spirits. We must take responsibility for our own lives and 
continually strive to see self and world more clearly, truly, authentically and as a whole.   
Importantly, Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer’s messages position them as 
more than mere chroniclers of America and American experience: they serve as prophets, 
healers, and guides for their generations, for Americans then and now. In Fitzgerald’s 
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Gatsby, Fitzgerald guides us through the Jazz Age, through modern New York and 
through the dilemmas of modern vision. In Death in the Afternoon, Hemingway guides us 
through his study of death, through Spain and Spanish culture, and attempts to show his 
readers how to experience the spiritual and transcendental value of the Spanish bullfight 
for themselves. In An American Dream, Mailer guides us through the philosophical and 
psychological experience of “Being” American, just as Fitzgerald and Hemingway 
accomplished in their time. Mailer guides readers through the “psychological frontier”—
the only frontier in America, Mailer claims, that has not been used up, that has yet to be 
explored (qtd. in Adams 71). Yet Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer not only explore 
and guide us through the existential center of their times; they do so by merging 
philosophy and art and capture the depth and dimensions of the dilemmas of human 
existence for their times. In fact, the depth in which Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer 
capture the texture and feel of their respective historic human moments is not only what 
gives their art its enduring quality, but is the genius of their art. Their art not only serves 
to provide existentialist critiques of their American moments, but also, and more 
importantly, serve as responses to and offer remedies for the existential predicament of 
“Being” American in their time. By doing so, Fitzgerald, Hemingway, and Mailer 
become more than chroniclers who capture the psychological and philosophic 
experiences of “Being” American in their times; they become the prophets of their 
generations, healers for “those who are without faith” (Fadiman 64). 
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